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ABSTRACT
Web services provide a platform neutral and programming language independent
technology that supports interoperable machine-to-machine interaction over a
network. Clients and other systems interact with Web services using a
standardised XML messaging system, such as the Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP), typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialisation in
conjunction with other related Web standards. Nevertheless, the idea of
applications from different parties communicating together raises a security threat.
The challenge of Web services security is to understand and consider the risks of
securing a Web-based service depending on the existing security techniques and
simultaneously follow evolving standards in order to fill the gap in Web services
security. However, the performance of the security mechanisms is fraught with
concerns due to additional security contents in SOAP messages, the higher
number of message exchanges to establish trust, as well as the extra CPU time to
process these additions. As the interaction between service providers and
requesters occurs via XML-based SOAP messages, securing Web services tends
to make these messages longer than they would be otherwise and consequently
requires interpretation by XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the
performance of Web services. The work described in this thesis can be broadly
divided into three parts, the first of which is studying and comparing the
performance of various security profiles applied on a Web service tested with
different initial message sizes.
The second part proposes a multi-criteria decision making framework to aid Web
services developers and architects in selecting the best suited security profile that
satisfies the different requirements of a given application during the development
process in a systematic, manageable, and effective way. The proposed framework,
based on the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach, incorporates not only
the security requirements, but also the performance considerations as well as the
configuration constraints of these security profiles. The framework is then
validated and evaluated using a scenario-driven approach to demonstrate
situations where the decision making framework is used to make informed
i

decisions to rank various security profiles in order to select the most suitable one
for each scenario.
Finally, the last part of this thesis develops a novel steganography method to be
used for SOAP messages within Web services environments. This method is
based on changing the order of XML elements according to a secret message. This
method has a high imperceptibility; it leaves almost no trail because it uses the
communication protocol as a cover medium, and keeps the structure and size of
the SOAP message intact. The method is empirically validated using a feasible
scenario so as to indicate its utility and value.
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Chapter

1: Introduction

Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
The Internet has changed the business world in a revolutionary way to a virtual
world where the customer is served around the clock and around the world. In
order to increase the productivity, decrease the cost and satisfy the customer, most
of the organisations have shifted their business policies from a traditional way into
applying Internet-based technologies (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004). In this
context, distributed computing has been the magical key enabling the business
over the Internet (Nagappan, Skoczylas & Sriganesh, 2003).
In early stages, two basic standards, HyperText Markup Language (HTML) and
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), were developed in order to enable the
sharing of documents across the distributed network which led to the great success
of the Web. Later, the Web became the preferable platform for many applications
especially e-commerce, which illustrated the need of transferring the Web from
the human-centric paradigm to the application-centric paradigm (Cerami, 2002;
Hondo, Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002; Nandigam, Gudivada & Kalavala, 2005).
Many technologies have been developed to enable the movement from the human
end-user interaction to the application-application interaction. Each of them has
succeeded in its mission to a certain degree, but most of these systems consisted
of ad hoc solutions (Cerami, 2002). According to Nandigam, Gudivada &
Kalavala (2005), many solutions, such as Remote Procedure Call (RPC),
Common Object Request Broker Architecture (CORBA), Component Object
Model/ Distributed Component Object Model (COM/DCOM), Java Remote
Method Invocation (RMI) and Message based application integration, had the idea
of component-based software. However, they were determined by difficulties that
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appeared because of the non-transparency and dependency on programming
languages, operating systems, data representations and network protocols.
The idea of Web services came about to overcome the previously mentioned
problems, while offering the promise of automated Web with some
standardisation in order to lower the barrier of application integration (Cerami,
2002).
A Web service is an application that is available on the Internet, or intranet, uses a
standardised eXtensible Markup Language (XML) messaging system, and
independent of any programming language or operating system (Cerami, 2002;
Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). This technology is based on the
standard Internet protocols, such as HTTP, File Transfer Protocol (FTP), and
Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), as well as XML-based protocols, such as
the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP), Web Services Description Language
(WSDL), Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) and Web
Services Security (WS-Security) (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004; Hondo,
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002). Web services provide a standardised way for
applications to expose their functionality and communicate with other applications
over a network, regardless of its implementation, programming language or
platform (Singh et al., 2004).
The idea of applications from different parties communicating together raises a
security threat, however. The security of exchanged messages is thus an important
issue to be taken into consideration in Web services. The recipient of the message
should be able to confirm its integrity and assure that it has not been modified.
Additionally, the message should be delivered to the recipient confidentially
where only the authorised users could read it, know the identity of the sender and
determine the operation requested in the message (Mi et al., 2005). The challenge
of Web services security is to understand and consider the risks of securing a
Web-based service depending on the existing security techniques and
simultaneously follow evolving standards in order to bridge the gap in Web
services security. Any security model should illustrate the data flow through an
Bachar Alrouh
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application and network topology without exposing it to undue risk (Hondo,
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002).

1.2 Research Motivations
As the interaction between service providers and requesters occurs via XMLbased SOAP messages, securing Web services tends to make these messages
longer than they would be otherwise and consequently require interpretation by
XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the performance of Web services
(Menasce, 2002). The cost, in terms of performance, of securing Web services can
be significant. The trade-off between performance and security depends primarily
on the security approach that is used to secure the Web service (Novakouski et al.,
2010). There are occasions when a simple transport-level security protocol, such
as the Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) standard, is sufficient to meet the security
requirements. However, for many types of applications, SSL alone is insufficient
and more rigorous message-based mechanisms should be implemented (Sosnoski,
2009).
Moreover, as different standards and techniques for securing Web services have
been developed by several organisations and various members of industry, some
of these standards and techniques complement and extend each other, while others
conflict or compete in the mix. Thus, selecting an appropriate security profile
represents a complex dilemma for Web services architects and developers. This is
due to the following three reasons: (1) There is no one supreme Web service
security profile for all cases; i.e. different Web services security profiles achieve
different requirements; (2) Applying different security profiles normally results in
different quality measurements of a certain Web service; and (3) Different
organisations usually have different requirements and even the same organisation
may establish different requirements across different software applications.
Furthermore, choosing the best-suited Web service profile to be deployed for a
certain application in a particular organisation is a complex undertaking decision-
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making task. This decision is usually uninformed as in many cases the decision is
based on the sole experience of the developer. In some other cases, developers
tend to use a profile that is (a) configurable based on the organisation’s
infrastructure; (b) developers are familiar with; or (c) supported by existing
providers, without taking into consideration other security profiles. This is in fact
represents the problem space.
Accordingly, the selection of a candidate profile, in an ideal world, should depend
on evaluating the available security profiles against all the requirements of the
given Web services application. Ideally, Web services developers specify a set of
requirements according to the service provider’s security preferences and
technological constraints, taking into consideration the level of performance
expected by the service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several
dimensions according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a
multi-dimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight
according to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is
also weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion.
Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When
there are a small number of selection criteria, direct judgments are possible; yet
when the number of requirements is large, the direct judgement may favour the
key elements only (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision
making model, it is important to have quantifiable values that are rational and
consistent.

Bachar Alrouh

4

Chapter

1: Introduction

1.3 Research Aim and Objectives
The previous section (1.2) has highlighted that there is a considerable number of
different security profiles and mechanisms that can be employed for Web
services. Selecting a security profile for a given Web service often requires
understanding the trade-offs between security and performance. Accordingly, the
main aim of this research is thus:
To develop a prototypical framework that aids Web services
architects to select the best suited security approach that
satisfies the security and performance requirements of a given
Web services application.
In fulfilling this aim, the following objectives are considered important to be
achieved:
Objective 1: Design a performance testing model to understand the cost of
applying security profiles on the performance of Web services.
Objective 2: Develop a decision making framework based on the results gathered
from the testing model, as well as the security requirements and
system limitations.
Objective 3: Evaluate the developed framework through the use of real scenarios
so as to indicate theframework’s utility and value.
Objective 4: Explore and evaluate the feasibility of using steganography as an
alternative approach to secure Web services.
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1.4 Research Approach
The paradigm followed in this research is the Design-Science Research (DSR).
This research aims, by utilising DSR, at producing an artefact in the form of a
framework to help architects and developers to choose the best-suited security
approaches for Web services applications. The aim of this research is highly
consistent with the general aim of DSR.
In the context of this research, designing and developing a framework for
selecting the most fitting security profile for a certain Web services application is
the tackled wicked problem. In the context of design-science research, the term
“wicked problems” can be described as unstructured decision-making activities
and settings. This is because these types of decisions are normally “poorly
formulated, confusing, and permeated with conflicting values of many decision
makers or other stakeholders” (Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008).
Design artefacts are classified by March & Smith (1995), and anchored by Hevner
et al. (2004), into constructs of vocabulary and symbols, models representing
reality with appropriate levels of abstraction, methods in the form of algorithms
and practices, and instantiations which are implemented systems and/or their
prototypes developed as proof-of-concepts (Al-Debei & Fitzgerald, 2010). The
developed framework in this thesis represents a model artefact which includes
constructs. While its application and use in the course of the Analytical Hierarchy
Process and the steganographical embedding/extracting algorithms represents the
method artefacts. Developing the AHP and Steganography applications as
software as well as the usage of real scenarios to validate them denote the
instantiations.
The scheme to construct design artefacts is still very broad. Two main and general
processes are identified by March & Smith (1995) as build and evaluate. Whilst
building design artefacts demonstrate feasibility, they are evaluated against
criteria of value to a community of intended users to ensure utility, quality, and
efficacy (Hevner et al., 2004). Importantly, Design Science Research stresses the
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importance of iterations in producing the design artefacts and assumes that reality
and knowledge emerge throughout the iterations effort (Markus, Majchrzak &
Gasser, 2002; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009).

1.5 Thesis Structure
The rest of this thesis is structured as follows:
Chapter 2 provides a literature review on Web services security and its related
specifications. The trade-off between security and performance is highlighted and
several approaches to analyse the performance of Web services security and
selecting the best security approach are explored. The discussion identifies the
research gaps that this thesis is addressing.
Chapter 3 details the research methodology employed in this thesis. A theoretical
grounding of Design Science Research (DSR) is provided in this chapter.
Thereafter, The DSR paradigm is justified as a suitable approach for this research.
The research conducted in this thesis is then explained in line with the DSR
research cycle.
Chapter 4 describes a set of performance tests conducted to evaluate the
performance of various security profiles applied on a Web service, and tested with
different initial message sizes. The results are used to compare the performance of
SSL-based profiles against the message-level security ones. We also analyse the
penalty of using SAML-based, STS-based, symmetric vs. asymmetric and
reliability profiles on the performance of Web services.
Chapter 5 introduces a novel Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) decisionmaking framework for Web service security profiles. This framework represents
the solution space which aims to make the decision in this context more informed,
systematic, manageable, and effective by providing developers with an approach
through which they can prioritise the security requirements, rank the available
alternatives accordingly, and then select the profile that best fulfils their defined

Bachar Alrouh

7

Chapter

1: Introduction

requirements. Three real-life scenarios are then tested using this framework and
the results are compared to those presented in documentations of best practices to
verify its efficiency.
Chapter 6 discusses a number of steganographic studies in text, XML as well as
SOAP messages, and then proposes a novel steganography method to be used for
SOAP messages within Web services environments. The method is based on
rearranging the order of specific XML elements according to a secret message.
This method is then empirically validated using a feasible example so as to
illustrate its utility and value.
Chapter 7 summarises the research findings and outlines the research
contributions to the knowledge. Finally, the limitations of this research are
discussed and directions for future research are explored.
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Chapter 2: Web Services Security
2.1 Overview
This chapter provides an overview of the Web services technology and its security
standards and specifications. It also reviews previous research in the fields of
performance analysis and selecting the most suitable approach to secure Web
services. Accordingly, the chapter is organised as follows: the Web services
technology is presented in section 2.2. The Service Oriented Architecture (SOA)
is described in section 2.3. Section 2.4 explores the different Web service
standards. The benefits of Web services and the challenges that face their
development are mentioned in sections 2.5 and 2.6, respectively. Section 2.7
defines the security requirements of Web services and Section 2.8 describes the
basic cryptographic concepts. Various XML and Web services security standards
are explored in section 2.9, while the Web Services Interoperability Technology
(WSIT) is introduced in section 2.10. Related studies in the subjects of
performance analysis and decision making are reviewed in sections 2.11 and 2.12.
Finally, section 2.13 summarises the chapter and highlights the research gap.

2.2 Web Services
It is generally accepted that Web services are applications that are available on the
Internet or the intranet, use a standardised XML messaging system, and are
independent of any programming language or operating system (Cerami, 2002;
Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). This technology is based on the
standard Internet protocols (e.g., HTTP, FTP, and SMTP) as well as XML-based
protocols (such as SOAP, WSDL, UDDI and WSS) (Yang, 2002; Rao et al., 2004;
Hondo, Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002). The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)
defines a Web service as “a software system designed to support interoperable
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machine-to-machine interaction over a network. It has an interface described in a
machine-processable format (specifically WSDL). Other systems interact with the
Web service in a manner prescribed by its description using SOAP messages,
typically conveyed using HTTP with an XML serialisation in conjunction with
other Web-related standards.”(Booth et al., 2004).
Web services’ applications can be implemented with different programming
models. These models fall into three main categories (Goncalves, 2010), which
shall now be presented:

2.2.1 XML-RPC Web Services
XML-RPC is a remote procedure call protocol. This protocol uses XML for
marking up the Web services requests and responses (Lerner, 2001; Zimmerman,
2007). In an XML-RPC model, the service requester passes a request which
contains the method name and parameters wrapped in XML that defines their data
types. The response comes back with similar data (Zimmerman, 2007). RPCbased Web services are easy to implement when using scripting languages, which
have very loose data types (Muller, 2010). However, the main criticism of XMLRPC is not being loosely-coupled, because it is usually implemented by mapping
services directly to language-specific functions or method calls (Muller, 2010).
Moreover, this mechanism does not handle advanced data structures (Lerner,
2001). Therefore, many vendors felt this approach to be a cul-de-sac and stopped
their support for RPC-style Web services.

2.2.2 REST-based Web Services
REST (REpresentational State Transfer) Web services are collections of Web
resources, which are identified by their Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs).
Every document and process is modelled as a Web resource with a unique URI
(Goncalves, 2010). These Web resources are manipulated by actions that can be
specified in an HTTP header. Messages can be exchanged in any format, such as

Bachar Alrouh

10

Chapter

2: Web Services Security

XML, HTML, without the need for the WSDL or SOAP protocols. A Web
browser can serve as a client in many cases. A Web service interacts with
resources, rather than working with messages and operations. HTTP is the main
protocol in REST, where only four methods are available: GET, PUT, POST, and
DELETE (Goncalves, 2010; Netbeans, 2011). REST can typically be used for
simpler applications, where HTTP is the appropriate protocol, and when the
HTTP infrastructure alone can satisfy the security requirements of these
applications (Netbeans, 2011).

2.2.3 SOAP-Based Web Services
The business logic of SOAP-based Web service is exposed on the net via a WSDL
document. Messages are exchanged between the Web service and its clients using
SOAP messages. SOAP-based Web services are suitable for complex
applications, where complicated operations are required, or for applications
requiring advanced security (Goncalves, 2010).
For the purpose of this thesis, and because the main focus is the security of Web
services, all the discussion will be based on SOAP-based Web services.

2.3 Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA)
The word services in Web services refers to the Service-Oriented Architecture
(SOA) (O’Neill et al., 2003). SOA is a recent development in distributed
computing, in which an application can call a functionality from another
application over a network (O’Neilletal.,2003). This architectural style supports
software reusability by creating reusable services in comparison with the
traditional Object-Oriented Architecture (OOA), which supports reusability by
reusing classes or objects (Booch, 1986). The major difficulty with OOA is that
objects are often too fine-grained for efficient reusability. Therefore, a
Component-Oriented Architecture (COA) has emerged to use software
components as reusable entities, which consist of a set of related classes,
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resources and configuration information (Singh et al., 2004). Although COA is a
powerful way to design software systems, it does not address the additional issues
emerging from current-day enterprise environments, which have become rather
complicated because of using different software and hardware platforms, Internetbased distributed communication and enterprise application integration (Brown,
Johnston & Kelly, 2002; Singh et al., 2004). The Service-Oriented Architecture
addresses these issues by using services as reusable entities (He, 2003).
According to Cerami (2002), He (2003) and Carminati, Ferrari & Hung (2005),
there are three major roles in the Service-Oriented Architecture:


A service provider that implements the service and makes it available for a
particular business purpose.



A service requester that utilises an existing Web service to meet business
requirements.



A service registry which is a centralised place where developers can
provide new Web services or use the existing ones.

An important aim of Service-Oriented Architecture is to achieve loose
coupling among interacting software agents (He, 2003). To enable this, the
following mechanisms should be available (Singh et al., 2004):


A mechanism for clients to access services and registries.



A mechanism for services to be registered with registries and for
clients to search these registries for their required services. The Web
services’ architecture enables services that are located over the
network with transparent locations to be dynamically discovered by
clients.



A mechanism for well-defined Webservices’interfaces to be exposed
in a way that enables clients to access those interfaces.
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In a Web service model, functionality is published on a network where two
important capabilities are provided: the first is the ability to find the functionality
(discovery), and the second is the ability to connect to the functionality (binding).
These capabilities are represented by three roles: Web services provider, Web
services requester and Web services broker (O’Neill et al., 2003; Carminati,
Ferrari & Hung, 2005). The publish-find-bind model is illustrated in Figure 2-1.

Figure 2-1: The Publish-Find-Bind Model (O’Neilletal.,2003)

2.4

Web Service Standards

Singh et al. (2004) have stated that for any technology to be successful, the
technology standards must be widely accepted. To enable such a wide acceptance,
Web services standards and systems that implement those standards should have
the following criteria:


“A Web service should be able to service requests from any client
regardless of the platform on which the client is implemented”.



“A client should be able to find and use any Web service regardless of the
service’simplementationdetailsortheplatformonwhichitruns”.

Standards enable Web services to achieve wide acceptance and interoperability by
establishing a base of commonality.
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The main Web services standards cover the following areas:


Common markup language for communication.



Common message format for exchanging information.



Common service specification formats.



Common means for service lookup.

Figure 2-2 illustrates a stack of the main standards on which Web services are
generally based on:

Figure 2-2: The Web Services Technology Stack (Albreshne, Fuhrer &
Pasquier, 2009)

2.4.1 Extensible Markup Language (XML)
The eXtensible Markup Language (XML) is a simple and flexible text based
markup language. This standard is accepted throughout the computer industry as it
facilitates the communication between service providers and requesters using a
common language. XML is also independent of any platform or technology.
Messages in XML can be exchanged over the Internet using standard Internet
protocols such as HTTP (Guruge, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a).
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Tags enclosed in angled brackets are used to mark XML data; the tags contain the
meaning of the data they mark. The XML tag usage is different from HTML,
which is oriented to displaying data. Thus, unlike HTML, display is not intrinsic
in XML (Cerami, 2002).
XML is a product of the W3C. Therefore, changes to it will be supported by all
leading parties. This means that when XML evolves, Web services can also
evolve without having concerns about compatibility (Singh et al., 2004).

2.4.2 Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
As XML fills the need for a common language, the Simple Object Access
Protocol (SOAP) solves the need for a common messaging format (Mitra &
Lafon, 2007). SOAP enables different objects to communicate by exchanging
messages. SOAP is an XML-based protocol that uses data encoding format and
HTTP/SMTP to transfer messages. SOAP does not require any specific
technology at its endpoints because of its independency of programming
languages and platforms. Moreover, SOAP is also supported by leading industrial
parties (Singh et al., 2004).

Figure 2-3: SOAP Message Structure (Singh et al., 2004)
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SOAP defines an envelope, which contains a SOAP body, where the message is
included, and an optional header. The SOAP envelope, body plus header, is an
XML document (Mitra & Lafon, 2007). Figure 2-3 illustrates a SOAP envelope:

2.4.3 Web Services Description Language (WSDL)
The role of the Web Services Description Language (WSDL) is to define a
standard way for specifying the details of a Web service (Christensen et al., 2001).
Details of Web service interfaces, bindings and other deployment details are
specified using a general-purpose XML schema. That enables clients without prior
knowledge of the service to use that Web service (Adams & Boeyen, 2002; Singh
et al., 2004).

Figure 2-4: WSDL Service Description (Singh et al., 2004)
WSDL grammar describes Web services as a collection of communication
endpoints, as shown in Figure 2-4. The exchanged data are specified as part of
messages. Every action allowed at an endpoint is an operation. In addition, port
types are grouped together collections of operations that are possible on an
endpoint. The port types, operations as well as messages are all abstract
definitions, which do not hold deployment-dependent details in order to enable
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their reuse. A binding is specified by a protocol and data format specifications for
a particular port type. A port is defined when a network address is associated with
a reusable binding. A collection of ports, in turn, defines a service. Furthermore,
WSDL specifies a common binding mechanism to bring together all protocols and
data formats with an abstract message, operation, or endpoint (Singh et al., 2004).

2.4.4 Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration
(UDDI)
The Universal Description, Discovery, and Integration (UDDI) specification
defines a standard way for registering, deregistering, and looking up Web services
(Clement et al., 2004). UDDI is a standards-based specification for Web service
registration, description, and discovery.

Figure 2-5: Role of Registry in a Web Service (Singh et al., 2004)
The main purpose of UDDI registry is to enable service providers to register their
services witha“broker”and requesters to find services advertised by this broker.
The role that UDDI plays between the service requester and the service provider
ends when a requester finds the service; a service provider registers its services
with the broker (i.e. UDDI registry). A service requester then searches for the
required service in the UDDI registry. When the required service is found, the
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service requester binds directly with the service provider to use that service (Singh
et al., 2004), as illustrated in Figure 2-5.
Using the UDDI specification, an XML schema is defined for applications
wanting to use the registry. A service provider registering its Web service with a
UDDI registry must provide service, business, binding and technical information
about the service (Adams & Boeyen, 2002; Singh et al., 2004). This information
is stored in a common format that contains three parts:
1. White pages that describe general business information such as name,
description, phone numbers, etc.
2. Yellow pages that describe the business using terms of standard
classifications (taxonomies), which follow standard industrial
categorisations in order to enable locating services by industry, category,
or geographical location information.
3. Green pages that list the service, binding, and service-specific technical
information.
Web services standards have been widely accepted throughout enterprises and the
popularity of Web services is increasing because of the benefits they provide.

2.5 Benefits of Web Services
According to Singh et al. (2004) and Albreshne, Fuhrer & Pasquier (2009), these
are the benefits enterprises gain from adopting Web services:

2.5.1 Interoperability
The key feature of the Web services model is that it allows various distributed
services to be implemented using different programming languages and executed
on a variety of software platforms and architectures. This is a vital benefit in large
enterprises, where different solutions and systems that often require different
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platforms are developed over the time; Web services thus enable interoperability
in these heterogeneous environments and various systems can use the services to
easily interoperate with each other.

2.5.2 Expanding Business Services Through the Web
In the business world, Web services can be used to build upon the benefits of the
World Wide Web for its operations. For example, product catalogues can be made
available to retailers through a Web service to achieve better supply chain
management.

2.5.3 Enabling Integration With Existing Systems
Most enterprises have a huge amount of data stored in existing enterprise
information systems and databases, and the cost of replacing these systems may
not be a reasonable option. Web services provide developers with standard ways
to access middle-tier and back-end services without forcing developers to learn
new programming models or styles.

2.5.4 Freedom of Choice
Web service standards have expanded the marketplace for tools, products, and
technologies. This gives organisations an extensive diversity of choices, and they
can select configurations that best cover their application requirements.
Developers can improve their productivity because they can choose from a ready
market of pre-built application components rather than having to develop their
own solutions. Moreover, these tools enable developers to move quickly and
easily from one configuration to another as needed. Web services also guarantee
the standardisation of tools, so that developers can choose to adopt tools from
either server vendors or a third party, depending on the requirements.
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2.5.5 Supporting More Client Types
Web services enable more client types to use applications and services. They aim
at supporting interoperability, and therefore, extending the reach of existing
applications or services to various client types. This does not depend on the
platform on which the client is based. For example, a client can be based on a Java
or Microsoft platform or even a wireless platform.

2.5.6 Increasing Programming Productivity
Productivity in an information-driven economy demands the ability of developing
and deploying applications in a reasonable time frame. It means that applications
should go rapidly from the prototyping stage to the production phase and
simultaneously continue to evolve even after they are placed into production.
Productivity is improved when application development teams have standard
ways to access the services required by multi-tier applications and standard means
to support a different types of clients, and that what Web services provide by
creating a common programming standard. Before the appearance of Web
services, distributed computing environments have had many different
technologies, which are not always compatible. Developers have tried to tie
several different systems together, such as custom and standard database
management systems and transaction processors, with traditional Web
technologies, but have had to deal with a large number of different programming
models. Since Web services introduce a common standard across the Web,
vendors, in order to stay in the competition, are more likely to develop better tools
and technologies to attract developer, and so the whole industry benefits.
Thanks to its advantages, Web services technology has rapidly extended through
enterprises. However, there are many challenges that face Web services
technology. To benefit from this new technology, these challenges should be well
addressed.
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2.6 Challenges of Web Services Development
The Web services specifications are evolving quickly and sometimes in
unexpected directions. These specifications vary in their degrees of maturity and
therefore these technologies may change as they are extended to provide improved
Web services support (Singh et al., 2004). Moreover, they are supported and
maintained by various standards organisations, and as a result they may
complement, overlap or compete with each other (Lakshminarayanan, 2010); thus,
it is important to take these factors into consideration when developing Web
services.

2.6.1 Security
Unsurprisingly, security is as important for Web services as it is for other
enterprise applications. As a matter of fact, security becomes an even more
important aspect as applications on the Web expose their enterprise’s processes
and business data to distributed, and not necessarily trusted, clients (Hondo,
Nagaratnam & Nadalin, 2002; Holgersson & Soderstrom, 2005; Mahmoud, 2005).

2.6.2 Advancing Technologies
Although the basic Web services' standards and protocols (including WSDL and
SOAP) have matured during the last decade, there is a growing number of
supporting protocols , referred to as WS-* protocols , that have yet to reach the
level or wide adoption SOAP and WSDL have achieved (Kontogiannis, 2008).
In addition, Interoperability is a persistent challenge, which Web services have
already succeeded to realise, but achieving interoperability requires developing
further standards to guarantee an interoperability degree that matches the vision of
Web services (Lakshminarayanan, 2010).
Another challenge that faces Web services is the organising of multiple services
for processing business logic (Singh et al., 2004). Often, a single business process
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is implemented as a sequence of stages in a workflow, where a separate service
may be used to implement a particular stage in that workflow. Therefore,
achieving the goal of a specific business logic process requires a high level of
coordination between the services that compose this process (Singh et al., 2004).

2.6.3 Reliability
Reliability is the quality aspect that is concerned with how well a service is
maintained and can be measured by the number of failures that occur during a
specified period of time. In Web services’ environments, achieving reliability is
an obvious challenge due to the unreliable nature of the underlying protocols. For
instance, the default HTTP best-effort delivery neither guarantees the delivery of
all the sent packets nor delivering them in the same sending order (Singh et al.,
2004; Wang et al., 2004).

2.6.4 Availability and Response Time
Availability is the probability that a Web service is present and ready to be used
when required (Singh et al., 2004). One of the challenges that faces the developers
of Web services is to maximise the availability of these services and minimise the
amount of time a client has to wait before receiving a response from an invoked
service.

2.6.5 Scalability
The scalability challenge concerns handling a large number of simultaneous client
interactions. An efficient implementation of a Web services’ system requires a
good management of the system’s resources and services, including database
connections and XML parsing. Validating XML documents through XML parsing
is an intensive process, when compared to its equivalent binary format. This can
have a significant effect on the performance of Web services as it increases the
payload size (Singh et al., 2004).
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In this thesis, the focus will be on the security challenge. The crucial issue in Web
services is how to ensure their security since they are based on exchanging
messages through the Internet where there are always security risks regarding
stealing, loosing or modifying these messages (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002).
Geer (2003) has stated that Web services pose a difficulty to network
administrators because Web services open up networks by enabling users from
outside their networks to access databases, applications and internal users.
Furthermore, Web services can perform large number of transactions in a short
time which are difficult to be secured using traditional security techniques, such as
Virtual Private Networks (VPNn) or Secure Socket Layer (SSL).

2.7 Security Requirements
There are some major security requirements that must be addressed to ensure the
safety of exchanging Web services information through a network. These
requirements are:

2.7.1 Confidentiality
In any networked system, the communicating parties need to exchange data while
guaranteeing that only the expected receiver can read this data. This means that
the exchanged data must be protected against eavesdroppers (Nakamur, Hada &
Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). The term confidentiality in the field of information
security refers to the requirement for exchanged data between two communicating
parties not to be available to a third party that may try to pry into the
communication (O’Neill et al., 2003). In order to achieve confidentiality, one
approach is to use a private connection between the communicating parties, such
as a dedicated line or a virtual private network (VPN). However, the critical
information of a Web service, such as WSDL and SOAP messages, are usually
exchanged through untrusted networks, the Internet most likely, where the private
connection is not achievable and another approach is used to meet the requirement
of confidentiality, that is encryption (Rao et al., 2004).
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2.7.2 Integrity
The term integrity refers to the requirement of ensuring that transmitted
information hasn’t been changed or modified during transmission (Nakamur,
Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). It does not mean preventing information
from being tampered with since it is impossible in untrusted networks, especially
the Internet. The next best thing is to detect this tampering if it occurs. The
knowledge about the fact that tampering has occurred fulfils the integrity
requirement. Integrity can be achieved using digital signature (O’Neill et al.,
2003).

2.7.3 Non-repudiation
Non-repudiation literally means that the message originator cannot deny sending
this message. Any doubt about the message sender throws confidentiality and
integrity into question and the results could be either bad or disastrous. Digital
signature and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) technologies are used to deliver
non-repudiation (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003).

2.7.4 Authentication
Authentication refers to establishing identity (Geer, 2003) which ensures that
access to data and applications is limited to those who have the appropriate proof
of identity (Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002). As with standard Web traffic, the
service provider should authenticate service requesters before sending Web
services information (Yang, 2002). PKI technology could be also used for
authentication. However, it is not the only available method for authentication.
Biometrics, passwords and hardware devices, such as dongles and smart cards, are
also used for authentication. They all are based on the idea of having a token in
the possession of the entity that is authenticated and this token is either softwarebased or hardware-based. In the case of Web services the communication could be
between software and another which adds a new twist on authentication. The
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scenario is a human user may authenticate directly to their systems using a
human-machine authentication technique where they will not be running Web
services directly. However, when a Web service starts, information about the
authentication status must be carries in the Web service communication. This
scenario is enabled by the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) (O’Neill
et al., 2003).

2.7.5 Authorisation
Authorisation means determining the privileges of the user and deciding whether
the entity is allowed to access particular resources and services or not (Yang,
2002; Nakamur, Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). Just because a user is
authenticated does not mean that they are always authorised. Authorisation
software allows an administrator to manage a policy for access control to services
by giving different privileges to different users and groups. Single Sign-On (SSO)
technologies, such as SAML, are used in Web services for both authentication and
authorisation (O’Neilletal.,2003).

2.7.6 Availability
Availability could be an ambiguous security requirement but it is very essential.
As well as Web services, security services themselves require availability.
Otherwise they are meaningless because it is costly for any business if critical
information is not available when needed (O’Neilletal.,2003).

2.7.7 Privacy
While confidentiality is the requirement that data that is in transit is not available
to eavesdroppers, the privacy requirement concerns the privacy rights of the
subject of the data. A strong encryption could protect the data while it is in transit.
However, this data could not be well encrypted while storing it and if there are
any back doors in the Web application or a direct connect to the database this data
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may be stolen. Privacy thus requires assuring that data is always protected
(O’Neilletal.,2003).

2.8 Basic Cryptographic Concepts
In the world of Information Systems, cryptography is often seen as a synonymous
with security (O’Neilletal.,2003) because security implies some core concepts ,
which are keys, cryptography, signature and certifications (Siddiqui, 2003b).

2.8.1 Cryptography
There are two encryption methods, asymmetric cryptography and symmetric
cryptography. The first method uses a pair of keys (public key and private key).
This pair is generated by a suitable cryptographic algorithm. The public key, as
the name implies, is open for public use, while the private key should be kept
confidential. When someone wants to send a confidential message to a specific
party, the sender asks for the public key of the receiver and uses this key to
encrypt the original message. The receiver uses the private key to decrypt the
message. No one else will be able to decrypt the message since only the receiver
has the private key. The other encryption method (symmetric cryptography) uses
the same key for encryption and decryption which makes this method less
expensive than the first one. Therefore, the asymmetric method is used only to
exchange the shared secret. When both of the parties know the shared secret, they
start using the symmetric encryption (O’Neill et al., 2003; Siddiqui, 2003b;
Tatsubori, Imamura & Nakamura, 2004).

2.8.2 Message Digests
The message digest method introduces an added field (value) to the original
message that occurs from applying a digest calculation on the message data. The
sender sends the digest value with the message, while the receiver reapplies the
same digest calculation and compares the resulted value with the digest value. If
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the message has been altered, these values will not match. The drawback of this
method is that the change will not be detectable at the receiver side if both the
message and its digest are altered during the transmission (Siddiqui, 2003b).

2.8.3 Digital Signature
In this method, the digest algorithm is used to generate the digest value of the
message, and then the private key is produced to generate a digital signature over
the digest value. The message receiver repeats the digest calculation and then uses
the public key to verify the signature. This method assuresthatthemessagehasn’t
been altered after applying the digest calculation (message integrity) and the
message is surely coming from the owner of the public key (user authentication)
(Yang, 2002; Siddiqui, 2003b).

2.8.4 Certification
The certificate consists mainly of two fields of information, the identification of
the certificate owner and the public key of the certificate owner. The certificate
issuing authority also signs the certificate using its own private key, which
enables any interested party to check the integrity of the certificate by verifying
the signature (Yang, 2002).

2.9 XML and Web Services Security Standards
With the aim of fulfilling the security requirements and providing a framework to
secure XML-based applications, standards organisations, such as the W3C and the
Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards (OASIS),
have presented various security specifications that coordinate with each other to
form modules of XML firewalls (Siddiqui, 2003a). Figure 2-6 illustrates the most
common XML and Web services standards and their dependencies.
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Figure 2-6: XML and WSS standards and their dependencies (Naedele, 2003)
The security specifications can be divided into three main categories (Nordbotten,
2009). These categories and their underlying specifications are:

2.9.1 XML Security
XML Digital Signature (XML DSig)
The XML Signature specification is a joint effort of the W3C and The Internet
Engineering Task Force (IETF) aiming to provide data integrity, message
authentication and signer authentication features wrapped in an XML format
(Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003; W3C, 2002b).
The XML signature specification describes XML syntax to associate between
cryptographic signature and XML documents. It includes procedures for
establishing and verifying XML signatures (Naedele, 2003). Digital signature of
one party could be read by another because the machines work with the same
encrypted digest for the same section of XML document (Siddiqui, 2003a).
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XML Encryption (XML Enc)
W3C’sXMLEncryptionspecificationusesencryptiontechniquestoaddress the
requirement of data confidentiality (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003;
W3C, 2002a).
The XML encryption specification defines the process for encrypting and
representing encrypted data in XML documents. All or just part of the XML could
be encrypted in the message. Therefore, only information that is confidential is
encrypted while the unconfident information could be sent unencrypted (Geer,
2003).
XML Key Management Specification (XKMS)
XKMS (W3C, 2001) defines a Web service interface that combines the
interoperability of XML with the security of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) in
order to manage the security of PKI-based application. XKMS consists of two
sub-protocols; XML Key Information Service Specification (X-KISS) and XML
Key Registration Service Specification (X-KRSS) (Nordbotten, 2009). X-KISS is
used for locating and retrieving public keys from a key server to perform the
encryption or signature verification, while X-KRSS defines an interface that can
register, revoke and recover escrowed keys from a key server (Naedele, 2003).

2.9.2 Security Markup Languages
eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML)
Presented by OASIS, XACML enables developers to express their authorisation
and access policies in XML (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003).
XACML specifications enable access control policies to be expressed in XML. It
expresses sophisticated access control model and fine-grained access policies in
XML documents, or any other e-resources. Using this specification, the access
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control policies control how XML documents appear to the end user (Nagappan,
Skoczylas & Sriganesh, 2003; Naedele, 2003).
Extensible Rights Markup Language (XrML)
XrML is an easy-use general-use specification focuses on expressing rights and
conditions related to digital services and resources (e.g., expiration times). Thus,
XrML deals with digital rights management, but it is not suitable for complex
access policy or rule sets, which are addressed by XACML. Both XACML and
XrML don’t deal with authentication and protection directly; instead they leave
these matters to the underlying encryption and digital signature protocols
(Naedele, 2003).
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
OASIS provides a possibility for partner applications to share user authentication
and authorisation information, by achieving the single sign-on feature without
using cookies as in the normal way (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui, 2003a; Naedele, 2003).
SAML is an XML-based framework for exchange security information. Such
exchanges occur usually between interacting applications that do not always share
the same authentication and authorisation techniques. However, SAML assumes
trust between participants because SAML does not provide this trust by itself. It
refers to XML Enc and XML DSig to establish this trust (Hondo, Nagaratnam &
Nadalin, 2002; Geer, 2003; Naedele, 2003).

2.9.3 Web Services Security
Web Services Security (WS-Security)
OASIS defines this specification depending on The XML Signature and XML
Encryption specifications in order to include integrity, confidentiality and single
message authentication features within a SOAP message (Geer, 2003; Siddiqui,
2003a). WS-Security (Nadalin et al., 2006) specification provides a way for Web
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services developers to implement several different security models throughout
attaching security data to the headers of SOAP messages (SOAP extensions)
(Geer, 2003).
Web Services Policy (WS-Policy)
The WS-Policy (Bajaj et al., 2006) specification defines a framework for
expressing policies that refer to interoperability capabilities and requirements in a
Web services-based system (Vedamuthu et al., 2007).
Web Services Security Policy (WS- SecurityPolicy)
The WS-SecurityPolicy (Nadalin et al., 2007c) specification defines a standard set
of assertions that represent security requirements and preferences for Web service
endpoints in order to describe the preferable way of securing the communications
path (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010).
Web Services Trust (WS-Trust)
WS-Trust (Nadalin et al., 2007b) supplements the functionality of WS-Security
and Web Services Policy by deﬁning security tokens management mechanisms
(such as issuing, renewing, cancelling, and validating security tokens). In a Web
services security model, the service consumer may use WS-Trust, after
discovering what security token is required, to obtain the required token from a
Security Token Service (STS) (Vedamuthu et al., 2007).
Web Services Secure Conversation (WS-SecureConversation)
WS-SecureConversation (Nadalin et al., 2007a) extends WS-Security and WSTrust to provide mechanisms for establishing and identifying a security context in
order to support exchanging multiple messages. The communicating parties share
the security context for the duration of the communication session. This can
potentially improve the overall performance of subsequent message exchanges,
because more efficient keys or new key material can be exchanged.
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2.10 Web Services Interoperability Technologies
(WSIT)
In order to improve Web services Quality of Service (QoS) and to enable
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services, The Web Services
Interoperability Technologies (WSIT) (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010; Sun
Microsystems Inc., 2007) has been developed as a joint effort between Sun
Microsystems, Inc. (later merged with Oracle USA, Inc. to become Oracle
America, Inc.) and Microsoft Corporation as part of the Metro Web services
stack.
Enterprise features aresupportedinMetro’sWSIT through the implementation of
several open Web services standards and specifications, such as message
optimisation, reliable messaging, and security. Figure 2-7 shows the underlying
services that were implemented for each technology.

Figure 2-7: WSIT Web Services Features (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007)
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2.10.1 WSIT Reliable Messaging Technology
Reliability is the QoS aspect of a Web service representing how well it maintains
its service quality. Reliability is often measured by the number of failures that
occur in a given time period. Reliability in Web services systems may be more
difficult to maintain because of the unreliable nature of the underlying transport
specifications, such as HTTP (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010).

Figure 2-8: Application Message Exchange without Reliable Messaging
(Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007)
Without reliability, the receiving endpoints would not know if messages are lost,
duplicated, or reordered as these messages transfer over the HTTP connection
without delivery assurances (Figure 2-8).

Figure 2-9: Application Message Exchange with Reliable Messaging Enabled
(Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007)
The Web Services Reliable Messaging technology (WS-ReliableMessaging)
defines a protocol that implements a QoS contract between an application and its
underlying messaging processor service. This contract consists of four actions:
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submit, deliver, respond and notify, and covers the following delivery assurances:
at most once, at least once, exactly once and in order (Bertino et al., 2010).
Securing SOAP messages alone does not prevent them from being lost in transit,
or delivered out of order (Bertino et al., 2010). Reliability enables systems to
overcome the failure of losing messages in transit or delivering them out of order.
If a message is lost, the sender endpoint resends the message until its receipt is
acknowledged by the receiving endpoint, as illustrated in Figure 2-9. If these
messages are received out of order, the receiving endpoint can rearrange the
messages into the correct order.

2.10.2 WSIT Security Technology
WSIT implements several Web services security specifications to provide
interoperability and secure communication between Web services endpoints, as
well as any intermediary nodes, as presented in Figure 2.10. Security, as provided
by WSIT, is an addition to the existing transport-level security, which may still be
used when point-to-point security is all that is needed. Besides the main XML and
Web services specifications, security is implemented in WSIT by adopting the
following specifications:






Web Services Security (WS-Security).
Web Services Policy (WS-Policy).
Web Services Trust (WS-Trust).
Web Services Secure Conversation (WS-SecureConversation).
Web Services Security Policy (WS-SecurityPolicy)

Figure 2.10: WSIT Security Specifications
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2.10.3 WSIT Security Profiles
A security profile is a description of a secure communication exchange between a
service provider and its client. Achieving different levels of security requires a
combination of different security techniques (i.e. security tokens, encryption,
signature, and even securing the entire wire using SSL). As a result, SOAPmessages can be safely delivered over the unsecured wire and can be processed,
entirely or partially, by middleware services if required (Hatala, Eap & Shah,
2004).
WSIT provides a number of security profiles that can be applied to secure a Web
service. Each profile represents a set of pre-defined security specifications and
configurations. These security profiles are (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010):


Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA): This profile depends
on a symmetric key cryptography that is used for integrity and
confidentiality. It relies on a single, shared secret key, generated at runtime
and encrypted using the service’s certificate. The client does not possess
any certificates on its own, but instead sends its username/password for
authentication.



Username with digest passwords (UDP): This profile is similar to UA,
except that digest passwords are used in the username token and therefore
is not required to be encrypted.



Mutual Certificates Security (MCS): This is an asymmetric cryptography
profile that adds security via authentication and message protection that
ensures integrity and confidentiality.



Symmetric

Binding with Kerberos Tokens

(Kerb):

This

profile

authenticates the client using Kerberos Tokens. The integrity and
confidentiality protection are established using symmetric keys, generated
with the Kerberos Protocol.
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Transport Security using SSL: This profile uses Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL) to protect the application during transport. Transport-layer security
is provided by transport mechanisms used to transmit information over the
wire between clients and providers, thus transport-layer security relies on
HTTP Secure transport (HTTPS) using SSL. Transport security is a pointto-point security mechanism that can be used for authentication, message
integrity, and confidentiality.



Message Authentication over SSL (MA): This profile attaches an
authentication token with the message and uses SSL for confidentiality
protection.



SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA): This profile attaches an authorisation
token with the message and uses SSL for confidentiality protection. In this
profile, the SAML token is expected to carry some authorisation
information about end users. The sender of the token is actually vouching
for the credentials in the SAML token.



SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV): This profile protects
messages with mutual certificates for integrity and confidentiality. The
sender vouches a SAML token for authorisation.



SAML Holder of Key (HOK): Under this profile, the truest between a
service and a client is not established directly, but requires the client to
send a SAML assertion, issued by a specific SAML authority. The service
has a trust relationship with the authority that issues the SAML token. The
request is signed with the client's private key and encrypted with the server
certificate. The response is signed using the server's private key and
encrypted using the key provided within the SAML assertion.



Endorsing Certificate (End-Cert): This profile uses a symmetric key for
integrity and confidentiality protection, and an endorsing client certificate
to supplement the claims provided by the token associated with the
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message signature. For this profile, all the requests need to be authorised
by a special identity, e.g. a purchase manager should endorse a purchase
request to a vendor.


STS Issued Token: This profile enables the use of a single Security Token
Service (STS) to establish a chain of trust between servers and clients;
especially where service providers and requesters are in different managed
environments and confidentiality is a major issue. Instead of services
trusting clients directly, services trust tokens issued by a trusted STS. The
client then has to securely authenticate to this STS.



STS Issued Token with Service Certificate (STS-SC): This profile is similar
to the previous one, except that confidentiality protection is enabled using
a service certificate.



STS Issued Token Endorsing Token (STS-End): This is also an STS-based
profile, that requires the client to authenticate using a SAML token that is
issued by a designated STS, but the message signature has to be signed by
an endorsing token.

2.11 The Performance of Web Services Security
The performance of the security mechanisms is fraught with concerns due to
additional security contents in SOAP messages, the higher number of message
exchanges to establish trust as well as extra processing time to process these
additions. As the interaction between service providers and requesters occurs via
XML-based SOAP messages, securing Web services tends to make these
messages longer than they would be otherwise and consequently requiring
interpretation by XML parsers on both sides, which reduces the performance of
Web services (Menasce, 2002).
Performance is an open problem in Web services, and has been analysed in
different manners. A study by Gray (2004) compared the performance of Web
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services with other middleware, such as CORBA and Java RMI. This study has
shown that the performance of Web services is a major drawback. Another study
(Jeckle, Melzer & Himsolt, 2004) also compared the same technologies and
illustrated that the HTTP overhead causes higher response time for SOAP
packages, which grows exponentially as the payload size increases.
The majority of the related studies have compared the performance of different
toolkits. In (Machado & Ferraz, 2005), several SOAP toolkits have been evaluated
with an objective of identifying and measuring SOAP inefficiency. Head et al.
proposed a standard benchmark suite for quantifying and comparing the
performance of the different SOAP implementations, such as gSOAP, AxisJava,
XSUL and bSOAP (Head et al., 2005), and various XML parsers (Head et al.,
2006).
Moreover, there have been several studies to benchmark the various aspects of
performance by studying the effect of the implementation framework on the
performance of Web services. For example, both studies by Sun Microsystems
Inc. (2004) and Microsoft Corporation (2004) compared the performance of Web
service technologies in two common middleware platforms: Java 2 Platform
Enterprise Edition (J2EE) and .NET, that offer similar facilities for creating and
using Web services. Similarly, Microsoft Corporation (2008) conducted a
comparison of the performance of Web services applications deployed on two
application servers (.NET 3.5/Windows Server 2008 vs. IBM WebSphere 6.1
ND/Red Hat Linux). Each of the previous studies claimed that its framework has
theupperhandintermsofWebservices’performance; yet all the previous studies
discussed the performance of plain-text services, without considering the security
aspects of these services.
Early discussions of the security and performance trade-off (Vaughan-Nichols,
2002; Dodds, 2002) highlighted that SOAP-Web services suffer a performance hit
when applying security measures. Because SOAP messages in their initial XML
plain text are insecure, applying encryption and decryption on each message in the
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service-side and client-side will increase the overhead of these messages and
increase processing time in both ends.
In security related studies, Shirasuna et al. (2004) evaluated three security
approaches, namely SSL, WS-Signature and WS-SecureConversation, for grid
services. Their evaluation has shown that transport level security is faster than
message level security, and should be used if there is no additional requirement to
use message level security. Their results indicated that WS-SecureConversation
should be used when several messages are exchanged between the service and the
clients, where XML-Signature is slightly faster than WS-SecureConversation for
one-time invocations. Nevertheless, WS-SecureConversation has a scalability
concern if the Web service is invoked by a huge number of clients simultaneously.
In a study of vertical scalability (i.e. adding capacity, such as processors and
memory, to an existing system) of Tomcat Application Server, Guitart et al. (2005)
examined the cost of security in Web services. However, its scope was restricted
to the security of the communication channel, using SSL. Message layer security
approaches were not considered in their tests.
Moralis et al. (2007) compared the performance of Web services with Kerberos
Token Profile against X.509 Token Profile, while Liu, Pallickara & Fox (2005)
conducted several tests for different operations (Signing vs. Verifying and
Encryption vs. Decryption with several algorithms). Two studies by Tang et al.
(2006) and Chen et al. (2007) compared the cost of WSS Signing and WSS
Encryption. They indicated that using either the Username or X.509 tokens does
not make a significant difference to the performance of Web services.
Sosnoski (2009) studied how using the WS-Security and WS-SecureConversation
standards affect the performance of Java Web services implemented using the
Apache Axis2 Web services stack. The aim was to provide a guideline on when
and how to use WS-Security. He also suggested the usage of WSSecureConversation for long-running exchanges of messages between clients and
a server, especially when relatively small messages are exchanged between the
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service and its clients. Further work led by Sosnoski (2010) expanded that test to
provide a performance comparison between the Apache Axis2 and Sun’s Metro
Web services stacks. This experiment suggested that Metro is twice to three times
faster than Axis2 when security configurations (i.e. signature, encryption and
username tokens) are applied, even though they perform similarly without
security.
Aiming at providing a general guideline for selecting appropriate security
mechanisms, the work by Novakouski et al. (2010) compared different WSSecurity mechanisms (i.e. Password Only, Sign Only, Encrypt Only. Sign Then
Encrypt, Encrypt Then Sign, and WS-SecureConversation) in details. It examined
the impact of applying these mechanisms on the performance of SOAP-based
Web services, measured in terms of: Round Trip Time (RTT), message size and
resource usage. The study established that to minimise the huge penalty of
applying security on the performance of Web services, a good understanding of
the requirements and expectations is required, as there is no supreme standard that
can provide security and performance in all applications and systems.
The previously discussed studies, however, considered the performance of the
security standards that can be applied on Web services, such as the usage of
encryption and digital signature, and the type security tokens. Alternatively, our
study focuses on the overall performance of the security profiles, which simplify
the security usage. Each profile predefines a set of security features to be
implemented when securing a Web service. This approach shields the developers
of Web services from the complexity of making a technical decision and allows
them to focus on addressing the requirements of the security system.

2.12 Selecting Security Profiles
Architects and developers responsible for Web service security have a
considerable number of options available to them. These options are further
complicated by the fact that different projects and organisations have different
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security requirements. Applying different sets of standards and techniques could
result in different quality measurements of a certain Web service (Shirasuna et al.,
2004; Liu, Pallickara & Fox, 2005; Tang et al., 2006; Singhal, Winograd &
Scarfone, 2007; Moralis et al., 2007;). To design, develop, and deploy secure Web
services, architects and developers should be able to select an appropriate security
profile amongst the available technologies by considering the new threats
associated with exposing functionality on potentially unsecured networks
(Microsoft Corporation, 2005), and simultaneously providing a level of quality
that is acceptable by the service consumer (Casola et al., 2009).
Currently, there are several XML-based security profiles and mechanisms that
may be used to satisfy the security requirements of a particular application. In an
ideal situation, the task a Web service developer is to select the one profile that
satisfies all the requirements. On many other occasions, there may be several
solutions that satisfy most of the requirements, but not all of them. This can be
considered as a decision problem, where an informed decision should be made by
prioritising the requirements, and ranking the available options accordingly, to
select the profile that matches the most important requirements.
The selection of a candidate solution depends on evaluating the available security
profiles against several characteristics derived from the requirements of the given
application. A Web services application developer specifies a set of requirements
according to the service provider’s security preferences and technological
constraints, taking into consideration the quality of service expected from the
service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several dimensions
according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a multidimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight according
to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is also
weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion.
Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When
there is a small number of selection criteria, then direct judgments may be a
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possibility. Nevertheless, when the number is large, the judging process may lead
to improper selection due to the bias towards key elements only (Godse, Sonar &
Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision making model, it is important to
have quantifiable values that are rational and consistent.
In research trends of Web services, the Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) is
widely used as a Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) method to select the
best Web service from a pool of services that have the same functionality
provided by different service providers (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008). Wu &
Chang (2007) presented a conceptual model using AHP to help service consumers
to find the service provider who provides the most optimal quality; yet their
approach was not concerned with security.
The framework of Zuo, Wang & Wu (2008) approached the problem of selecting
an optimal service among many Web services, which all meet the functional
requirements, by establishing an index system for Web services products selection
based on four aspects: user, product, environment and supply. They conducted a
questionnaire survey to collect the views of 30 experts divided into two groups:
business operation experts and academics.
Godse, Sonar & Mulik (2008) suggested the use of AHP as a quantitative
approach to alternate the common ad-hoc practices in choosing Web services.
Their model consists of three main criteria: security, quality and business
agreement. Casola et al. (2009) also proposed a framework for quality and
security evaluation. Their model depends on response time, integrity and
confidentiality as measuring aspects to find a provider that guarantees these
requirements. Thirumaran et al. (2011) proposed an AHP framework to choose the
best custom search service based on performance, cost, security and usability
requirements.
While all the previous models focused mainly on the point of view of the service
consumer (selecting the optimal service among many available services that all
meet the functional requirements), our research emphasises the service

Bachar Alrouh

42

Chapter

2: Web Services Security

developer’s viewpoint. The aim here is to provide a decision making tool to help
Web services developers to select the best suited security approach to secure Web
services that satisfies the security, configuration and performance requirements of
a given application during the development process.

2.13 Summary and Discussion
This chapter provided background information in the area of Web services
security and standards. The several approaches to analyse the performance of Web
services security were discussed, which in turn led to highlight the high cost of
applying security on the overall performance of Web services.
The literature review reports that the trade-off between security and performance
depends largely on the selected security approach, where different security
specifications affect the performance of Web services differently, as discussed by
various studies (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Liu, Pallickara & Fox, 2005; Tang et al.,
2006; Moralis et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2007; Sosnoski, 2009; Novakouski et al.,
2010).
On the other hand, achieving a certain security level requires sometimes a
combination of different security techniques (Hatala, Eap & Shah, 2004). There is
no security standard that can achieve all the security requirements of all the
applications while maintaining the best performance (Novakouski et al., 2010). As
a result, a Web services developer would ideally apply a combination of security
specifications in order to achieve the required level and coverage of security. This
can be a very daunting task because of the complexity and variety of Web services
security standards. Therefore, Several Web services development environments,
such as .net and JAVA’s METRO Web services stacks, provide developers with
predefined sets of security specifications, or simply security profiles. The
parameters of these profiles, for instance security token, encryption algorithm and
sign before/after encryption, can be adjusted by the developers according to their
security preferences.
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In order to select the most suitable security profile for a given application, it is
important to evaluate the security coverage of each profile against its
performance. The previously mentioned related studies focused on the
performance of individual security specifications and components. Instead, the
approach of this research is to explore the overall performance of these profiles by
developing a performance testing model to understand the cost of applying
security profiles on the performance of Web services (Objective 1). The argument
here is that understanding the overall performance of the security profiles will
help in the initial selection process. Then, the performance of the individual
security components (such as what proportion of that performance is due to the
delay in encrypting the SOAP message and what proportion is because of
acquiring credentials) can be considered to fine-tune the selected profile in order
to achieve the finest solution.
The issue of selecting the best-fitted security profile can also be addressed by
consulting rigorous documentations of best practices and case studies provided by
reputable studies. However, due to the huge variation of the nature of modern
systems that relay on Web services, different systems may have different
requirements, configurations and limitations. Therefore, it is difficult to provide
an ultimate solution that fits in all the scenarios. In addition, there are cases where
more than one recommended solution can be implemented to satisfy the security
requirements of a certain system, while there are other cases where there is no
solution that satisfies all system requirements. Such cases require rating the
various alternatives according to their coverage of the different requirements, and
subsequently, selecting the security profile with the highest rate. This emphasises
the need of a systematic framework to rate the alternatives according to different
criteria (i.e. requirements) in order to aid Web services developers in selecting the
most appropriate profile amongst a set of alternatives.
Several studies provided Multi-Criteria Decision Making (MCDM) frameworks
for Web services discovery and composition (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang &
Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.;
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2011). Their approaches considered the service consumer point of view (the aim is
to select the most suitable Web service from a pool of services that provide the
same functionality). Alternatively, we approach the issue from the Web services
developer view-point by addressing how to provide a Web service with the bestpossible security that considers the performance expectations and the service
provider’slimitations (Objective 2).
The MCDM frameworks introduced in previously discussed related work were
illustrated via the use of example scenarios. However, they did not provide an
empirical validation of their efficiency as they did not provide a benchmark to
validate against. In this thesis, we try to validate and evaluate the developed
framework using a scenario-driven approach. To demonstrate the framework’s
utility and value, the tested scenarios are chosen from well-known documentations
of best practices, and the results of the framework are compared to the
recommendations of these documents (Objective 3).
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Approach
3.1 Overview
This chapter aims at describing the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology
which will be undertaken as a general research methodology for this thesis. A
detailed discussion from its different perspectives is presented in order to explain
and justify the adoption of this methodology.

3.2 Philosophical Grounding
A paradigm can be defined as a set of basic beliefs which guide the actions and
the activities of the researchers throughout the research process (Guba & Lincoln,
1994; Mingers, 2001). Research in the field of information systems and
computing can be categorised into three main paradigms (Chua, 1986; Orlikowski
& Baroudi, 1991; Klein & Myers, 1999; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009). These
paradigms are:


The Positive Research: Collected data is used to support hypotheses and
assumptions that made prior to investigation.



The Interpretive Research: Collected data is used to extract knowledge
without making assumptions.



The Design Science Research approach: Constructing artefacts and
evaluating them is used to explain and enhance aspects of the system.

In the research world, there are four philosophical theories to view the research
paradigms (Guba & Lincoln, 1994; Mingers, 2001; Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009):
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The theory of existence (Ontology) which describes the nature of reality
by asking questions like what is real and what is not? What is fundamental
and what is derivative?



The theory of knowledge (Epistemology) that explores the nature of valid
or true knowledge.



The theory of reasoning and inference (Methodology) which studies the
relations between theory and practice in order to identify the best approach
that helps in generating the desired knowledge in a valid and reliable way.



The theory of value and value judgement (Axiology or Ethics): What is of
value or considered right?

Table 3-1 summarises the theoretical perspectives of these four research
paradigms.
Our research aims at producing an artefact in the form of a framework to help
architects and developers to choose the best-suited security profiles for Web
services applications. The aim of this research is highly consistent with the
general aim of DSR. This is because the research in information systems and
computing is considered a DSR research, if the main aim is to change a current
situation related to organisational or social systems into a more desirable one
through the development of novel artefacts (Hevner et al., 2004). Hence, we argue
that DSR is highly fitting in the context of this research.
Indeed, design-science research is primarily a problem solving paradigm (Hevner
et al., 2004) that seeks to create artefacts addressing the so-called wicked
problems (Pries-Heje & Baskerville, 2008; March & Storey, 2008). In principle,
design-science research attempts to successfully design, develop, and evaluate
technology-oriented design artefacts characterised as novel, innovative, and
purposeful. When portrayed as purposeful, this implies that these artefacts would
potentially provide organisations and humans with recognisable utility since they
should address unsolved problems (Hevner et al., 2004), or provide better
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solutions and thus enhance existing practices (Kuechler & Vaishnavi, 2008).
Hence, these artefacts aim to provide additional improvements to real-world
phenomena (March & Storey, 2008; Iivari, 2007; Purao, 2002). Therefore, while
humans could change their life styles through the introduction of these novel
artefacts, organisations might change the ways in which they do business so as to
exploit the opportunities that emerged due to these artefacts.

Basic Belief

Positivist

Ontology

A single reality.
Knowable,
probabilistic

Epistemology

Objective;
dispassionate.
Detached
observer of truth

Methodology

Observation;
quantitative,
statistical

Axiology

Truth: universal
and beautiful;
prediction

Research Perspective
Interpretive

Design
Multiple,
contextually
situated
Multiple
alternative
realities, socially
world-states.
constructed
Sociotechnologically
enabled
Knowledge
Subjective;
through making:
values and
objectively
knowledge
constrained
emerge from the construction
researcherwithin a context.
participant
Iterative
interaction
circumscription
reveals meaning
Developmental:
Participation;
Measure
qualitative.
artefactual
Hermeneutical,
impacts on the
dialectical
composite
system
Control;
Understanding:
creation;
situated and
progress;
description
understanding

Table 3-1: Philosophical Assumptions of Research Approaches
(Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009)
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3.3 Overview of Design Science Research
Design Science research (DSR) is a set of analytical techniques and perspectives
for performing research in the area of information systems and computing. Design
Science Research involves the analysis of the use and performance of designed
artefacts to understand, explain and most probably enhance the behaviour of
aspects of information systems (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009).
Design means to invent, plan and develop something for particular purpose. To
bring design activity into focus at an intellectual level, we should distinguish
between “natural science” and “science of artificial”. The natural science is the
knowledge about objects or phenomena that describes and explains how they
behave and interact with each other. On the other hand, the knowledge about
artificial objects and phenomena designed to meet certain desired goals is known
as the science of artificial.
Research, according to Kuhn (1996), is defined as an activity that contributes to
the understanding of a phenomenon. A phenomenon is a set of behaviours of
some entities that is found interesting by the researcher. In the case of information
systems, the phenomenon, or part of it, may be created, instead of naturally
occurring. Understanding means the knowledge that allows prediction of the
behaviour of some aspects of the phenomenon. Research methods or techniques
are the set of activities a research community considers appropriate to the
production of understanding.
Owen (1997) introduced a general model for generating and accumulating
knowledge (Figure 3-1) that is helpful to understand the Design Science Research
process: “Knowledge is generated and accumulated through action. Doing
something and judging the results is the general model” (Owen, 1997). The
process is illustrated as a cycle where knowledge is used to create works, and
works are appraised to create knowledge.
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Knowledge Building Process
Channel

Knowledge

Paradigm

Works

Channel
Knowledge Using Process

Figure 3-1: A General Model for Generating and Accumulating Knowledge
(Owen, 1997)

3.4 The Outputs of Design Science Research
Based on the work of March & Smith (1995) and Hevner et al. (2004), Vaishnavi
& Kuechler (2009) have proposed five general outputs explicate the types and
levels of knowledge that can be derived from Design Science Research,
highlighted in Table 3-2.
Output

Description

Constructs

The conceptual vocabulary of a domain

Models

A set of propositions or statements expressing relationships
between constructs.

Methods

A set of steps used to perform a task (how-to knowledge).

Instantiations

The operationalisation of constructs, models and methods.

Better theories Artefact construction as analogous to experimental natural
science
Table 3-2: The Outputs of Design Science Research
(Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2005)
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Purao, (2002) has pointed out a different perception on the output of Design
Science Research where the multiple outputs are classified by level of abstraction,
as shown in (Figure 3-2).

Constructors
Better Theories
Models

Emerging Theory about
embedded phenomena

Models

Abstraction

Knowledge as Operational

Abstraction

Principles

Methods
Constructors
Better Theories

Abstraction

Instantiations
Artefact as Situated

Methods

Implementation

Constructs

Figure 3-2: Outputs of Design Science Research (Purao, 2002)

3.5 Design Science Research Methodology
Drawing heavily from the work of Owen (1997), Vaishnavi & Kuechler (2009)
have developed a general methodology of Design Science Research, (Figure 3-3).
In this model, each of the stages can be revisited at any point in the process.
Therefore, Design Science Research in considered as an interactive approach,
which is especially suitable for software development, because requirements are
constantly changing, and findings from one stage may require a revisit to a
previous stage to alter the design of the system and improve it.
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Knowledge
Flows

Process
Steps

Outputs

Awareness of
Problem

Proposal

Suggestion

Tentative Design

Development

Artefact

Circumscription

Operation and
Goal
Knowledge

Evaluation

Conclusion

Performance Measures

Results

Figure 3-3: The General Methodology of DSR (Vaishnavi & Kuechler, 2009)
The previous figure illustrates the five stages of the Design Science Research
cycle,where“knowingismaking”,andeachstagecanberevisitedatanypointin
the process. The following section will discuss these stages (Vaishnavi &
Kuechler, 2009):
Awareness of Problem: This may come from multiple sources: new
developments in industry or in a reference discipline. Reading in an allied
discipline may also provide the opportunity for application of new findings to the
researcher’sfield.Theoutputofthisphaseisaproposal, formal or informal, for a
new research effort.
Suggestion: This stage comes immediately after the proposal. The output of this
phase is a tentative design that is intimately connected with the proposal.
Development: The provisional Design is implemented in this stage and the final
result is an artefact.
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Evaluation: Once constructed, the artefact is evaluated according to criteria that
are always implicit and frequently made explicit in the proposal (Awareness of
Problem phase).
Conclusion: This phase is the final effort of a specific research. Normally, if the
result is satisfying, even if there are still deviations in the behaviour of the artefact
from the hypothetical predictions, the results may be considered good enough.
The results of the effort are consolidated and written up at this phase, and the
knowledge gained in the effort is frequently categorised as firm facts that have
been learned and can be constantly applied, or behaviour that can be repeatedly
invoked. Otherwise, the knowledge gained in the effort is categorised as loose
ends or uncharacteristic behaviour that requires explanation and may well serve as
the subject of further research.

3.6 Developing a Framework for Selecting
Security Approaches Based on DSR
Following the DSR paradigm, we aim to develop a framework for selecting a Web
services security approach that is most appropriate for a certain application. To
this end, three possible approaches are investigated throughout the DSR cycle,
namely AHP, performance analysis and steganography.
By referring to (Saaty, 2008), we recognise four facets need to be defined to
develop the first approach: (a) goal; (b) alternatives; (c) criteria; and (d) sub
criteria. An AHP hierarchy indicates a relationship between elements of one level
with those of the level immediately below. This relationship percolates down to
the lowest levels of the hierarchy. In the hierarchic structure, at the root of the
hierarchy is the goal or objective of the problem being studied and analysed. The
leaf nodes are the alternatives to be compared. In between these two levels are
various criteria and sub-criteria. It is important to note that when comparing
elements at each level, a decision-maker needs just to compare with respect to the
contribution of the lower-level elements to the upper-level ones.

Bachar Alrouh

53

Chapter

3: Research Design and Approach

In the context of this research, defining the goal of the AHP framework was quite
straightforward as it is directly mapped to the current research problem; i.e.
choosing the best-suited security profile to be deployed for a particular application
including its Web services. Having the goal established, we moved a step further
to define the decision alternatives. For this purpose, we selected the security
profiles that are deemed representatives.
However, the issue of defining the decision criteria and sub-criteria was more
complex. Three iterations incorporating design, deployment, and evaluation
courses of action were needed before the final artefact (i.e. AHP Framework) has
been emerged which includes a comprehensive criteria and sub-criteria in this
context. In addition, a fourth iteration has been used to introduce an alternative
approach to secure Web services based on steganography. In the following subsections, we discuss these four iterations in detail.

3.6.1 DSR Iteration One: Library Research
In this iteration, we followed a library research in which a comprehensive
literature review was undertaken. The main purpose of this library research was to
understand the security elements or criteria that are relevant in the domain of Web
services. In fact, this iteration was not very challenging given the fact that there is
almost a consensus in the relevant literature regarding Web service security
measures (Nakamur, Hada &Neyama,2002;Yang,2002;Geer,2003;O’Neillet
al., 2003; Siddiqui, 2003; Naedele, 2003; Rao et al., 2004; Tatsubori, Imamura &
Nakamura, 2004; Nadalin et al., 2006/2007). The identified security criteria based
on which Web service security profiles need to be compared are: (1)
Authentication, (2) Integrity, (3) Confidentiality, (4) Non-repudiation, (5)
Authorisation, and (6) End-to-End Security.
After establishing these criteria, we deployed and utilised them to compare
different Web service security profiles. Retrospectively, we found out that
although these criteria facilitate reducing the number of favoured security profiles
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for a certain application; yet there is a number of security profiles that can be
employed, such as: UA, UDP, MCS, SSL, SA, SV and STS. Consider this example,
a certain Web application is highly critical and requires fulfilment of all of the
previously discussed security criteria. To choose the best-suited security profile,
the developer need to compare the security profiles based on the defined security
criteria. These criteria alone will lead the developer to find out that more than one
security profile can be selected, although there are slight differences in the level of
security they can achieve.
Moreover, despite the fact that these security profiles can achieve the defined
security requirements to a certain degree, they may have substantial differences in
terms of performance. Hence, we recognised that these criteria alone are not
sufficient for developers so as to take informed decisions and that performance
requirements need to be taken into consideration. Table 3-3 summarises this
iteration. This evaluation led us to start the iteration two of our DSR research.
Problem:

Selecting security approaches for Web services.
To identify and define:

Suggestion:

1. The security criteria and sub-criteria.
2. The available security profiles.
Model: Initial selection framework (based on a decision making
approach).

Outputs:

Construct: security criteria (e.g. authentication, authorisation) and
security profiles (e.g. UA, MCS).
Method: Initial AHP framework (security criteria).

Evaluation: The performance evaluation of the security profiles is required.
Table 3-3: DSR Iteration One (Library Research)
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3.6.2 DSR Iteration Two: Laboratory Experiments
To test the effect of individual security profiles on Web services performance, we
designed and implemented a performance testing experiments, where a simple
Java API for XML Web Services (JAX-WS) application was used. This Web
application consists of a Web service and a client, and it represents the peer-topeer mode test. The performance analysis framework resulted from this iteration
represents the first approach to consider when selecting a security profile since it
provides performance guidelines of the security profiles.
Problem:

Selecting security approaches for Web services.

Suggestion: Analyse the performance of the identified security profiles.
Model: Improved selection framework (based on performance
analysis and decision making approaches).
Outputs:

Construct: performance criteria (e.g. Round Trip Time, message
size).
Instantiation: Performance tests. (Chapter 4: ).
Method: AHP framework (security and performance criteria).

Evaluation: The configuration limitations and preferences of the system should
be considered.
Table 3-4: DSR Iteration Two (Laboratory Experiments)
Having reached this point of the research, we recognised that security profiles
need to be selected not only based on their fulfilment of security requirements, but
also based on their performance measures. In other words, the AHP hierarchy at
this point included two major criteria (security and performance) along with their
sub-criteria. By utilising the current AHP hierarchy we started analysing different
scenarios and cases related to Web applications. This step has highlighted an
important

criterion

which

has

been

overlooked,

namely configuration

requirements. In fact, while conducting these cases, it became apparent that
different security profiles normally call for different infrastructures to be in place.
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Examples of these infrastructure and configuration requirements include
certificates and security service tokens. Table 3-4 illustrates the second iteration.
Having recognised the importance of configuration requirements to the decision
of which security profile is most appropriate to be deployed in a certain situation;
we started DSR iteration 3 to further enhance the AHP framework.

3.6.3 DSR Iteration Three: Configuration Requirements
As highlighted in the previous subsection, each security profile requires
configuring some options on the Web service host. These configuration
requirements reflect the technological constrains and system preference of the
Web service provider. The Web service client may need to be configured
depending upon the security profile selected by the server side. For Web service
security profiles, the service configuration requirements are: (1) Certificates
stores, (2) Security Token Service, (3) Users’ database, and (4) Flexibility.
After these three iterations of the conducted design-science research, we have
reached a point where, from our perspective, the developed AHP framework in its
current form can be implemented and tested using real scenarios to verify its
utility and value. The results of the evaluation stage indicate that the AHP
framework can be used to facilitate the selection of a security profile based on the
three selected criteria: security, performance and configuration. Table 3-5
explains the third DSR iteration.
On the other hand, the performance results, from iteration two, highlighted the
effect of applying security and reliability profiles on the size of the secured SOAP
messages and related that to the drop of performance of Web services. Therefore,
in iteration four, we look at another alternative to secure Web services using
steganography rather than encryption in order to minimise the impact of the
message size.
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Problem:

Selecting security approaches for Web services.

Suggestion: Analyse the configuration requirements of the identified security
profiles.
Model: Improved selection framework (based on (1) performance
analysis and (2) improved decision making approaches).

Outputs:

Construct: configuration criteria (e.g. security tokens, users’
database).
Method: Final AHP framework (security, performance and
configuration criteria). (Chapter 5: )
Instantiation: AHP tool. (Appendix C)

Evaluation:

- The AHP framework is evaluated using scenarios from
documentations of best practices. The results are satisfactory.
- Alternative approaches may be considered to reduce the size of
security assertions.

Table 3-5: DSR Iteration Three (Configuration Requirements)

3.6.4 DSR Iteration Four: Alternative Solution Based on
Steganography
The literature review, as well as the performance analysis conducted as part of this
research, demonstrates that applying security and reliability profiles to SOAP
messages decreases the performance of Web services dramatically. This is due to
the extra security assertions added to these messages and the higher number of
message exchanges needed to establish trust and reliability. Therefore, we have
considered alternative options, using steganography, to establish trust between
Web services and their clients. During this iteration, we developed a method to
embed a hidden message in the sender endpoint and extract this message in the
receiver endpoint. This method is based on shuffling the XML tags of a SOAP
message in a particular order, where each permutation of these tags has a specific
meaning (e.g. an alphabet letter or a control status).
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Problem:

Selecting security approaches for Web services.

Suggestion:

Explore and evaluate the feasibility of using steganography as an
alternative approach to secure Web services.

Outputs:

Model: Final selection framework (based on (1)performance
analysis, (2)decision making and (3)steganography approaches).
Method: Embedding and Extracting Algorithms. (Chapter 6: )

Evaluation:

The steganography method is validated using an example to
illustrate its utility and value. The results are satisfactory.
The overall selection framework is accepted.

Table 3-6: DSR Iteration Four (Alternative Solution Based on
Steganography)
After the fourth iteration (Table 3-6), the final selection framework is considered
to be satisfactory. This framework provides three approaches to tackle the
problem of selecting a suitable security approach for a given Web services
application. The first is to use the results of the performance analysis
instantiations that have been developed during iteration 2. Those instantiations
map the performance aspects to the tested security profiles and can be used when
there is no need to consider the system limitations and constraints. The second
approach is to use the AHP multi-criteria decision making framework to make an
informed decision based on the security, performance and configuration criteria.
This approach enables developers to rate the tested security profiles according to
those criteria. Finally, the third approach is to apply our developed steganography
method. This method is an alternative to traditional encryption-based security
approaches and can be used to minimise the size and the number of exchanged
messages.

3.7 Summary
This research is about constructing an artefact (A multi-criteria decision making
framework) and evaluating it as an effort to enhance and automate the process of
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selecting the most appropriate Web services profile in a given application.
Accordingly, we are dealing with an artificial science (information systems and
computing) rather than a natural science. Therefore, Design Science Research is
the obvious choice as a general methodology for this research. This research aims,
by applying the DSR, at producing an artefact in the form of a framework aiming
to help Web services developers to select the best-suited security profiles for
software applications. The aim of this research is highly fitting with the general
aim of DSR. The research in information systems and computing is considered a
DSR research, if the main aim is to change a current situation related to
organisational or social systems into a more desirable one through the
development of novel artefacts (Hevner et al., 2004). Hence, the DSR is highly
consistent in the context of this research.
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Chapter 4: A Performance Evaluation of
Security Profiles for Web services
4.1 Overview
This chapter describes a series of performance tests that focuses on understanding
the impact of applying various security profiles on the performance of Web
services. The collected results represent a starting point for understanding tradeoffs between performance and security, and form a basis for making architectural
and engineering decisions, which will be discussed in the following chapter.
Chapter 4 is organised as follows: The test design is described in section 4.2. The
test results are presented and analysed in section 4.3. Finally, section 4.5
summarises the key findings.

4.2 Test Design
Recently, Web services security has witnessed a significant impetus as several
specifications have been developed and implemented to meet the security
challenges of Web services. However, the performance of the security
mechanisms is fraught with concerns due to additional security contents in SOAP
messages, the higher number of message exchanges needed to establish trust as
well as extra CPU time to process these additions. See Appendix A for a
comparison between four SOAP messages (Simple, Secured with UA, Secured
with MCS, and Reliable Message) with an initial data of one character.
This test focuses mainly on the overall performance of WSIT security and
reliability profiles. Therefore, the following discussion does not essentially cover
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the performance of underlying WSS specifications implemented within the
security profiles.

4.2.1 Test Subjects
This section describes the METRO/WSIT project (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007)
and its security profiles that were selected to be benchmarked by the experiments.
In order to improve Web services’ Quality of Service (QoS) and to enable
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services, the Web Services
Interoperability Technologies (WSIT) (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2007) has been
developed as joint effort between Sun and Microsoft. WSIT is an implementation
of a number of open Web services specifications to support enterprise features,
such as message optimisation, reliable messaging, and security.
Web services have relied on transport-based security such as SSL to provide
point-to-point security. WSIT implements WS-Security so as to provide
interoperable message content integrity and confidentiality, even when messages
pass through intermediary nodes before reaching their destination endpoint. WSSecurity, as provided by WSIT, is an addition to the existing transport-level
security, which may still be used.
WSIT provides a number of security profiles that can be applied to secure Web
services. Each profile represents a set of pre-defined security specifications and
configurations. Using security profiles reduces the development time and allows
Web services developers to focus their effort on identifying the security
requirements of their systems rather than going into the complexity of
understanding the several security standards and finding the right combination
that fulfils the security needs of the developed systems. However, while applying
WSIT security profiles to enhance the security of Web services, this may also
result in increasing the size and number of the exchanged SOAP messages, which
may in turn lead to an increase in the time of processing these messages and
transmitting them over the network.
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Currently, there are many security profiles that can be implemented to secure Web
services, see section 2.10.3 . We have deliberately selected seven of them for this
experiment. The selection was based on identifying the generic profiles, which
cover the general configuration types and represent the different security methods,
as illustrated in Figure 4-1. The selected profiles are:


Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA).



Username with digest passwords (UDP).



Mutual Certificates Security (MCS).



Transport Security using SSL (SSL).



SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA).



SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV).



STS Issued Token (STS).
Layer

Test Case/ Security Profile

Security Method

No Security

UA

Username
Authentication Security

Message
Layer Security

UDP
STS

Third Party STS

MCS

Mutual Certificates

SV
Transport

SA

Security

SAML

Layer Security
SSL

Figure 4-1: METRO Security Profiles

Bachar Alrouh

63

Chapter 4: A Performance Evaluation of Security Profiles for Web services

We also test the impact of applying Reliable Message Delivery and Deliver
Messages in Exact Order, asprovidedbyMetro’sWSIT,ontheperformanceof
Web services.

4.2.2 Test Scenario and Cases
Echo Web service (Simple structure/ Dynamic payload): This JAX-WS echo
application consists of a Web service and a client, which represents the peer-topeer mode test; the client sends different size auto-generated messages (from 1
Byte to 1MByte) and the Web service echoes (send back) the same message
received. The test was run with and without applying security profiles, using
different initial message sizes: 1byte to 1 Mbyte. This Web service was used to
test the performance of security profiles because using a simple payload reduces
the side effects of unrelated processing of the business logic. In addition, as
security profiles employ encryption algorithms, which are used to decipher the
exchanged data, the encryption/decryption process depends on the size of the
message. Therefore, a dynamic size payload was selected for this experiment.
Book details Web service (Complex structure/ static payload): The client
sends a sequence of messages; each contains a one-element array of book details
objects (Figure 4-2). The Web service replies by sending a simple string response
for each message it receives. The complex structure/ static payload was used for
the performance of reliable messaging methods because reliability guarantees the
delivery of the message, as a whole, regardless of the actual payload. If a message
is lost, the sender resends the message until its receipt is acknowledged by the
receiver. If these messages are received out of order, the receiver can rearrange
the messages into the correct one.
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<S:Body>
<ns2:bookOrder xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/">
<book>
<isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn>
<author>Author_1</author>
<name>Book_1</name>
<pages>111</pages>
<publisher>Publisher_1</publisher>
</book>
</ns2:bookOrder>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

Figure 4-2: Complex Payload SOAP-Message

4.2.3 Test Environment and Settings
In this chapter, the focus is on the increment of processing time when applying
security profiles instead of the network latency. As a result, the data were
collected from a local machine; the Web service and the client were deployed on a
Dell machine (Pentium D CPU 2.80 GHz / 3GB of RAM) Running Microsoft XP.
NetBeans IDE 6.5 was used to develop the Web service and the client. The Web
service was developed as a Web application and deployed on a GlassFish 2.2
application server. A Java SE application was used to represent the client. The
initial data sent from the client to the service were randomly generated before
sending the message to avoid any caching.Metro’sWSITWeb service stack 1.4
was used to apply security profiles to the tested Web service.

4.2.4 Evaluation Metric
The time spent in requesting and responding on the client side was measured as
round trip time (RTT) using Java’s System.nanoTime(). For the reliable
messaging experiment, we also measured the average response time, maximum
response time and the maximum throughput using the Web services monitor in the
Glassfish Admin Console. Every test was repeated 1000 times and the average,
maximum and standard deviation RTT were calculated for each case. The test is
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then repeated on 10 different occasions, and used the average results after
eliminating the highest and lowest scores to reduce the noise results. The results
were then compared using the Round Trip Time Increment Percentage (Tang et
al., 2006; Chen et al., 2007) (RTTIP) in order to evaluate the performance
overhead for a specific security profile deployment:
RTTIP 

RTTi  RTT0
100%
RTT0

(1)

Where:


RTT0 is the round trip time without applying any security profile
deployment.



RTTi is the round trip time of the Web service with a specific security
profile i deployment.

4.3 Results and Analysis
The average value of the RTT for each initial message size and each profile is
used to study the normal behaviour of the Web service (Table 4-1). We also
calculated the standard deviation RTT (Table 4-2) and maximum RTT (Table 4-3)
as suggested by (Casola et al., 2009) to indicate how often the Web service
secured using a certain profile shifts from its normal behaviour, and the worse
scenario, respectively.
Security
Profile
No
Security
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

1

10
24
80
80
119
42
52
122
266

100
25
81
80
119
42
52
122
285

Initial Message Size (Byte)
1K
10 K
25
82
80
119
42
53
124
288

25
84
81
121
43
52
124
294

27
101
98
137
45
55
140
316

100 K
42
263
259
295
71
80
303
481

1M
228
2055
2051
2109
348
357
2110
2229

Table 4-1: Average Round Trip Time (milliseconds)
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Security
Profile
No
Security
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

1

10
6
25
26
29
22
23
23
664

100

Initial Message Size (Byte)
1K
10 K

8
28
26
29
22
24
24
957

8
28
27
29
22
23
27
1048

9
28
27
29
23
23
24
1246

100 K

12
33
31
33
24
25
29
1272

1M

31
59
57
56
42
41
57
1201

54
18
15
16
20
24
15
498

Table 4-2: Standard Deviation Round Trip Time (milliseconds)
Security
Profile
No Security
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

1

10
207
237
235
295
205
215
282
19218

Initial Message Size (Byte)
1K
10 K
211
211
211
236
239
253
235
237
251
275
277
291
205
206
205
215
215
214
282
282
298
22973
30351
30366

100
213
237
235
274
205
214
282
23250

100 K
211
400
393
435
218
226
516
26838

1M
390
2509
2398
2489
381
460
2464
33229

Table 4-3: Maximum Round Trip Time (milliseconds)
The data collected from these experiments can be analysed in many different
ways. Figure 4-3 illustrates the RTT Increment percentage for the average values
of the tested security profiles. This figure shows three types of performance
behaviour in response to the increase in the message size. The first group includes
SSL and SA, which are transport layer security profiles. These profiles are clear
winners as they have the smallest incremental percentage values amongst the rest,
and their RTTIP decreases when the data size increases. However, they provide
point-to-point security only and cannot guarantee end-to-end security. The second
group includes UA, UDP, MCS and SV. These message layer security profiles
can provide end-to-end security, but they show a significant increase in their RTT
as the data size increases. The third group is for the STS-based profiles, which
have the worst performance amongst all the other profiles. However, their
performance is stable for all data sizes, and becomes very similar to the rest of the
message layer security profiles for large data sizes (1 MByte+).
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RTT Increment Percentage (%)
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Figure 4-3: RTT Increment Percentage for the Average Values
Based on the previous observations, the results can be discussed using the
following criteria: security layer (transport vs. message), encryption type
(symmetric vs. asymmetric), the usage of SAML tokens and finally authentication
type (direct vs. STS).

4.3.1 Transport Security vs. Message Security
Figure 4-4 illustrates the huge difference in performance between message level
security, represented by UA, and transport level security using SSL. While the
increment percentage of RTT using message level security increases when the
data size increases, we can notice its decrease when using transport layer security.
This is because SSL is lightweight, as it depends on securing the communication
channel and does not involve any XML parsing. Therefore, transport layer
security should be used if there is no special requirement to use message level
security, such as having a chain of Web services, where end-to-end security is
required.
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RTT Increment Percentage (%)
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Figure 4-4: Transport Security vs. Message Security

4.3.2 Username Tokens vs. Mutual Certificates
As shown in Figure 4-5, when the initial data size is in the range of 1 byte to 1
Kbyte, the round trip time is increased by around 220-230% when applying
username authentication profiles. The UDP performs slightly better than UA
because the username token in UDP, unlike UA, is not encrypted due to the use of
digest passwords. On the other hand, using MCS for the same data sizes increases
the round trip time by 370-390%. The difference can be related to the fact that
UA and UDP use symmetric key cryptography while MCS uses asymmetric
cryptography, where symmetric is always faster than asymmetric encryption (Sun
Microsystems Inc., 2007).
When large messages are exchanged between the client and the service (i.e.
1Mbyte) we notice however that the difference between the performance of UA,
UDP and MCS decreases dramatically because most of the processing time is
spent on applying the actual encryption rather than manipulating the keys.
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RTT Increment Percentage (%)
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Figure 4-5: Username vs. Mutual Certificates

4.3.3 SAML: Over SSL vs. Mutual Certificates
Figure 4-6 confirms that the performance of SAML-based security profiles (SA
and SV) depends mainly on the underlying security method that is used to protect
the data (SSL and MCS respectively).

RTT Increment Percentage (%)
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400
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1000

10000 100000 1000000

Initial Message Size (byte)

Figure 4-6: SAML-Based Profiles Compared to Their Underlying Security
Profile
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In both of the security profiles, SA and SV, the sender vouches a SAML token for
authorisation. However, SA protects the exchanged message using SSL in the
transport layer, while SV depends on mutual certificates, which is a message level
security mechanism. Comparing the performances of (SSL vs. SA) and (MCS vs.
SV) indicates that there is a negligible increase in RTTIP when SAML is applied,
especially when very large messages are exchanged.

4.3.4 STS vs. Non-STS
In Figure 4-7, we compare the performances of STS-based and non-STS (direct
client-service authentication) security profiles. The non-STS based profile used
for the comparison is UA. Since the security of the client is dependent upon the
security profile selected for the STS itself, not the service, the STS itself is

RTT Increment Percentage (%)

secured using a separate UA profile.
1200
1000
800
600

UA

400

STS

200
0
1

10

100

1000

10000 100000 1000000

Initial Message Size (byte)

Figure 4-7: STS vs. Non-STS
Results show that using third party STS tokens affect the performance of the Web
service significantly. When the initial message size is between 1 byte – 1 Kbyte,
the RTTIP of STS is about 4 times its value when applying non-STS security
profile, UA. Therefore, STS security profiles should only be used when the
service and the client are in two different domains, where direct authentication can
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be an issue.

However, when the initial data size reaches 1 M byte, the

performance difference decreases noticeably.

4.3.5 Average, Standard deviation and maximum
This section explores the effect of changing the data size on the performance
behaviour of the security profiles.
In order to demonstrate the normal behaviour, the average values of RTT were
used, as shown in Figure 4-8. All the testes profiles show a very small increase in
the RTT when the data size increases gradually from 1 byte to 10 Kbyte.
However, the increase becomes significant when the data size is increased to 100
Kbyte and then 1 Mbyte. The message layer security-based profiles (UA, UDP,
MCS and STS) respond with a very sharp increase in the RTT when the data size
reaches 1 MByte. Nonetheless, the differences between the RTT values of these
message layer security profiles values start to disappear and they all when very

Average Round Trip Time –RTT
(milliseconds)

large messages (1 MByte+) are used.
10000
No Security

1000

UA
100

UDP
MCS

10

SSL
SA

1

SV
STS
Initial Message Size (byte)

Figure 4-8: Average Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds)
The standard deviation values (STDEV) of the round trip time (Figure 4-9)
illustrate the variation there is from its normal behaviour, represented by the
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average. A small STDEV value indicates that the data points tend to be very close
to the average, whereas a large value for the STDEV indicates that the data are
spread out over a large range of values.

STDEV Round Trip Time –RTT
(milliseconds)

10000

1000

No Security
UA

100

UDP
MCS
SSL

10
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SV

1

STS
Initial Message Size (byte)

Figure 4-9: STDEV Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds)
In small data sizes (1 byte to 1 Kbyte), all the studied profiles, apart from the STS,
have a steady STDEV when the data size increases. STS depends on a third party
to provide tokens, which means that there are two active communication channels,
where the latency could occur in either. This mean that STS based profiles tend to
have a variant performance where the round trip time could vary quite often from
its normal (average) value. All the other profiles show an increase in the STDEV
when the data size increased to 100Kbyte, which then decreases to a smaller value
when the data size reaches 1 Mbyte.
Figure 4-10 shows the change in maximum round trip time when the data size
increases.Themaximumvaluecanbeusedtodescribethe“worstcasescenario”
or the worst performance you can get from a particular Web services. Due to the
bigger number of communication channels in the STS profile, this profile has the
highest value of maximum RTT. Its maximum values vary slightly in response to
changing the data size.
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Figure 4-10: Max Round Trip Time –RTT (milliseconds)
On the other hand, all the other profiles have a very similar maximum values in
small data size messages (1 byte to 10Kbyte). Significant differences start to
appear when the data size reaches 100 Kbyte. The maximum values at the 1
Mbyte data size indicate that the worst case scenarios for transport layer security
profiles are still better than those of message layer security profiles. In addition,
The STS profile performs significantly worse than the rest, which is different from
its behaviour in normal scenarios (average values), where the differences between
the performance of all message-level security profiles start to disappear when the
message size increases to 1 Mbyte.

4.4 Reliable Messaging
As illustrated in Table 4-4, adding reliable messaging to our Web service resulted
in increasing the average response time by around 30 % when applying reliable
messaging alone, and more than twice its value when we applied the Exact Order
Delivery (which drops the throughput to less than half its value).
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Simple (No reliability)

16

32

62.5

107.42

Reliable Messaging (RM)

21

312

47.62

135.11

RM + Order

35

18329

28.57

155.94

Table 4-4: Reliable Messaging Results
The maximum response time recorded in this experiment for Web services with
reliable messaging implemented was more than 10 times the maximum value of
Web services without reliability assurance. When applying the exact order
delivery assurance, the maximum value increased by more than 570%. This is
because when a message is lost, the sender endpoint resends the message until its
receipt is acknowledged by the receiving endpoint. If these messages are received
out of order, the receiving endpoint can rearrange the messages into the correct
order. These processes have a huge impact on the performance of Web services,
as demonstrated in the previous table.

4.5 Summary
In this chapter, we have compared the performance of several security profiles for
Web services. The performance evaluation has shown that profiles that use
transport level security are always faster than the message-level security ones. In
addition, Message level security protocols have a scalability problem if large
messages are exchanged, unlike SSL-based profiles. Within message level
security profiles, username authentication based profiles perform better than
mutual certificates security. However, the difference is insignificant when using
very large size messages. Using digest passwords instead of encrypting the whole
username token can slightly improve the performance. Moreover, the performance
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penalty of using SAML is very small and depends primarily on the underlying
security profile. In addition, the performance of STS security profiles is massively
less than non-STS profiles and should only be used when the service and its
clients are on different domains. Finally, reliable messaging is very important in
critical systems because it enables them to overcome the failure of losing
messages in transit or delivering them out of order. However, reliability comes at
the expense of the performance of Web services, as discussed in the previous
section.
Several studies, such as (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Moralis et al., 2007; Novakouski
et al, 2010) reached similar conclusions regarding the high performance of SSL
when compared to message-layer security mechanisms and the little impact of
changing the security token on the performance of Web services. On the other
hand, the main difference between our approach and the previous work is that we
focused on the performance of security profiles rather than its underlying
standards and protocols. We argue that our approach simplifies the security usage
and increases the usability when making a decision on which security profile to
select for a given application. This is because it shields the developer from the
complexity and variety of the different security standards, and allows them to
focus on the overall performance of the easier-to-understand profiles. Moreover,
we studied the impact of changing the message size on the performance of Web
services and analysed not only the average values, but we also considered the
maximum and standard deviation values in order to reach a better understanding
of the overall performance.
This chapter represents the second iteration of the DSR cycle (see section 3.6.2 );
the results gathered from these experiments provide the basis for the AHP model
that is developed in the next chapter. The discussion provided in this chapter may
also be used as a performance guideline to be consulted when selecting a security
profile for a Web services application.

Bachar Alrouh

76

Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision

Making Approach

Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security
Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision
Making Approach
5.1 Overview
As discussed in the previous chapter, there are several XML-based security
profiles and mechanisms that may be used to satisfy the security requirements of a
particular application. The task a Web service developer in an ideal situation is to
select the one profile that satisfies all the requirements. On many other occasions,
there may be several solutions that satisfy most of the requirements, but not all.
This can be considered as a decision problem, where an informed decision should
be made by prioritizing the requirements and ranking the available options
accordingly to select the profile that matches the most important requirements.
The selection of a candidate solution depends on evaluating the available security
profiles against several characteristics derived from the requirements of the given
application. A Web services application developer specifies a set of requirements
according to the service provider’s security preferences and technological
constraints, taking into consideration the quality of service expected from the
service consumer. The requirements can be divided into several dimensions
according to different independent criteria and sub-criteria to create a multidimensional model. Each criterion and sub-criterion is given a weight according
to its level of importance in the application. Each candidate solution is also
weighted against each sub-criterion according to what extent this particular
solution matches the requirement represented by this sub-criterion.
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Generally, service providers set these weights on the basis of judgment. When
there are a small number of selection criteria, then direct judgments may be a
possibility. Nevertheless, when the number is large, the judging process may lead
to improper selection due to the bias towards key elements only (Godse, Sonar &
Mulik, 2008). In such a multi-criteria decision making model, it is important to
have quantifiable values that are rational and consistent.
In this chapter, an Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1982) approach is
used to solve the problem of assigning weights to selection features and enable a
quantitative basis for selecting a security profile for a Web service. AHP is a wellestablished method to make these types of decisions. It is a quantitative approach
based on relative judgments, with the assurance of consistent output. AHP is able
to handle tangible as well as intangible attributes while monitoring the
consistency in judgment (Godse, Sonar & Mulik, 2008; Roper-Lowe & Sharp,
1990) .
This chapter also provides a scenario-driven approach to demonstrate situations
where the decision making framework is used to make informed choices to rank
various service security patterns and select the best possible one to meet the
requirements of these scenarios.
Accordingly, the structure of this chapter is as follows: Section 5.2 discusses the
decision making concept, while section 5.3 provides an overview of the common
methods used in Decision making. Section 5.4 explains the Analytical Hierarchy
Process (AHP) and the steps of its implementation. The AHP framework for
selecting security profiles for Web services is introduced in section 5.5. The
framework is then validated using three different scenarios in Section 5.6. Finally,
concluding remarks are presented in section 5.7.
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5.2 The Necessity of a Formal Decision Making
Framework
The modern enterprise sees itself operating in an ever-complex environment, with
technological advances and information overload forcing such enterprises to look
and deal with different tasks. The decision making process is one of the most
important tasks in any organisation, due to its high-risk implication and future
consequences (Saaty, 1982).
In such situations, the multiplicity and complexity of the criteria lead to a complex
decision making process. In the real life environment communication links
between the members of the decision-making group with a common
understanding of the syntax and semantics of the underlying issues are an
essential requirement for making an informed decision.
As a consequence of the complexity, stochasticity and the involvement of many
decision makers, a disciplined framework for decision making has become a
requirement. Thus, many formal decision techniques were developed in the past to
tackle these problems. However, these tools were too mathematical or theoretical
or only capable of solving problems simpler than the modern ones (Bhushan &
Rai, 2004).
On the other hand, advances in the field of the mathematics, operations research,
cybernetics, artificial intelligence have been applied and used to develop decision
making techniques (Bhushan & Rai, 2004). The underlying principle of these
methods is optimisation. This results in a vast expansion of quantitative decision
making aid using optimisation techniques.
Decision making is a process of choosing one alternative among a set of
alternatives, based on some criteria. This can be achieved by assessing these
criteria against each alternative as well as the evaluation of the alternatives based
on each criterion. The conclusion of all these evaluations is then used to achieve
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the relative ranking of the alternatives. In addition, with a group of experts’
opinions to be incorporated in the decision making the complication will increase.
Therefore, a structured approach is needed to avoid the ambiguity of the analysis
and boost the progress. A generic disciplined process should provide a structure to
deal with complex problems, a justification for the decisions, consistency,
objectivity and finally the decisions can be repeated and reviewed and are easy to
understand.

5.3 Decision Making Methods
There are several tools for solving a decision problem. The selection of an
appropriate tool is not an easy task and depends on the concrete decision problem,
as well as on the objectives of the decision makers. The chosen approach should
employ credible evaluation methods (Baker et al., 2001).
Over decades, several approaches were developed as a try to standardise the
process of making decisions. Choosing an appropriate decision making method is
dependent on the decision problem type, the attributes of the decision making
methodandthedecisionmakers’objectives.Theuseofoptimizationtechniques
can also lead to a more deployment of decision making methods (Bhushan & Rai,
2004). The chosen method should thus be justified and evaluated (Baker et al.,
2001). In general, the ease of use and the applicability remain an issue for some
approaches due to the heavy dependence on Math (too theoretical) or incapability
to solve complicated decision problems. For instance, Ranking Approach (RA)
(Buss, 1983), non-linear programming model (Badria & Davisb, 2001; Santhanam
& Kyparisis, 1996), 0-1goal programming model and Analytical Network Process
(ANP) (Lee & Kim, 2000) reliant on complicated mathematical models are
difficult to understand and therefor to use.
Numerous multivariate methods also reported to be used ignore decisionmakers’
preferences in the process of decision making (e.g. the Simple Multi-Attribute
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Rating technique (SMAR) (Salmeron & Herrero, 2005; Dutta & Burgess, 2003)
and Decision Making Units (DMU) (Salmeron & Herrero, 2005)). DMU involves
assessing the performance of different units that might be different in their nature
such as a computer or a school. The performance is measured considering the
amount of inputs involves and outputs generated. The units’ performance
measures are then compared in a sense that one unit is more efficient that another
if it gives more outputs for same inputs quantity or same amount of outputs for
smaller set of inputs. This comparison can be represented mathematically by ratio
of a sum of outputs over a sum of inputs. Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA)
(Salmeron & Herrero, 2005) extends DMU by assigning different weights to
outputs and inputs. The weights are different values assigned to make a unit more
important than others. DMU and DEA are preferred when there is no need to
consider preferences of decision makers as the main intention to compare units’
performances.
Pros and Cons Analysis (Baker et al., 2001) could be used for simple decisions
with few alternatives and criteria. Kepner-Tregoe (K-T) Decision Analysis
(Kepner & Tregoe, 1981) is suitable for fairly complex problems. Multi-Attribute
Utility Theory (MAUT) (Edwards & Barron, 1994; Goodwin & Wright, 1999) is a
quantitative comparison method used to combine dissimilar measures of costs,
risks, and benefits, along with individual preferences, into high-level, aggregated
preferences. The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) (Saaty, 1982; Saaty &
Vargas, 1984; Saaty & Kearns, 1985; Saaty, 1987; Saaty, 1990a; Saaty, 1990b;
Saaty & Vargas, 1991; Saaty & Vargas, 2000; Saaty, 2001; Saaty, 2008) is a
quantitative comparison method used to select a preferred alternative by using
pair-wise comparisons of the alternatives based on their relative performance
against the criteria. The basis of this technique is that humans are more capable of
making relative judgments than absolute judgments (Saaty, 2008).
A research conducted by (Kamal, 2008) compared several prioritising approaches
and identified AHP as the most-effective one, as shown in Table 5-1.
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Characteristics Differentiating the Prioritisation
Techniques
Incorporation of preference structure
Synthesised analysis of diverse judgements
An intuitive technique
Optimising resource allocation for interaction of factors
Limited attributes to carry out real world decisions
Captures individual knowledge and experience
Gives easy understanding of problem situation
Time-consuming process
Non-linear representation
Managing large amount of qualitative/quantitative data
Applicability weakened by complex mathematical models
Easy understanding of the prioritisation process
Quick insight into structure of information
Requires less skill and training
Measure the performance efficiency of decision makers
Structures through symbolic and numeric representation
Supports different viewpoints through rich pictures
Techniques not appropriate for all situations
Too much focus on quantifiable calculations
Providing a step-wise guideline for prioritising the factors
Accessible data format
Graphical representation
Resolves complex problems of choice and prioritisation

AHP


–

–


–
–

–



–



–





Prioritisation Techniques
SMAR DEA
RA
ANP
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–
–

–
–

–






–
–
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
–
–

–
–
–
–
–
–
–



–

–
–
–
–







–
–

–
–
–
–
–
–
–








–
–
–

–

–
–
–
–
–
–
–

–


Table 5-1: Comparisons of Decision Making Approaches (Kamal, 2008)

5.4 The Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP)
The AHP was developed as an organised approach, utilising the experience,
intuition and heuristics, to give decision-making the structure of a well-defined
methodology derived from sound mathematical principles.
The wide spread AHP acceptance by the decision makers is due to its simplicity
andeaseofuse.AHPhelpsstructurethedecisionmaker’sthoughtsandorganise
the problem in an easy to follow and analyse manner. A wide range of
applications has utilised the AHP, including alternative selection (Zeng et al.,
2007), resource allocation (Ramanathan, 1995), forecasting (Saaty, 1987; Ülengin,
1994; Jensen, 1982; Jensen & Spencer, 1986), business process re-engineering
(Ashayeri, Keij & Bröker, 1998; Wei, Chien & Wang, 2005), quality function
deployment (Karsak, Sozer & Alptekin, 2003), balanced scorecard (Ravi, Shankar
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& Tiwari, 2005), benchmarking (Lu et al., 1994), public policy decisions (Saaty,
2001), healthcare (Dolan, 1989), multimedia communication (Ghinea, Magoulas
& Siamitros, 2005) and many more. Essentially, the AHP has been used to
structure the complexity, measurement and synthesis of rankings. These features
make it suitable for all these applications and it has been acknowledged as a
theoretically sound and market-testedandacceptedmethodology.AHP’ssuccess
is given by its almost universal adoption as a new paradigm for decision-making
coupled with simplicity of implementation and understanding. Furthermore, its
results agree with perceptions and expectations.
The main concepts of the AHP are:


The AHP is analytic. It assists in analysing the decision problem logically
and in establishing numbers based on the decision maker’s intuition and
feelings which can be validated, questioned and reviewed by others.



The AHP utilises a hierarchy structure. This property comes naturally with
the human tendency to decompose and reduce the complex problems into
sub problems to be tackled one by one.



The AHP defines a step-by-step process for decision making.

These steps will now be described (Saaty & Vargas, 2000):

5.4.1 Hierarchy
The problem is decomposed into a hierarchy of goal, criteria, sub-criteria and
alternatives.
Hierarchy indicates a relationship between elements of one level with those of the
level immediately below. This relationship percolates down to the lowest levels of
the hierarchy and in this manner every element is connected to every other one, at
least in an indirect manner.
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In the hierarchic structure, at the root of the hierarchy is the goal or objective of
the problem being studied and analysed. The leaf nodes are the alternatives to be
compared. In between these two levels are various criteria and sub-criteria. It is
important to note that when comparing elements at each level a decision-maker
has just to compare with respect to the contribution of the lower-level elements to
the upper-level one.

5.4.2 Pair-Wise Comparisons
Data are collected from experts or decision-makers corresponding to the
hierarchic structure, in the pair-wise comparison of alternatives on a qualitative
scale as described below. The comparisons are made for each criterion and
converted into quantitative numbers, as illustrated in Table 5-2.
Numerical
value(s)
1
3
5
7
9
2, 4, 6, 8

Option

Equal
Marginally strong
Strong
Very strong
Extremely strong
Intermediate values to reflect fuzzy inputs
Reflecting dominance of second alternative compared with
Reciprocals
the first
Table 5-2: The Nine-Point Scale For Pair-Wise Comparisons
The pair-wise comparisons of various criteria generated at step 2 are organised
into a square matrix. The diagonal elements of the matrix are 1. The criterion in
the ith row is better than criterion in the jth column if the value of element (i, j) is
more than 1; otherwise the criterion in the jth column is better than that in the ith
row. The (j, i) element of the matrix is the reciprocal of the (i, j) element.

A= [
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5.4.3 Eigen Vector
The principal Eigen value and the corresponding normalised right Eigen vector of
the comparison matrix give the relative importance of the various criteria being
compared. The elements of the normalised eigenvector are termed weights with
respect to the criteria or sub-criteria and ratings with respect to the alternatives.

5.4.4 Consistency Ratio
The consistency of the matrix of order n is evaluated. Comparisons made by this
method are subjective and the AHP tolerates inconsistency through the amount of
redundancy in the approach. If this consistency index fails to reach a required
level, then answers to comparisons may be re-examined. The consistency index,
CI, is calculated as:
CI=(λmax- n) / (n - 1)

(3)

Whereλmaxisthemaximumeigenvalueofthejudgmentmatrix.ThisCIcanbe
compared with that of a random matrix, RI (Table 5-3). The ratio derived, CI/RI,
is termed the Consistency Ratio (CR). Saaty suggests the value of CR should be
less than 10%.
CR = CI / RI

(4)

Order of the matrix

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Random Consistency Index – RI

0

0

0.58

0.89

1.11

1.25

1.35

1.40

1.45

1.49

Table 5-3: Random Consistency Indices (Saaty, 1990a)

5.4.5 Ratings
The rating of each alternative is multiplied by the weights of the sub-criteria and
aggregated to get local ratings with respect to each criterion. The local ratings are
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then multiplied by the weights of the criteria and

aggregated to get global

ratings.

5.4.6 Integrating Group Judgments
If the judging process involves multiple experts, then a single consolidated
judgment is calculated using a geometric mean to integrate the group judgment.

5.5 The AHP Framework
This section proposes an AHP framework for selecting security profiles for Web
services.

5.5.1 Hierarchy
The main goal of this study is to provide a framework that aids Web service
developers when they select the best-suited security profile for a certain
application. Therefore, we classified the requirements according to three criteria,
namely security, configuration and performance.
The security category is subcategorised according to the different security
requirements for Web services. The configuration criterion refers to the resources
management requirements for the security profiles (certificates, users’ database
and security service token), as well as the configuration flexibility. The
performance criterion is defined by the average round trip time, standard deviation
round trip time and maximum round trip time. In this hierarchy model (Figure 51), the alternatives are represented by the different profiles that can be used to
secure Web services.
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Making Approach

Criteria

Peer Authentication
Message Origin
Authentication
Message Integrity
Message Confidentiality
Non-repudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End Security

Alternatives

Security

Sub-criteria

Selecting security profile for a Web service

UA

UDP

Performance

Configuration

AVR RTT
Certificates
Users’Database
Security Service
Token
Flexibility

MCS

SSL

SA

STDEV
RTT
MAX RTT

SV

STS

Figure 5-1: An AHP Framework for Web Service Security Profiles

5.5.2 AHP Alternatives : Security Profiles
For the purpose of demonstrating the most common security profiles for Web
services, the Metro Web services stack (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) is used in
this chapter. Metro is an advanced Web services stack that provides
interoperability between Java and .Net Web services. The most used feature of
Metro is security, which involves streaming encryption/signatures, secure
conversation, and trust. To simplify security usage, Metro provides several
security profiles that cover the most-used cases. Choosing a profile can be done
according to the type of security (transport or message level), type of client
credentials (user name/password, X.509 certificate, SAML assertion, Kerberos
ticket, or issued token from a third-party) and the role the client credential plays in
securing the messages (Carr & Guo, 2009).
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In Chapter 2: , several METRO/WSIT security profiles were described and
evaluated. Our selection process considered choosing the most common and
generic security profiles that represent various security methods, tokens and
implementation layers. These profiles are used as alternatives in the proposed
AHP model:


Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA).



Username with digest passwords (UDP).



Mutual Certificates Security (MCS).



Transport Security using SSL (SSL).



SAML Authorisation over SSL (SA).



SAML Sender Vouches with Certificates (SV).



STS Issued Token (STS).

5.5.3 AHP Criterion 1: Security
There are some major security requirements that must be addressed to ensure the
safety of exchanging Web services information through a network (Nakamur,
Hada & Neyama, 2002; Geer, 2003). These requirements are:


Authentication: It refers to establishing identity which assures that access
to data and applications is limited to those who have appropriate proof of
identity. Authentication mechanisms are based on the idea of having a
token in the possession of the entity that is authenticated and this token is
either software or hardware based. When a Web service starts, information
about the authentication status must be carried in the Web service
communication. As in standard Web traffic, service provider should
authenticate service requesters before sending Web services information.
This mechanism is known as peer-to-peer authentication. Another
important mechanism is known as message origin authentication. The idea
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here is that received messages are authenticated based on their origin. This
is useful if messages are communicated through a chain of Web services.


Integrity: It refers to the requirement of ensuring that transmitted
information has not been changed or modified during transmission.
Knowledge about tampering occurrence fulfils integrity requirements.
Integrity can be achieved using digital signature, for example.



Confidentiality: It refers to the requirement for exchanged data between
two communicating parties not to be available to a third party that may try
to pry into the communication. In order to achieve confidentiality, one
approach is to use a private connection between the communicating
parties, such as a dedicated line or a VPN. However, the critical
information of Web services is usually exchanged through untrusted
networks, the Internet most likely, where the private connection is not
achievable and another approach is used to meet the requirement of
confidentiality, which is encryption.



Non-repudiation: It means that the message originator cannot deny
sending this message. Any doubt about the message sender throws
confidentiality and integrity into question and results could be disastrous.
The Web Services Security (WSS) standard assures non-repudiation
through its use of the XML Signature standard” (Singhal, Winograd &
Scarfone, 2007).



Authorisation: It refers to granting privileges for users and deciding
whether an entity is allowed to access particular resources and services or
not. Just because a user is authenticated does not mean that they are
always authorised. Authorisation software allows administrators to
manage a policy for access control to services by giving different
privileges to different users and groups. Single sign-on technologies, such
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as SAML, are used in Web services for both authentication and
authorisation.


End-to-End Security: It means that communicated data is signed and
encrypted between partners communicating the data throughout the chain.

5.5.4 AHP Criterion 2: Configuration
Each security profile requires configuring some options on the Web service host.
These configurations requirements reflect the technological constraints and
system preference of the Web service provider. The Web service client may need
to be configured as well depending upon the security profile selected by the server
side.
For the security profiles mentioned earlier, the regular service configuration
requirements (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) are:


Certificates stores: there are two types of certificates stores. Keystore is
used in the service and client sides to specify the certificates and private
keys for the service and client, respectively. Truststore is used in the server
side to specify aliases that contain the certificates and trust root of the
clients, and vice versa.



Security Token Service: this service implements a protocol that defines
message formats and message exchange patterns for issuing, renewing,
cancelling, and validating security tokens. The STS we used in our test
was deployed in the active mode, as it implements the WS-Trust protocol,
as opposed to the WS-Federation passive protocol. The security
configuration for the client-side of this application is dependent upon the
security mechanism selected for the Security Token Service, and not on
the security mechanism selected for the application.



Users’ database: to be used by security profiles that require username, and
preferably passwords, for authentications.
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Flexibility: The configuration requirements vary in terms of flexibility
between the different security profiles. Transport level security profiles are
usually easier to configure than the message level ones. Furthermore, some
profiles require configuring additional options, such as SAML callback
handler on the client side. We use the term “configuration flexibility” in
this chapter to refer to how flexible it is to implement a certain security
profile.

5.5.5 AHP Criterion 3: Performance
In order to study the performance of the security profiles, in the previous chapter,
we used a simple JAX-WS echo application, which consists of a Web service and
a client in a dedicated switched network; the client sends different sized messages
(from 1 Byte to 1MByte) and the Web service echoes (sends back) the same
message received. Every security mechanism has been tested under the default
settings of its profile to secure the request and response SOAP messages, where
all the tested profiles provide peer authentication (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010).
We measured the time spent in requesting and responding on the client side as
round trip time (RTT), which starts from the moment the client starts initializing a
request to the server until receiving the final response from the server. This
includes for example the time needed to authenticate and obtain an assertion from
an Identity Provider in SAML-based profiles, or an issued token from a Security
Token Service (STS) in STS-based profiles. However, some security profiles,
such as MCS, SSL and SV, require an out-of-band exchange for the digital
certificates. The method and frequency of exchanging the certificates are not part
of the default settings of these profiles; hence the time needed to exchange them
can vary. In order to test the performance of such profiles, we assumed that the
digital certificates already exist on the server as well as the client, and flagged the
Certificates Stores sub-criterion in the AHP model to reflect the dependency on
these certificates as a configuration issue.
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Accordingly, the considered performance parameters are: (1) average RTT, (2)
maximum RTT, and (3) standard deviation RTT.

5.5.6 Data Collection
In order to evaluate the performance of the different security profiles, a
performance test was conducted on various security profiles applied individually
on a simple Web service and tested every time with different initial message sizes.
In Chapter 4: the results were used as basis for the comparison between the
security profiles in terms of performance.
When selecting a security profile to secure a Web service, it is important to
consider the initial data size exchanged between the service provider and client. In
the previous chapter, we demonstrated that some security profiles perform
differently when changing the size of the exchanged data. Therefore, it is
important for the service developer to estimate or measure the expected size of the
exchanged data when selecting a security profile.
In this framework, we used the performance measurements of data sizes that range
from 1 byte and 1 Megabyte. A developer would choose an appropriate selection
window for the application, and then, the results are aggregated accordingly. The
Factor Analysis dimension reduction method (FA) (Kim & Mueller, 1993) was
used to reduce the number of measurements into a single value that describes the
performance measurements of the selected window for each security profile. Since
the number of dimensions (i.e. data size categories) is relatively small, medians
and geometric means can be biased (Li, Hastie & Church, 2007).
The representatives resulted were then normalised to cover the scale from 1 to 9 to
be used in the pair-wise comparison step. The security profile with the largest FA
value for a selected window of data sizes should have a normalised value of 1
(lowest) as this profile has the longest round trip time. Similarly, the security
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profile with the smallest FA value should have the value of 9 (highest) to indicate
that this profile has the best performance, or the shortest round trip time.
In this chapter, the AHP framework used a data size window that covered the
whole range (1 byte to 1 Megabyte). Table 5-4, Table 5-5 and Table 5-6 illustrate
results for the average, standard deviation and maximum RTT, respectively.
Security Profile

1

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

80
80
119
42
52
122
266

Initial Message Size (Byte)
10
100 1 K 10 K 100 K
81
82
84
101
263
80
80
81
98
259
119 119 121
137
295
42
42
43
45
71
52
53
52
55
80
122 124 124
140
303
285 288 294
316
481

FA Value
1M
2055
2051
2109
348
357
2110
2229

Normalised
Value
6.798309
6.854555
5.746259
9
8.719699
5.638189
1

-0.04871
-0.06932
0.33679
-0.85547
-0.75276
0.37639
2.07595

Table 5-4: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (Average RTT Results)
Security Profile

1

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

25
26
29
22
23
23
664

10
28
26
29
22
24
24
957

Initial Message Size (Byte)
100
1K
10 K 100 K
28
28
33
59
27
27
31
57
29
29
33
56
22
23
24
42
23
23
25
41
27
24
29
57
1048 1246 1272
1201

1M
18
15
16
20
24
15
498

FA
Value
-0.34493
-0.34978
-0.344
-0.36063
-0.35538
-0.35418
2.47481

Normalised
Value
8.955704
8.969387
8.95308
9
8.985187
8.981802
1

Table 5-5: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (STDEV RTT Results)
Security
Profile
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

1

10
237
235
295
205
215
282
19218

237
235
274
205
214
282
23250

Initial Message Size (Byte)
100
1K
10 K
236
239
253
235
237
251
275
277
291
205
206
205
215
215
214
282
282
298
22973
30351
30366

FA Value
100 K
400
393
435
218
226
516
26838

1M
2509
2398
2489
381
460
2464
33229

-0.32987
-0.33284
-0.32621
-0.38763
-0.38478
-0.32544
2.47385

Normalised
Value
8.838517
8.846821
8.828285
9
8.992032
8.826132
1

Table 5-6: Factor Analysis and Normalised Values (Max RTT results)
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5.5.7 Pair-wise Comparisons Matrices for Alternatives
In this model, there are 14 pair-wise comparison matrices for the seven
alternatives with respect to all the sub-criteria connected with the alternatives.
Due to space limitations and to avoid repetition, a few representative matrices are
shown in this section. However, all the matrices are provided in Appendix B.
For each sub-criterion within the security criteria, we rely on judgments derived
from the literature study. The words that have been used in literature to describe
the strength of alternatives with respect to a specific sub-criterion are used to
compare these alternatives. The comparisons then are converted to numerical
values using the nine-point scale for pair-wise comparisons (Table 5-2).
For example, in terms of peer authentication, security mechanisms that use
asymmetric key cryptography are considered marginally stronger than those that
use username tokens (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010). Hence, MCS is 3 times more
than UA in a 9-point scale, as shown in Table 5-7. Although all the examined
security profiles guarantee peer-authentication, digital certificates used in the
asymmetric key methods (MCS, SSL, SV, etc…) are usually stronger in
establishing identity than username/password authentication methods (UA and
UDP), which can be sometimes compromised.

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

UA
1
1
3
3
3
3
3

UDP
1
1
3
3
3
3
3

MCS
1/3
1/3
1
1
1
1
1

SSL
1/3
1/3
1
1
1
1
1

SA
1/3
1/3
1
1
1
1
1

SV
1/3
1/3
1
1
1
1
1

STS
1/3
1/3
1
1
1
1
1

Table 5-7: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to
Peer Authentication
The configuration elements (sub-criteria) are also based on judgments. For
instance, we compared the alternatives with respect to the configuration

Bachar Alrouh

94

Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision

Making Approach

flexibility; assuming that implementing the transport layer security profile (SSL)
is the easiest and most straightforward way. Some profiles require configuring
additional options, such as the username based profiles (UA and UDP) which
require some configurations to the keystore on the server-side and the trust-store
on the client-side. Whilst SAML-based profiles require configuring callback
handler on the client side, STS-based profiles require configuring the security
token service node, in addition to the service provider and client nodes, which
make them the most difficult to implement. Table 5-8 shows the values of the
pair-wise judgments with respect to flexibility.

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

UA
1
1
1/2
2
1/2
1/2
1/6

UDP
1
1
1/2
2
1/2
1/2
1/6

MCS
2
2
1
3
1
1
1/5

SSL
1/2
1/2
1/3
1
1/3
1/3
1/7

SA
2
2
1
3
1
1
1/5

SV
2
2
1
3
1
1
1/5

STS
6
6
5
7
5
5
1

Table 5-8: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to
Flexibility
On the other hand, the performance of the different security profiles can be
measured as described in the previous section. Thus, the pair-wise comparisons
here are done based on actual data rather than judgments, as illustrated in
Table 5-9.

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

UA
1
1.01
0.85
1.32
1.28
0.83
0.15

UDP
0.99
1
0.84
1.31
1.27
0.82
0.15

MCS
1.18
1.19
1
1.57
1.52
0.98
0.17

SSL
0.76
0.76
0.64
1
0.97
0.63
0.11

SA
0.78
0.79
0.66
1.03
1
0.65
0.11

SV
1.21
1.22
1.02
1.6
1.55
1
0.18

STS
6.8
6.85
5.75
9
8.72
5.64
1

Table 5-9: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to
Average RTT
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5.5.8 Raised Power Matrices
All the comparison matrices should be raised to a higher power to improve
accuracy (Saaty, 2008). Table 5-10 shows a matrix derived from the comparison
matrix of the flexibility by squaring it twice.

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

UA
357.15
357.15
200.48
591.91
200.48
200.48
53.15

UDP
357.15
357.15
200.48
591.91
200.48
200.48
53.15

MCS
635.35
635.35
356.82
1052.84
356.82
356.82
94.6

SSL
222.16
222.16
124.67
368.37
124.67
124.67
33.08

SA
635.35
635.35
356.82
1052.84
356.82
356.82
94.6

SV
635.35
635.35
356.82
1052.84
356.82
356.82
94.6

STS
2522.64
2522.64
1416.79
4182.67
1416.79
1416.79
376.07

Table 5-10: Raised Power Matrix (Flexibility)

5.5.9 Normalised Matrix and Eigen Vectors
To normalise the previous matrices, each element is divided by the sum of its
column. The Eigen vector is then calculated by dividing the sum of each row of
the normalised matrix by the number of its elements. A representative normalised
matrix of the matrix in Table 5-8 and its Eigen vector are shown in Table 5-11,
while Table 5-12 illustrates the rankings of the alternatives against each subcriterion.
The consistency ratio for this matrix is CI/RI = 1.12% < 10%, so the weights are
accepted.

UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

UA
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

UDP
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

MCS
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

SSL
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

SA
0.18
0.18
0.1
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

SV
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

STS
0.18
0.18
0.10
0.30
0.10
0.10
0.03

Eigen Vector
0.1821
0.1821
0.1023
0.3019
0.1023
0.1023
0.0271

Table 5-11: Normalised Matrix and Eigen Vector (Flexibility)
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Criteria

Sub-criteria

Security

Configuration

Performance

Peer
Authentication
Message
Origin
Authentication
Message
Integrity
Message
Confidentiality
Nonrepudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End
Security
Certificates
Exchange
Users
Database
Security
Service Token
Flexibility
AVR RTT
STD RTT
MAX RTT

Security Profiles
UA
UDP
MCS

SSL

SA

SV

STS

0.0588

0.0588

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.2308

0.2308

0.2308

0.0256

0.0256

0.0256

0.2308

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.0588

0.0588

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.1765

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.1429

0.0323

0.0323

0.0323

0.0323

0.2903

0.2903

0.2903

0.1915

0.1915

0.1915

0.0213

0.0213

0.1915

0.1915

0.0435

0.0435

0.3913

0.3913

0.0435

0.3913

0.0435

0.2903

0.2903

0.0323

0.2903

0.0323

0.0323

0.0323

0.0667

0.0667

0.0667

0.0667

0.0667

0.0667

0.6000

0.1821
0.1554
0.1633
0.1627

0.1821
0.1567
0.1635
0.1628

0.1023
0.1313
0.1632
0.1625

0.3019
0.2057
0.1641
0.1656

0.1023
0.1993
0.1638
0.1655

0.1023
0.1289
0.1638
0.1624

0.0271
0.0229
0.0182
0.0184

Table 5-12: Ratings for the Alternatives on Each Criterion

5.6 Scenarios
In this section we illustrate the usage of our proposed framework by adopting
three common scenarios (Microsoft Corporation, 2005) used by Microsoft to
demonstrate the different Web service security considerations and solutions in
common Web services interactions. Additionally, we augmented these scenarios
to include performance and configuration requirements besides the security
requirements provided by the original solution.
Each scenario starts with a high-level description of the application followed by
an identification of requirements and preferences for the application.
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5.6.1 Public Web Service Scenario (S1)
Description:
A distributor uses Web services to provide catalogue information to online sellers
that provide online shopping services. The sellers access the Web service from
their Web applications to display current items available from the distributor. The
Web service provider has the following requirements:
Web services clients require direct access to the Web service. Sellers accessing
the Web service must be authenticated, and data passed between the service and
clients contains some information, such as account information, that must be
protected while in transit. The Web service provider has a database for the sellers
that are allowed to use this service. A high performance is expected by the clients
as they should get instant responses when using the service.
Solution Factors:
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer we service:


Merchant accounts are stored in a custom database or directory service.



The message data must be protected during transit.



Performance must be considered.

AHP Application
According to the previous description, the three criteria are compared against each
other’s. Within each criterion, the sub-criteria are also pair-compared in terms of
their importance to compose the pair-wise comparison matrix. In this scenario we
assumed the performance should have the highest priority since we are dealing
with an online application. It is strongly more important than configuration.
Security is marginally less important in this application than the performance. The
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matrix is then raised to a higher power and normalised to calculate the Eigen

Security
1
3
1/3
Configuration 1/3 1
1/5
Performance
3
5
1
Consistency Ratio = 3.32 %

Priorities

Performance

Configuration

Security

vector (Priorities), see Table 5-13.

0.2583
0.1047
0.6370

Table 5-13: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect
to the Goal (S1)
With respect to security criteria, each sub-criterion that satisfies a requirement is
considered to be extremely more important than a sub-criterion that does not
represent a requirement in the application (Table 5-14). The security requirements
that should be fulfilled in this application are: peer authentication, integrity,
confidentiality and non-repudiation, while the support of message origin
authentication, authorisation and end-to-end security is not required in this

9
1
9
9
9
1
1

1
1/9
1
1
1
1/9
1/9

1
1/9
1
1
1
1/9
1/9

9
1
9
9
9
1
1

9
1
9
9
9
1
1

Local weight

Non-repudiation

Message
Confidentiality

Message Integrity
1
1/9
1
1
1
1/9
1/9

End-to-End
Security

1
1/9
1
1
1
1/9
1/9

Authorisation

Peer Authentication
Message Origin Authentication
Message Integrity
Message Confidentiality
Non-repudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End Security
Consistency Ratio = 0 %

Message Origin
Authentication

Peer
Authentication

particular application.

0.2308
0.0256
0.2308
0.2308
0.2308
0.0256
0.0256

Table 5-14: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Security (S1)
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Within the configuration criteria, based on the idea that the service provider has a
database for the names of its clients, the user database management option is
extremely more important than managing exchanged certificates out-of-band. All
the Web clients are accessing the service directly, where there is no need to enable

1
9
1
7

Local weight

Security Token
Service

1/9
1
1/9
1/3

Flexibility

Certificates
1
Users DB
9
Security Token Service 1
Flexibility
7
Consistency Ratio = 3.41 %

Users DB

Certificates

the management of security service token. Table 5-15 shows the comparisons.

1/7
3
1/7
1

0.0522
0.5953
0.0522
0.3004

Table 5-15: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Configuration (S1)
For the performance criteria, we presume that the average value of the round trip
time has stronger importance than the standard deviation value, and very stronger

Local weight

MAX RTT

STDEV RTT

AVR RTT

importance than the maximum value, as shown in Table 5-16.

AVR RTT
1
5
7
STDEV RTT 1/5 1
3
MAX RTT
1/7 1/3 1
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 %

0.7306
0.1884
0.0810

Table 5-16: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Performance (S1)
The next step is to calculate the global weights vector by multiplying the local
weight of each sub-criterion by the priority of its criterion, as illustrated in
Table 5-17.
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Criteria

Priorities

Security

0.2583

Configuration

0.1047

Performance

0.6370

Subcriteria

Local weight

Peer Authentication
Message
Origin
Authentication
Message Integrity
Message Confidentiality
Non-repudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End Security
Certificates Exchange
Users Database
Security Service Token
Flexibility
AVR RTT
STD RTT
MAX RTT

0.2308

Global Weight
Criteria
x
subcriteria
0.0596

0.0256

0.0066

0.2308
0.2308
0.2308
0.0256
0.0256
0.0522
0.5953
0.0522
0.3004
0.7306
0.1884
0.0810

0.0596
0.0596
0.0596
0.0066
0.0066
0.0055
0.0623
0.0055
0.0315
0.4654
0.1200
0.0516

Table 5-17: Local and Global Weights (S1)
The results are synthesised by multiplying each alternative weights vector by the
global weights vector. The resulting weights are added for each alternative to
calculate its final priority, as shown in Table 5-18.
Finally, the results can also be presented in the ideal form by dividing each
priority by the maximum priority to make this first ranked alternative an ideal one
with the others getting their proportionate value, as demonstrated in Table 5-19.
The AHP framework suggests the usage of the transport security using SSL to
secure the service because of the tendency towards a high performance in the
given scenario. Transport layer security mechanisms are normally faster than
message layer security profiles and easier to configure. Although this profile is a
point-to-point security mechanism, it is enough to satisfy the security
requirements of the proposed application. Microsoft (Microsoft Corporation,
2005) suggests using Username Token and HTTPs in this scenario, which is an
equivalent to the Transport Security using SSL provided by the Metro Web
service Stack (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010).
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Criteria

Sub-criteria

Security

Configuration

Performance

Peer
Authentication
Message
Origin
Authentication
Message
Integrity
Message
Confidentiality
Nonrepudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End
Security
Certificates
Exchange
Users
Database
Security
Service Token
Flexibility
AVR RTT
STD RTT
MAX RTT

Total Priority
Ranking

Security Profiles
UA
UDP
MCS

SSL

SA

SV

STS

0.0035

0.0035

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0015

0.0015

0.0015

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0015

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0035

0.0035

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0105

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0085

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0002

0.0019

0.0019

0.0019

0.0013

0.0013

0.0013

0.0001

0.0001

0.0013

0.0013

0.0002

0.0002

0.0021

0.0021

0.0002

0.0021

0.0002

0.0181

0.0181

0.002

0.0181

0.002

0.002

0.002

0.0004

0.0004

0.0004

0.0004

0.0004

0.0004

0.0033

0.0057
0.0723
0.0196
0.0084
0.1517
4

0.0057
0.0729
0.0196
0.0084
0.1523
3

0.0032
0.0611
0.0196
0.0084
0.1378
5

0.0095
0.0957
0.0197
0.0085
0.1925
1

0.0032
0.0927
0.0197
0.0085
0.1669
2

0.0032
0.06
0.0197
0.0084
0.1372
6

0.0009
0.0106
0.0022
0.0009
0.0628
7

Table 5-18: Synthesizing to Obtain Final Results and Ranking (S1)
Security Profile
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS

Normalised Priorities
0.1517
0.1523
0.1378
0.1925
0.1669
0.1372
0.0628

Idealised Priorities
0.7959
0.7991
0.7230
1.0000
0.8757
0.7198
0.3295

Ranking
4
3
5
1
2
6
7

Table 5-19: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S1)
In addition, our AHP framework provides an order for the other possible
alternatives. In this scenario, peer-to-peer authentication and configuration,
Transport layer based security profiles are the top of the ranking.
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5.6.2 Intranet Web Service Scenario (S2)
Description:
A company uses an internal application to access operations provided by a Web
services. Mutual authentication is required for all Web services interactions. The
application must support single sign on (SSO) capabilities. Message data are
sensitive and must be protected against unauthorised access and the message must
not be tampered with during transit.
Solution Factors:
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer Web service:


Mutual authentication is required for all Web service interactions.



Applications must support single sign on (SSO) capabilities.



Message data is sensitive and must be protected against unauthorised
access.



The message must not be tampered with during transit.

AHP Application

Security
1
5
3
Configuration 1/5 1
1/3
Performance
1/3 3
1
Consistency Ratio = 3.32 %

Priorities

Performance

Configuration

Security

The pair-wise comparison matrices and results are shown below:

0.6370
0.1047
0.2583

Table 5-20: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect
to the Goal (S2)
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3
1
1
1
1
3
3

1
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/1
1
1

1
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/1
1
1

Local weight

3
1
1
1
1
3
3

End-to-End
Security

3
1
1
1
1
3
3

Authorisation

Non-repudiation

3
1
1
1
1
3
3

Message
Confidentiality

1
1/3
1/3
1/3
1/1
1
1

Message Integrity

Peer Authentication
Message Origin Authentication
Message Integrity
Message Confidentiality
Non-repudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End Security
Consistency Ratio = 0 %

Message Origin
Authentication

Peer
Authentication

Making Approach

0.2308
0.0769
0.0769
0.0769
0.0769
0.2308
0.2308

Table 5-21: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect

Certificates
1
Users DB
1/9
Security Token Service 1/9
Flexibility
1/5
Consistency Ratio = 4.99 %

9
1
1
5

9
1
1
5

5
1/5
1/5
1

Local weight

Flexibility

Security Token
Service

Users DB

Certificates

to the Security (S2)

0.6693
0.0555
0.0555
0.2198

Table 5-22: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect

Local weight

MAX RTT

STDEV RTT

AVR RTT

to the Configuration (S2)

AVR RTT
1
5
7
STDEV RTT 1/5 1
3
MAX RTT
1/7 1/3 1
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 %

0.7306
0.1884
0.0810

Table 5-23: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Performance (S2)
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Security
Profile

Normalised
Priorities

Idealised
Priorities

Ranking

UA

0.1197

0.6411

7

UDP

0.1199

0.6422

6

MCS

0.1593

0.8532

2

SSL

0.1200

0.6427

5

SA

0.1507

0.8072

3

SV

0.1867

1.0000

1

STS

0.1436

0.7691

4

Table 5-24: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S2)
The AHP framework results indicate that using SAML Sender Vouches with
Certificates (SV) is the most appropriate alternative for this kind of applications.
This profile assures the fulfillment of the high security requirement due to the use
of mutual certificates for integrity and confidentiality, while ensuring a good
performance. In addition, the SV profile satisfies the requirement of providing
single sign on capability by using SAML tokens for authorisation.

5.6.3 Multiple Internet Web Service Scenario (S3)
Description:
A travel booking franchise provides a Web application that travel agents can use
to search for and book travel packages. The Web application uses several Web
services to perform the operations of searching for and booking packages. The
travel booking Web application is accessible from the Internet. However, only the
Web application can access the Web services that the application calls. Each Web
service has an independent data store.
The travel booking application has the following features:


Travel agents in a travel franchise help customers to book tour packages.



Two Web services are used: a travel packages Web service, and an online
booking Web service.

Bachar Alrouh

105

Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision

Making Approach



The travel packages Web service provides travel product catalogue
information such as tour dates, itineraries, and prices.



The online booking Web service allows travel agents to book tour
packages on behalf of the customers.



Identity propagation is needed for the online booking Web service because
the database needs to keep a record of each travel agent who makes a
travel request. Customers can go to any travel agent in the franchise to
book a tour.



During peak travel seasons, user activity is high. This means that
performance must be considered.

Solution Factors:
The following factors have to be considered for the distributer Web service:


Travel agent user accounts are stored in a database.



Mutual authentication is required.



SSO support is required.



Performance must be considered.



Sensitive data must be protected against unauthorised access.



Web services are behind a firewall.

AHP Application
The pair-wise comparison matrices and results are illustrated in the tables below.
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Security
1
Configuration 1/5
Performance
1/7
Consistency Ratio =

5
7
1
3
1/3 1
5.59 %

Priorities

Performance

Security

Configuration

Making Approach

0.7306
0.1884
0.0810

Table 5-25: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Main Criteria with Respect

Non-repudiation

Authorisation

End-to-End
Security

Local weight

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Message
Confidentiality

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Message Integrity

Peer Authentication
Message Origin Authentication
Message Integrity
Message Confidentiality
Non-repudiation
Authorisation
End-to-End Security
Consistency Ratio = 0 %

Origin
Message
Authentication

Peer Authentication

to the Goal (S3)

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Table 5-26: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect

1
1
9
3

1/9
1/9
1
1/7

1/3
1/3
7
1

Local weight

Flexibility

Token
Security
Service

Certificates
1
Users DB
1
Security Token Service 9
Flexibility
3
Consistency Ratio = 3.41%

Users DB

Certificates

to the Security (S3)

0.0630
0.0630
0.7186
0.1554

Table 5-27: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Configuration (S3)
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Local weight

MAX RTT

STDEV RTT

AVR RTT

Making Approach

AVR RTT
1
5
7
STDEV RTT 1/5 1
3
MAX RTT
1/7 1/3 1
Consistency Ratio = 5.59 %

0.7306
0.1884
0.0810

Table 5-28: Pair-wise Comparison Matrix for the Sub-criteria with Respect
to the Performance (S3)
Security
Profile

Normalised
Priorities

Idealised
Priorities

Ranking

UA

0.1206

0.5343

6

UDP

0.1207

0.5347

5

MCS

0.1425

0.6312

3

SSL

0.1125

0.4984

7

SA

0.1302

0.5766

4

SV

0.1479

0.6551

2

STS

0.2257

1.0000

1

Table 5-29: Final Results shown as Normalised and Idealised Priorities (S3)
The results recommend using single Security Token Service (STS) to establish a
chain of trust between the server and the client; especially that service providers
and clients are in different managed environments, each with its own resources,
where confidentiality is a major issue. As a confirmation of this recommendation,
the Sun Microsystems Metro User Guide (Sun Microsystems Inc., 2010) and
Microsoft Patterns and Practices Document (Microsoft Corporation, 2005)
indicate using an STS-based security profile for this kind of applications.

5.7 Summary
Selecting the best possible security profile for a Web service in a given
application can be a difficult task for Web services developers, as there are many
different options available to help secure Web services. The selection process is
further complicated by the fact that different systems and projects can have
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different requirements and specifications that drive their security decisions.
Furthermore, securing Web services tends to aggravate the performance of these
services. Therefore, the developer is expected to select a security profile that
satisfies not only the security requirements, but also the performance expectations.
In this chapter, we have provided a novel multi-criteria decision making
framework based on the analytical hierarchy process in order to help developers
prioritise their security, performance and configuration requirements in order to
rank the available alternatives according to their suitability for a specified
application. The data used in building this model has been derived from a
literature study as well as actual performance testing.
While other models (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang & Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar
& Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.; 2011) have focused on the
service consumer point of view to address the Web services composition problem,
this chapter has its focus on the service developer viewpoint during the
development process. We have also provided common security usage scenarios
for Web services and applied the proposed framework on them to test its validity.
The framework results match the security recommendations for these scenarios.
In order to evaluate the applicability of the proposed Multi-Criteria Decision
Making framework in practical settings, we have adopted three common usage
scenarios for Web services security, as presented by Microsoft and Sun.
Comparing the results of the MCDM framework to the suggestions of Microsoft
and Sun, and reaching similar conclusions illustrate the validity of the model.
However, there are other cases where a Web service developer may not be able to
rely solely on documentations of best practice, such as:
1) New or unusual scenarios, where no or very little documentations of best
practice are available.
2) More than one recommended solution can be implemented.

Bachar Alrouh

109

Chapter 5: Selecting Web Services Security Profiles: A Multi-Criteria Decision

Making Approach

3) The

recommended

solution

cannot

be

implemented

due

to

system/configurations limitations.
In addition, our MCDM includes not only the usual security factors, but also
configuration and performance considerations. It rates and provides an order for
all the possible alternatives that can be considered by a Web services developer,
so he/she can select which profile is best to be implemented.
The proposed framework can be implemented as a separate Web service that Web
developers can consult when selecting security profiles for their Web services.
Alternatively, the MCDM model can be extended to cover other quality
dimensions and therefore act as an additional sub-layer that sits at the top of the
Quality of Service (QoS) layer in the Web services protocol stack, as illustrated in
Figure 5-2.

Choreography
Business Process
Orchestration BPEL4WS
MCDM

Management

Transaction
WS-

WS-

Reliability

Security

Quality of Service

Coordination

Context
UDDI

Discovery

WSDL

Description

SOAP
Message
XML
HTTP, JMS, SMTP, FTP, IIOP

Transport Communication

Figure 5-2: The MCDM in the Web Services Stack
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This position enables the MCDM model to rely on the underlying QoS protocols
as they represent the criteria/alternatives, and keeps it independent of the upper
business logic layer and the lower discovery, description, message and transport
layers.
In Appendix C, We present the AHP framework as a generic Java class to perform
the AHP calculations and a Java Main class to run the AHP tool. The framework
and the tool are the outcomes of the third iteration of the DSR cycle (see
section 3.6.3 )
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Chapter 6: Information Hiding in SOAP
Messages: A Steganographic Method for
Web Services
6.1 Overview
Digital steganography is the art and science of hiding communications; a
steganographic system thus embeds secret data in public cover media so as not to
arouse an eavesdropper’s suspicion. There are still very limited methods of
steganography to be used with communication protocols, which represent
unconventional but promising steganography mediums. In this chapter, we discuss
and analyse a number of steganographic studies in text, XML as well as SOAP
messages. Then, we propose a novel steganography method to be used for SOAP
messages within Web services environments. The method is based on rearranging
the order of specific XML elements according to a secret message. This method
has a high imperceptibility; it leaves almost no trail because of using the
communication protocol as a cover medium, and since it keeps the structure and
size of the SOAP message intact. The method is empirically validated using a
feasible scenario so as to indicate its utility and value.

6.2 Steganography vs. Encryption
Secure and secret communication methods are needed for transmitting messages
over the Internet. Cryptography scrambles the message so that it cannot be
understood. However, it makes the message suspicious enough to attract
eavesdropper’s attention. Additionally, due to the increase of computers
capabilities and cipher texts availability, cryptographic techniques could be
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vulnerable. However, this vulnerability can be reduced significantly using
steganography, which is a method of covert communication and information
security.
Unlike encryption, steganography hides even the existence of secret information
rather than hiding its meaning only. Thus, steganography is the art of hiding secret
messages within other innocuous-looking cover files (i.e. images, audio, video,
and text files) so that it cannot be observed. Consequently, steganography aims to
hide the very existence of communication by embedding messages within other
cover objects. As a result, the purpose of steganography is to keep others from
thinking that a secret message even exists within the stego files.
Using only encryption for secret communication draws the attention of others.
Therefore, steganography combined with cryptography raises the security level
and would be the most secure method to go.
Steganography can be considered as a solution to exchange secret information and
news between people around the world over the Internet without any fear of the
message being detected.
Related to steganography but distinct from it, watermarking is a data hiding
technique that protects digital documents, files, or images against removal of
copyright information. Therefore, the goal of steganography is the secret
messages while the goal of watermarking is the cover object itself (Venkatraman,
Abraham & Paprzycki, 2004). Watermarking is the process of embedding a
specific copyright mark into digital documents in the same way. Nevertheless, in
order to detect any break of licensing agreement, a serial number is embedded in
every copy of this digital document. This process is known as fingerprinting.
Text steganography refers to the process of hiding secret information in text files.
For security and imperceptibility reasons, it is very important for stego texts not to
show any detectable artefacts. Thus, readers should not notice or discover the
modifications made in the stego text files. Generally, the redundant information in
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text files is very limited in comparison to that in images and audio files.
Therefore, using text as cover files in steganography represents the most difficult
way of information hiding (Bender et al., 1996).
It is well known that the Web represents the world's premier network and
Extensible Mark-up Language (XML) represents the world's premier data
representation format (Newcomer, 2002). Though, Web services require a data
exchange in the form of XML documents, Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
provides exactly this kind of data transport. Therefore, SOAP supports a common
data transfer protocol for effective communication over the Web (Newcomer,
2002). Thus, XML is playing an increasingly important role in the exchange of a
wide variety of data on the Internet. Therefore, XML documents are considered as
a language of Web pages and digital contents. Moreover, they are used for the
data exchange between organisations.
Basically, a SOAP message is an XML document that contains text. Therefore,
steganography methods used for text files and XML documents can theoretically
be used for SOAP messages. However practically, most of these methods are
infeasible.
In this chapter, we propose a new steganography method to embed secret
information in SOAP messages. This method changes the order of XML elements
according to the secret message to be embedded.
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.3 reviews the related
work on text and XML steganography. Section 6.4 discusses and explains the
concept of information hiding within SOAP messages. Furthermore, our designed
and proposed steganography method is illustrated in Section 6.5. An example
scenario is illustrated in section 6.6. Finally, the conclusion is presented in
Section 6.7.
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6.3 Related Work
There is a relatively small number of text steganography studies in comparison to
that of image video, and audio based steganography. This might be due to the lack
of redundancy in text files (Inoue et al., 2001).
Basically, there are three major methods to hide data in text files. The first
method, open space method, manipulates white spaces in the text. Therefore, it
exploits inter-sentence spacing, end-of-line spaces, and inter-word spacing. The
second method, syntactic method utilises punctuation. However, the third method,
semantic method, manipulates the words of the text themselves (Bender et al.,
1996).
Por & Delina (2008) improved the open space method proposed by Bender et al.
(1996). Accordingly, they proposed a hybrid steganography method for text by
combining both inter-word spacing and inter-paragraph spacing methods. Thus,
whitespaces between words and paragraphs in right-justification of text are used
for data hiding in order to increase the embedding capacity. However, the cover
text was dynamically generated according to the size of the secret message.
Shirali-Shahrez (2008) proposed a new steganography method for texts. This
method is based on the different spelling of some words in English between UK
andUS.Forexample,“centre”hasdifferenttermsinUK(centre)andUS(center).
This can be used to hide a one bit each time a certain spelling occurs in the text.
For example, A US spelling of a word means the secret bit is “0”, while a UK
spelling means thesecretbitis“1”.
Subsequently, the model proposed in (Shirali-Shahreza, 2008) defines a text
steganography method based on substituting the words which have different terms
in UK and US. For example, (Gas) has different terms in UK (Petrol) and US
(Gas).
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Liu, Guo & Zhou (2009) proposed a text steganography method to be used in
online chat. This method is based on an Internet meme named typoglecymia,
which holds that changing the order of word’s middle letters has a slight to no
effect on the ability of skilled readers to understand the text (e.g. Guitar and
Guiatr). Therefore, it used the redundancy found in the interior letters’ order.
Since this letter randomisation equals to the common error made by chatters due
to high speed typewriting, it is likely to be used in online chats, where the text
usually contains mistakes.
However, there are fewer studies and examples of research regarding information
hiding in XML files. Whilst the previous studies provide text steganography
method, these are not necessarily applicable in SOAP messages context due to the
fact that SOAP messages are exchanged and monitored by computer systems
rather than humans. Importantly, using misspelled or alternative words in SOAP
messages would result in the SOAP parsers not being able to handle the SOAP
messages received because they do not comply with the expected semantic.
Inoue et al. (2001) proposed five steganography methods to be used with XML
files. These steganography methods are summarised as follows:
1) The empty elements are represented according to the secret bit; either a
start-tag immediately followed by an end-tag (<img></img>), or an
empty-element tag (<img/>). This technique can embed one bit per empty
element.
2) According to the secret bit, we can either add a white space before the
close bracket (<tag >), or delete (normal with no added spaces) this white
space (<tag>). This technique can embed one bit per tag.
3) Two elements may or may not be exchanged according to the secret bit.
Thus, one bit per an exchange of two elements can be hidden.

Bachar Alrouh

116

Chapter 6: Information Hiding in SOAP Messages: A Steganographic Method for Web
Services

4) The order of attributes in an element can be exchanged to hide the secret
data. Thus, one bit per an exchange of the attributes order can be hidden.
5) Elements that contain each other can be used to hide secret data by
exchanging inner-tags and outer-tags. In this method, one bit per an
exchange can be hidden.
If an element has no content then empty-element tag can be used whether or not it
is declared using the keyword EMPTY. However, the number of such elements in
an XML document is limited and then the capacity of method (1) is limited too.
Additionally, using two formats to represent empty elements in the same
document will arouse the attention of observers. Moreover, the parser may use
only one representation of empty elements rather than two, which invalidate this
method.
Whilst names of XML elements can't contain spaces, there can be a space before
the closing character ">" (<tag >). However, this process will increase the size of
the XML file and the hidden data may be destroyed due to parsing which may
discard these added spaces (secret data).
Additionally, tags are case sensitive and therefore the tag <tag> is different from
the tag <tag >. In other words, the end-tag’snamehastoexactlymatchthestarttag's name. Thus, the method (2) is practically infeasible since it uses a start-tag
different from the end-tag (one tag may contain a white-space).
The order in which attributes are included on an element is not considered
relevant. For example, if an XML parser encounters a specific order of an element
attributes, it does not necessarily have to give us the attributes in the same order.
As a result, method (4) above is infeasible in terms of validity and applicability
even though its capacity is very limited. However, a certain order of information
can be maintained in an XML document if we put this information into elements,
rather than attributes. As a result, method (3) above is a valid and possible
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solution for steganography. Nevertheless, hiding only one secret bit per an
exchange of two elements represents a very small capacity.
Finally, an XML document must have a top-level element and all the other
elements are its children. Furthermore, one and only one root element must be
included in each XML document even if this element has no content. However,
each of these children elements may represent a parent element and therefore have
some sub-elements. Thus, exchanging a parent element with a sub-element
technically looks valid (method (5) above). However, it seems impractical since
the semantics will not make sense and we will get a new and different parent
element by such an exchange. Also, the steganographic capacity of this method is
very limited.
Since XML documents are widely used for data exchange over different networks
and exposed to different threats, XML security become a key concern of
organisations. Thus, Memon, Khawaja & Shah (2008) considered XML
steganography as a new method and solution for secure communication.
Furthermore, they proposed and designed four XML based steganography
methods for the purpose of securing the cover file (XML document) rather than
for the purpose of secret communication. The main aspects of these methods are
as follows:
1) Random characters are inserted inside all tags and their values. So, after
the first character of the first tag one random character is inserted, after the
second character of the first tag two random characters are inserted and so
on. Thus, it mixes up the actual XML data with random fake characters
and therefore increases the size of the stego XML file significantly.
2) XML tags are shuffled (sequentially) in such a way the position of the 1st
tag and its value are swapped with that of the last tag and its value. The
same process happens with the second and the second last tags, and so on.
The large XML file is, the better this technique work.
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3) This is similar to the previous method, however the correct order of
shuffled tags is identified in the attribute value of the root element. Thus,
the first tag is determined by the first character of attribute value while the
second character is randomly generated. Also, this method works better
with large XML files.
4) The sequence of characters in all tags and values are reversed. Thus, the
order of tags’ characters is reversed by moving the last character to
become the first one while the second last one becomes the second
character and so on. As a result, the XML file will look like an encrypted
file since the characters are scrambled in an unreadable form.
Memon, Khawaja & Shah (2008) then suggested combining all these methods
together in one hybrid method to provide better XML security. In conclusion, all
these four methods aim to safeguard the stego XML document against actual
XML content detection rather than against hidden information detection.
Additionally, their goal is the XML content not the hidden data itself. Therefore,
the goal of these methods is totally different from our steganography goal which
is undetectable and covert communication. Nevertheless, the first and fourth
methods are definitely infeasible for steganography since the stego XML arouses
the suspicion of everyone (look like encrypted). The second method may hide a
few bits only, while in the third method, the secret key is included in the stego
file, which is more than enough to extract the hidden message.
SOAP parsers have been developed and they only process XML that conforms to
the SOAP schema and associated structural rules. Zhang, Wang & Sun (2007)
proposed a steganography method depending on the text characteristics of SOAP
technology in order to hide information in SOAP messages. Therefore, the
physical properties of SOAP keywords and namespaces (self-defined) are used as
cover message.

Bachar Alrouh

119

Chapter 6: Information Hiding in SOAP Messages: A Steganographic Method for Web
Services

A character string is initialised by converting every letter in these keywords and
namespaces into lowercases. Coordinating every secret bit with every letter of the
character string, a specific letter is converted into a capital letter only when the
secret bit is “1”. However, the amount of SOAP keywords is limited for short
SOAP message.
Furthermore, the stego SOAP looks suspicious since some characters of this
message are in lowercase shape while others are in uppercase shape. Therefore,
the overall shape of the stego SOAP may attract attention. Last but not least, this
method does not comply with the case-sensitivity nature of XML documents.

6.4 Information Hiding in SOAP Messages
The SOAP protocol is designed to enable the exchange of structured information
(i.e. SOAP messages) over a variety of underlying protocols in decentralised and
distributed environments. This lightweight protocol uses XML technologies to
define a messaging framework that is independent of any specific programming
languages or implementation semantics (Newcomer, 2002).
A SOAP message is an XML document, which consists mainly of “envelope,
header, body and fault elements, as shown in (Figure 6.1).The“Envelope” is the
root element that defines the XML document as a SOAP message. Also, it
indicates the start and the end of the message. Application-specific information
(such as security and reliability) is usually defined within the optional “Header”
element. Additionally, headers may contain commands to SOAP processors either
to understand these headers or to reject the SOAP message. However, the actual
data is defined within the required “Body” element. Thus, mandatory information
that must be delivered to the intended recipient should be included within the
body part of SOAP message. The optional “Fault” element is used to identify
error messages. If an error occurs during SOAP processing, a SOAP fault element
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will be emerge in the body of the message. Then, the sender of the SOAP message
will get the fault response returned.
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<S:Header>…</S:Header>
<S:Body>…
<S:Fault>… </S: Fault >
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
Figure 6.1: SOAP Message Construct
public class BookOrder{
private String isbn;
private String author;
private String bookName;
private int numOfPages;
private String publisher;
private int year;
private double price;
public getters and setters
}
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<S:Body>
<ns2:BookOrder xmlns:ns2="http://service.bookorder.com/">
<book>
<isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn>
<author>Author_1</author>
<bookName>Book_1</ bookName >
<numOfPages>372</numOfPages>
<publisher>Publisher_1</publisher>
< year >2009</year>
<price>29.99</price>
</book>
</ns2:BookOrder>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
Figure 6.2: Example Java Class and Its XML Serialised Instance
When two parties communicate through SOAP messages, the actual data (i.e.
fields and properties of objects or parameters and return values of methods) in the
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sender endpoint are converted (serialised) into an XML stream that conforms to
the SOAP specifications. This serialised XML document is the SOAP message
that needs to be de-serialised at the receiver endpoint to reconstruct the actual
data. Figure 6.2 illustrates an example Java class Book and its XML serialised
class instance.
An endpoint application normally employs a SOAP package to perform the
serialisation and de-serialisation processes, as Web applications and clients care
mainly about the actual data transmitted and not the structure of the SOAP
message. Hence, secret information can be smuggled into SOAP messages, which
provide a perfect cover if the hidden secret message does not damage the SOAP
messages or spoil the actual data.
The main concern of hiding secret information within SOAP messages is how to
do this without the fear of detection. Basically, end users care about the actual
data transmitted but they do not care about other issues like SOAP namespace,
keywords, or the order of elements’attributes.However,thetransmittedmessage
must generate no errors and therefore not to discard the message.
Hiding secret information in a SOAP message means that the mule that is used to
convey the secret message is the communication protocol that governs the actual
data path over a network, instead of using the actual data itself as a cover. This
idea can overcome many of the limitations that faced the conventional
steganography techniques. Traditional techniques hide secret messages inside
digital files, which impose the threat of detecting the secret as these files are
usually saved. Alternatively, a SOAP message leaves almost no trail as they are
normally deleted after receiving the message and de-serializing the actual data. In
addition, a secret piece of information can be divided into multiple smaller
messages and transmitted over several SOAP messages to overcome the size
limitation as well.
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This chapter provides a novel steganography method that manipulates the SOAP
protocol by rearranging the order of the contents and attributes of specific
elements in a SOAP message, where every permutation represents a specific
status according to a secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. For
example, there are 7 sub-elements within the element book in Figure 6.2. These
sub-elements are arranged in a particular order (isbn, author, bookName,
numOfPages, publisher, year, and price). Whilst this order does not have any
importance for the endpoint application, if the order of these sub-elements is
rearranged, the message will still have the same meaning for the endpoint.
For a set of n sub-elements, there are a maximum of n! (factorial of n)
permutations . This means that n! different sequences of order can be presented,
and consequently, n! different symbols can be used in the character set of the
stego script.

6.5 Steganography Framework for SOAP
Messages
Considering the previous concept, we have designed and implemented a data
hiding method that monitors a SOAP message just after its serialisation in the
sender endpoint and before it is sent, analyses its elements and embeds a secret
message accordingly. Figure 6.3 illustrates the general model of data hiding in
SOAP messages.
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SOAP Message

Sender

Secret Message

Embedding

Transmitting

Stego Key
Stego SOAP Message

Extracting
Stego Key
Receiver

SOAP Message

Secret Message

Figure 6.3: SOAP Steganography Model
When the stego SOAP message arrives at the receiver endpoint, the secret
message is extracted using a stego key that is shared between the sender and
receiver.

6.5.1 Embedding Procedures
In our proposed method, the procedure of hiding a secret message within SOAP
consists of the following six steps.
1) Capturing the SOAP message after its serialisation.
2) Analysing its contents to identify all the elements with contents that can be
rearranged to determine if the SOAP message is suitable for embedding
(i.e. has elements with contents that can be rearranged).
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3) Calculating the number of elements that can be used to hide data (N).
4) Permuting every set of sub-elements to reflect a status of a symbol from
the secret message.
5) If all the symbols of the secret message can be hidden in one SOAP
message (the number of available sets N is greater than the length of the
secret message M), then the sub-elements of the set M+1 will be
rearranged to indicate the end of secret message.
6) Otherwise, if M>N, only a part of the secret message is sent in this SOAP
message and the last set of sub-elements is rearranged to indicate that
more hidden data are to arrive within the next received SOAP message.
Figure 6.4 illustrates the algorithm used for secret message embedding.
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Figure 6.4: Secret Message Embedding
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6.5.2 Extracting Procedure

The receiver, once the SOAP message is received, extracts hidden data by
analysing the contents of each eligible element using the secret key to reveal the
hidden symbol, as described in the following section and illustrated in the
Extracting Algorithm (Figure 6.5):
1) Capturing the SOAP message and checking its validity and capability to
be a stego SOAP message.
2) Calculating the number of elements that might be used for data hiding (N).
3) Extracting the hidden symbols by analysing the sub-elements order of each
element in the stego SOAP message.
4) Stop the process either if the extracted symbol indicates that the message
isnotastegoSOAPoriftheextractedsymbolmeans“EndofMessage”.
5) Iftheextractedsymbolmeans“ToContinue”,newSOAPmessagetobe
captured and analysed as in 1.
6) Otherwise, the next symbol will be extracted and so on until we get the
entire secret message embedded.
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Figure 6.5: Secret Message Extracting
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6.6 Example Scenario
Our proposed method for SOAP message-based steganography is empirically
tested and validated. Thus, we demonstrate the data embedding and extracting
algorithms using an example, yet realistic, Web service scenario (Book Order): In
this scenario, we assume that the person who wants to send secret data is the
“BookBuyer”whiletheintendedrecipientofsecretmessageisthe“BookSeller”.
However,theoppositescenarioistruesincethe“BookSeller”cansendasecret
messagetothe“BookBuyer”usingthesameprocedure.Theexamplescenariois:
Step 1: The Book Buyer (Service Requester) selects the books to be ordered from
the Book Seller Website (service Provider).
Step2: The Book Order will be formatted as XML document and then an XMLbased SOAP message will be generated in order to be sent to the Service Provider.
Step 3: An application is used at the sender (Book Buyer) endpoint in order to
capture each SOAP message before it has been sent (prevents the sending process
of SOAP).
Step 4: The “Embedding Procedure” of our SOAP steganography method is
applied on each captured SOAP message.
Step 5: The outputofthe“Embeddingprocedure”(astegoSOAPmessage)will
be sent to the Book Seller.
Step 6: The Book Seller receives the SOAP message (a stego SOAP) and a similar
application to that used at the Book Buyer endpoint will be used at the Book
Seller endpoint to capture each received SOAP message.
Step 7: The “Extracting Procedure” of our SOAP steganography method is
applied on each captured SOAP message in order to extract the secret message
from the stego SOAP messages.
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As illustrated in Figure 6.6, a book buyer is sending two messages to the book
seller. The first SOAP message contains an order for four books, while the second
is an order for three books. A secret message “Hello” is smuggled by shuffling
the sub-elements of each “book” element in these SOAP messages. The first
message contains only part of the hidden message “Hel” and “to continue”
symbol (Figure 6.7), while the second message contains the rest of the message
“lo” and the “end of message” symbol (Figure 6.8). Because each element has
five sub-elements, 5! (=120) different cases can be represented. That covers all the
alphabetical characters (in small and capital caps), numbers and most of the
printing characters. For the purpose of demonstration, we used a shifted version of
the ASCII table as a secret key for data hiding, see Appendix D. More complex
secret keys can be used in real implementations.
For this experiment, NetBeans IDE 6.9 is used to develop the Web service (book
seller service) and the client (book buyer application). The Web service is built as
a Web application and deployed on a Glass Fish 2.2 application server. All the
SOAP messages are intercepted in the sender endpoint just after being serialised
into XML messages and before the SOAP messages are sent to the receiver
endpoint. Similarly, all the coming SOAP messages are intercepted before they
are de-serialised. The SOAP messages are also monitored and recorded using
soapUI in the standard HTTP proxy mode.
SOAP Message 1

SOAP Message 2

Book Order 1

Book Order 2

Book 1: “H”

Book 5: “l”

Book 2: “e”

Book 6: “o”

Book 3: “l”

Book 7: “E.O.M.”

Book 4: “T.C.”

Figure 6.6: Example Secret Message Hidden in Two SOAP Messages
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Book Order (Step 1):
Order 1:
1-Book 1: isbn=1-11-111111-1, author=Author_1, name=Book_1, pages=111, publisher=Publisher_1
2-Book 2: isbn=2-22-222222-2, author=Author_2, name=Book_2, pages=222, publisher=Publisher_2
3-Book 3: isbn=3-33-333333-3, author=Author_3, name=Book_3, pages=333, publisher=Publisher_3
4-Book 4: isbn=4-44-444444-4, author=Author_4, name=Book_4, pages =444, publisher=Publisher_4
Cover SOAP (Stes 2+3):
Stego SOAP (Steps 4+5+6+7):
SOAP Message 1:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope

SOAP Message 1:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope

xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Body>
<S:Body>
<ns2:bookOrder
<ns2:bookOrder
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/">
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/">
<book>
<book>
<isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn>
<author>Author_1</author>
<author>Author_1</author>
<pages>111</pages>
<name>Book_1</name>
<publisher>Publisher_1</publisher>
<pages>111</pages>
<name>Book_1</name>
<publisher>Publisher_1</publisher>
<isbn>1-11-111111-1</isbn>
</book>
</book>
<book>
<book>
<isbn>2-22-222222-2</isbn>
<name>Book_2</name>
<author>Author_2</author>
<publisher>Publisher_2</publisher>
<name>Book_2</name>
<pages>222</pages>
<pages>222</pages>
<isbn>2-22-222222-2</isbn>
<publisher>Publisher_2</publisher>
<author>Author_2</author>
</book>
</book>
<book>
<book>
<isbn>3-33-333333-3</isbn>
<pages>333</pages>
<author>Author_3</author>
<isbn>3-33-333333-3</isbn>
<name>Book_3</name>
<publisher>Publisher_3</publisher>
<pages>333</pages>
<name>Book_3</name>
<publisher>Publisher_3</publisher>
<author>Author_3</author>
</book>
</book>
<book>
<book>
<isbn>4-44-444444-4</isbn>
<publisher>Publisher_4</publisher>
<author>Author_4</author>
<isbn>4-44-444444-4</isbn>
<name>Book_4</name>
<author>Author_4</author>
<pages>444</pages>
<name>Book_4</name>
<publisher>Publisher_4</publisher>
<pages>444</pages>
</book>
</book>
</ns2:bookOrder>
</ns2:bookOrder>
</S:Body>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
</S:Envelope>
Secret Message:
“Hel”
Stego Key:
NO EMBEDDING = isbn, author, name, pages, publisher.
“H”Character=author, pages, publisher, name, isbn
“e”Character=name,publisher,pages,isbn,author
“l”Character=pages,isbn,publisher,name,author
“ToContinue”=publisher,isbn,author,name,pages

Figure 6.7: Hiding the First Part of the Secret Message
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Book Order (Step 1):
Order 2:
1-Book 5: isbn=5-55-555555-5, author=Author_5, name=Book_5, pages =555, publisher=Publisher_5
2-Book 6: isbn=6-66-666666-6, author=Author_6, name=Book_6, pages =666, publisher=Publisher_6
3-Book 7: isbn=7-77-777777-7, author=Author_7, name=Book_7, pages =777, publisher=Publisher_7
Cover SOAP (Stes 2+3):
Stego SOAP (Steps 4+5+6+7):
SOAP Message 2:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope

SOAP Message 2:
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope

xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Body>
<S:Body>
<ns2:bookOrder
<ns2:bookOrder
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/">
xmlns:ns2="http://service.testproject/">
<book>
<book>
<isbn>5-55-555555-5</isbn>
<pages>555</pages>
<author>Author_5</author>
<isbn>5-55-555555-5</isbn>
<name>Book_5</name>
<publisher>Publisger_5</publisher>
<pages>555</pages>
<name>Book_5</name>
<publisher>Publisger_5</publisher>
<author>Author_5</author>
</book>
</book>
<book>
<book>
<isbn>6-66-666666-6</isbn>
<pages>666</pages>
<author>Author_6</author>
<author>Author_6</author>
<name>Book_6</name>
<name>Book_6</name>
<pages>666</pages>
<isbn>6-66-666666-6</isbn>
<publisher>Publisger_6</publisher>
<publisher>Publisger_6</publisher>
</book>
</book>
<book>
<book>
<isbn>7-77-777777-7</isbn>
<publisher>Publisher_7</publisher>
<author>Author_7</author>
<pages>777</pages>
<name>Book_7</name >
<name>Book_7</name >
<pages>777</pages>
<author>Author_7</author>
<publisher>Publisher_7</publisher>
<isbn>7-77-777777-7</isbn>
</book>
</book>
</ns2:bookOrder>
</ns2:bookOrder>
</S:Body>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
</S:Envelope>
Secret Message:
“lo"
Stego Key:
NO EMBEDDING = isbn, author, name, pages, publisher.
“l”Character=pages,isbn,publisher,name,author
“o”Character = pages, author, name, isbn, publisher
“EndofMessage”=publisher,pages,name,author,isbn

Figure 6.8: Hiding the Second Part of the Secret Message

6.7 Summary
In this chapter, we have provided a communication protocol-based steganography
method that manipulates the SOAP protocol. This method monitors a SOAP
message just after its serialisation in the sender endpoint and before it is sent. It
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analyses the SOAP elements and embeds a secret message accordingly by
rearranging the order of the contents and attributes of specific elements in a SOAP
message, where every permutation represents a specific symbol according to a
secret key shared between the sender and the receiver. As a result, the provided
method has a high resistance against detection since it uses the communication
protocol as a cover medium rather than the traditional digital files. Furthermore,
the stego SOAP message has the same size of the original message. The method is
tested and validated using a feasible scenario so as to demonstrate its utility and
applicability.
Security is an ongoing process and as soon as developers fix one set of problems
crackers will find yet another way to break these systems. Essentially, the
applications must be flexible in order to add new security features as needed.
Furthermore, anyone on the Internet can intercept the data transmitted between
different sites. Thus, distributed applications require higher security levels than
internal applications.
Encryption can be used to preserve data security but the technologies required for
encryption cause problems with firewalls and they don’t work very well on the
Internet. Encryption has another problem; if both communication parties don’t
have the same platform then the receiver can’t decrypt the sender’s message.
Thus, even a common encryption scheme usually can only work on a limited
number of platforms (Mueller, 2001). As a result, our SOAP based steganography
method could be a reasonable solution for transmitted data security. It can be used
as a secret communication channel over different kinds of networks regardless of
the applications used at the distributed endpoints. As a kind of communication
security, the process of surely knowing the identity of the other communicating
party (on the other end of a channel) is known as Authentication. Additionally,
associated HTTP Authentication Framework with HTTP 1.1 provides better
authentication means between communicating parties. Thus, the HTTP
Authentication Framework secures only the authentication portion of the
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communication. Furthermore, Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions
(S/MIME) and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) use digital certificates to provide
security which relies on the use of public key cryptography. Usually, using static
keys provides the crackers more chance to break the system than using dynamic
keys (Mueller, 2001).
As a result, we can use the proposed SOAP steganography method to convey
information of authentication which necessary to authenticate the communicating
parties. Additionally, encryption keys can be embedded and transmitted in order
to get dynamic keys instead of static keys, and therefore add another level of
system security.
On the other hand, the proposed method does not specify any prior stego keys as it
assumes that the initial exchange of the original stego key occurs out-of-band.
Hence, traditional cryptography-based key management mechanisms can be used
to facilitate the sharing of the stego key, and the overhead of the key sharing relies
mainly on the selected key management approach. For example, a simple
username authentication mechanism can be used to generate a symmetric stego
key that is used for both embedding and extracting hidden messages within the
SOAP messages in all future communications between the client and the server.
For this approach, the client does not possess any key of its own, but instead
authenticate to the server using a username/password token, which is used to
generate a single shared stego key at run time. Alternatively, more advanced STSbased approaches may be used to generate and share a sequence of stego keys,
where each key is valid for a certain period of time or number of exchanged
messages.
Basically, encryption algorithms represent a conventional solution of information
security but the encrypted data is still there and everyone can observe it over the
network. Thus, our SOAP steganography algorithm provides a way of secret
communications over the Internet. It can overcome the limitations and challenges
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of encryption as well as it can be used with encryption to provide a double layer
of security.
In conclusion, the proposed SOAP steganography method can be used for a
variety of applications such as; authentication, proof of identity, watermarking,
and message hashing. The framework is the outcome of the fourth iteration of the
DSR cycle (see section 3.6.4 )
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Chapter 7: Conclusion
7.1 Overview
Web services technology is the modern way of connecting businesses. Companies
nowadays expose their business functionalities, via the Web, as services for their
customers or other companies to use. However, this exposure represents a
complex dilemma of finding the right balance between security and performance.
This is because developers have to secure these Web services to limit their
vulnerability to attacks, while ensuring that an acceptable level of performance is
provided by these services. In view of that, the aim of the research presented in
this thesis was to develop a prototypical framework that aids Web services
architects to select the best suited security approach that satisfies the security and
performance requirements of a given Web services application.
In this chapter, we summarise the research conclusions and findings and identify
the research limitations in order to provide future research directions.

7.2 Thesis Overview and Findings
This thesis was organised in seven chapters. The following section summarises
the previous first six chapters:
Chapter 1 is the introduction of this thesis, in which the main motivations for
conducting this research were explored. The discussion highlighted the impact of
applying security on the performance of Web services and indicated that whilst
the different Web services security profiles achieve different levels of security,
they also have different performance measurements. This emphasised the
importance of selecting a suitable security approach that provides the best balance
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between security and performance, in accordance with the system requirements
and limitations. Consequently, the aim of this research was identified as
developing a framework to help Web services architect to choose the best suited
security profile that fulfils the security and performance expectations of a given
Web services application. Thereafter, the steps to achieve this aim were identified
as the objectives of this thesis and research approach was briefly explained.
Chapter 2 provided an overview of Web services security and its related
standards. Several approaches to analyse the performance of Web services
security were discussed and the trade-off between security and performance was
identified as a major challenge that faces the development of secure Web services.
The literature review indicates that this trade-off varies depending on the applied
security approach. Furthermore, there are many cases that require employing a
combination of security specifications to achieve the required level and coverage
of security. Web services development environments normally provide developers
with predefined sets of security profiles and allow for their parameters to be
adjusted according to the security preferences of the developed system. The
chapter pointed towards the importance of evaluating the security coverage of
these profiles against their performance when selecting a security profile for a
Web service, which requires a performance testing model as well as a systematic
framework to rate these security profiles.
Chapter 3 explained the research method undertaken in this thesis. A theoretical
grounding of Design Science Research (DSR) is provided in this chapter.
Thereafter, The DSR paradigm is justified as a suitable approach for this research.
The research conducted in this thesis is then explained in line with the DSR
research cycle. Four iterations were identified and presented to accomplish the
development of the selection model: (1) Library Research, (2) Laboratory
Experiments, (3) Configuration Requirements and (4) Alternative Solution Based
on Steganography.
Chapter 4 compared the performance of several security profiles for Web
services. The performance evaluation indicated that profiles that use transport
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level security are always faster than message level security profiles. In addition,
Message level security protocols have a scalability problem when large messages
are exchanged, unlike SSL-based profiles. Security profiles that utilise username
tokens perform better than mutual certificates security, especially when
exchanging small size messages. Moreover, the performance of SAML-based
profiles is controlled by their underlying security profile. STS-based security
profiles perform massively less than non-STS profiles and should only be
considered when the service and its client are located in different domains.
Finally, reliability has a huge impact on the performance of Web services as it
increases the number and size of SOAP messages, due to the addition of reliability
assertions, as well as the process time.
Chapter 5 proposed a multi-criteria decision making framework, based on the
Analytical Hierarchy Process (AHP) approach. This framework incorporates not
only the security requirements, but also the performance considerations as well as
the configuration constraints of these security profiles. This approach emphasises
the service developer viewpoint and focuses on analysing the performance of the
security profiles rather than the individual security features. The framework is
then empirically validated and evaluated using a scenario-driven approach to
demonstrate its utility and value. The different scenarios illustrate various
situations where the decision making framework is used to make informed
decisions to rank various security profiles in order to select the most suitable one
for each scenario.
Chapter 6 provided an alternative approach to secure Web services based on data
hiding (steganography). This approach utilises a communication protocol-based
steganography method that manipulates the SOAP protocol by analysing the
SOAP message and hiding a secret message accordingly. The idea is based on
rearranging the order of the XML tags of specific elements in a SOAP message.
Every permutation of these tags represents a specific symbol according to a secret
key shared between the sender and the receiver. This steganographical approach
has a high resistance against detection since it uses the communication protocol as
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a cover medium rather than the traditional digital files and keeps the original size
of the SOAP message intact. This method is then illustrated using a feasible
scenario to demonstrate its applicability and effectiveness.

7.3 Research Contribution
This thesis contributes to the theory and the demonstration of theory in practice.
The integration of the diverse but interconnected domains of Web services,
security, performance analysis, decision making and steganography enriches the
quality of this research. The main contributions of this thesis are as follows:

7.3.1 A Performance Evaluation Model
This model builds upon current research and extends it to provide guidelines for
Web services developers to aid them when selecting a security approach for their
applications. The proposed model helps to establish a better understanding of the
trade-off between security and performance in the field of Web services research
by measuring the performance of the security profiles and comparing the results to
classify the various security profiles according to their performance.
Several studies tried to tackle the problem of mapping security to performance in
the area of Web services (Shirasuna et al., 2004; Moralis et al., 2007; Novakouski
et al, 2010), but they generally compared the performance of different
specifications and standards that are rarely used in a stand-alone manner. Instead,
security profiles are normally used as they combine standards that are guaranteed
to work in a harmony. Therefore, the approach we followed to develop this model
was to evaluate the performance of these security profiles, rather than the
underlying standards. This approach shields the developers from the complexity
of these standards and allows them to direct their efforts towards fulfilling the
security as well as performance requirements of their applications.
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In addition, our proposed model is more comprehensive than those developed in
previous research as we tested a larger number of security and reliability profiles
that represent various security methods using different message sizes.

7.3.2 A Multi-Criteria Decision Making Framework
The second contribution have provided a novel multi-criteria decision making
framework, and accompanying software, based on the analytical hierarchy process
in order to help developers to rate security profiles according to the security,
performance and configuration requirements. The approach we followed to
develop this framework is to focus on the service developer viewpoint during the
development process. This is different from other related work that studied Web
services composition (Wu & Chang, 2007; Zuo, Wang & Wu, 2008; Godse, Sonar
& Mulik, 2008; Casola et al., 2009; Thirumaran et al.; 2011), and therefore
focused on the service consumer point of view. This framework provides
developers with a useful tool for the selection of security profiles for Web services
applications. This particularly useful in new or unusual cases, where no or very
little documentations of best practice are available. There are cases where several
profiles can be implemented, or when all the profiles cannot entirely satisfies all
the requirements, where this tool can help to determine the best option.
We have also provided three common security usage scenarios for Web services
and tested them using the proposed framework to demonstrate its validity and
effectiveness. The framework results match the security recommendations for
these scenarios.

7.3.3 A Steganographic Method for Web Services
In this thesis, we provide an alternative approach to secure Web services based on
a novel Steganography method. This method was developed to overcome the
limitations of using cryptographic-based techniques. The first major issue we
identified with the traditional security and reliability approaches is their impact on
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the size of SOAP-messages, as illustrated in Appendix A. In addition although
encryption can be used to establish data security but the technologies required for
encryption are not always firewall-friendly, and they are in many cases platformdependant (Mueller, 2001).
Therefore, we provided a communication protocol-based steganography method
that manipulates the SOAP protocol by monitoring a SOAP message just after its
serialisation in the sender endpoint and before it is sent, analysing the SOAP
elements and embedding a secret message accordingly. This is done by
rearranging the order of specific elements in the SOAP message in a way where
every permutation represents a specific character according to a secret key shared
between the sender and the receiver. This method has a high resistance against
detection because it uses the communication protocol as a cover medium rather
than the traditional digital files. The proposed data hiding method produces stego
SOAP messages that have exactly the same size of the original message, which
makes it undetectable using conventional detecting methods. Furthermore, a secret
message can be sent over a number of messages, providing that there is a
continues interaction between the sender and the receiver, which overcomes the
capacity issue of traditional data hiding techniques that are limited by the size of
the cover medium. There are several applications that can benefit from this
method, such as authentication and watermarking.
In conclusion, this research has suggested a prototypical framework for selecting a
security profiles for Web services applications. This framework consists of three
approaches: (1) a performance analysis approach that provides Web services
developers with a performance guideline, (2) a multi-criteria decision making
approach that aids developer to make an informed decision when selecting a
security profile based on different requirements and limitations, and finally (3) a
steganographic method that can be used as an alternative to cryptographic-based
security methods.
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Table 7-1 shows how this research successfully accomplished the objectives
established in section 1.3.
Research Objective

Objective 1: Design a performance
testing model to understand
the cost of applying security
profiles on the performance
of Web services.

Objective 2: Develop a decision making
framework based on the
results gathered from the
testing model as well as the
security requirements and
system limitations.
Objective 3: Evaluate the developed
framework through the use
of real scenarios so as to
indicatetheframework’s
utility and value.

Accomplishments
The first objective was achieved
in Chapter 4:
Several experiments were conducted
to compare the performance of
security profiles. The results were
analysed and presented.

We accomplished these objectives
in Chapter 5:
A MCDM framework based on the
AHP was developed. A generic AHP
software tool was also developed to
be used as an instantiation of the
framework. Three different scenarios
were used to validate the framework.

This objective was met in Chapter 6:
Objective 4: Explore and evaluate the
feasibility of using
steganography as an
alternative approach to
secure Web services.

We have developed an algorithm for
embedding and extracting hidden
messages in/from SOAP messages
using a novel steganographic
method. This method is based on
XML-tags shuffling. The method is
validated through the use of a real
scenario.

Table 7-1: Accomplishments of The Research Objectives
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7.4 Research Limitations and Future Work
During this course of this study, few issues were identified as limitations that may
require further addressing in future work.
The first limitation of this research is the number of security profiles we
evaluated, although we carefully selected a number of security profiles so they are
representatives of the different security methods, token types, security layer and
security coverage. We consider that there are more profiles that can be tested to
enhance the performance testing model. These profiles can also be tested using
different configurations, platforms and implementations so as to expand the scope
of this model.
The AHP framework can be improved by conducting rigorous pair-wise
comparisons using a number of experts in the field of Web services security, and
then integrating the group judgment in one overall framework. It is also
advantageous to conduct further validations and consider expanding the AHP
hierarchy by including other criteria and sub-criteria, such as cost and usability.
This thesis has also presented a data hiding method based on XML shuffling
technique. However, this method can only be applied to SOAP messages that have
a complex payload structure (in order to have enough XML tags to shuffle).
Messages with simple payload structures cannot be used with this method in its
current form. Exploring other approaches to hide data in Web services may
present an interesting future research. In addition, this method can be further
developed and implemented to be used in a variety of applications, such as
watermarking, establishing identity and reliable messaging.
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Appendix A
Examples of SOAP Messages Based on a One Character Initial Message

Simple (No Security)
UA
MCS

Number of SOAP
requests
1
1
1

Reliable Messaging

4

Profile

Request length (Bytes)
205
7693
7285
5674
(1222+1672+1144+1636)

Number of SOAP
responses
1
1
1
4

Response
length
(Bytes)
217
5345
5877
5710
(1222+2143+777+1568)

Example 1: Simple WS (No Security)
1

Request

Response

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<S:Body>
<ns2:sendEcho
xmlns:ns2="http://s00r0.server.bash/">
<echoText>A</echoText>
</ns2:sendEcho>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope
xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">
<S:Body>
<ns2:sendEchoResponse
xmlns:ns2="http://s00r0.server.bash/">
<return>A</return>
</ns2:sendEchoResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
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Example 2: Username Authentication with Symmetric Key (UA)
1

Request

Response

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"
xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<S:Header>
<To
wsu:Id="_5006"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS01R0WSServi
ce</To>
<Action
wsu:Id="_5005"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s01r0.server.bash/EchoS01R0WS/sendEchoRequest</Action>
<ReplyTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>
</ReplyTo>
<MessageID
wsu:Id="_5003"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:f780f110-9efd-47ed-aa59e5acc61368b5</MessageID>
<wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1">
<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:50:35Z</wsu:Created>
<wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:55:35Z</wsu:Expires>
</wsu:Timestamp>
<xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5002"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/>
<ds:KeyInfo
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"
xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"
xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"
xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">
<S:Header>
<To wsu:Id="_5005" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To>
<Action
wsu:Id="_5003"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s01r0.server.bash/EchoS01R0WS/sendEchoResponse</Action>
<MessageID
wsu:Id="_5002"
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:09bc6aba-46eb-422d-871cf5a97d63a528</MessageID>
<RelatesTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:f780f110-9efd-47ed-aa59-e5acc61368b5</RelatesTo>
<wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1">
<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:50:37Z</wsu:Created>
<wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:55:37Z</wsu:Expires>
</wsu:Timestamp>
<xenc:ReferenceList xmlns=""
xmlns:ns16="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns17="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:DataReference URI="#_5007"/>
</xenc:ReferenceList>
<ds:Signature Id="_1"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/>
</ds:CanonicalizationMethod>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5002">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>leCh8+B0DZ9FV73NIZBEGKZmeGw=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5003">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>JyDAngE0Rm2fAfB7WIYDJ5eG8kI=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>

<xenc:CipherValue>E9460LKVK7uQog7QdWhlOp2Bb/ffPoCIez3J4UhSbriSZ3Ds4xB9/MvJj+sJSIeai7ZtztrML9dEQfU8Ov43bTNX+Jj5vvsJ
NN94TdSD9Oa0wGsbqLvnZIDQgxWNo7XFlrq8r5zzp2aU141pcPEpRbQuYdpTcu0CFDlMtu5B1g0=</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedKey>
<xenc:ReferenceList xmlns=""
xmlns:ns16="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns17="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/>
<xenc:DataReference URI="#_5009"/>
</xenc:ReferenceList>
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5009"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Element"
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xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<ds:KeyInfo
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:Reference
URI="#_5002"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security1.1#EncryptedKey"/>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>3di4cQ/jAcVfnkgw2vljdWDwns7AxpVRJq+D/DXeouWcuxLNSDxKsAmQYfE+pXjzAUZRyaq9V0rsKbHrvQRwM1S6b
9dUf2WLnsgZOJ7CboMkg3dtWgqneYS0luOikzgf3BO2b/gZMatnS6/FJpCosHQeB1D046kF1ru2fN2GSejNa1fk26/Qu8LWjnQFk9Vj10qlHuY
gb2/SprJulH5mgEhOx4PLv2+GS6L9xdTIslpfV5RTtjoIrp8/BHb9mhfEKRfMqCppfFCOyDga3GX9fIY7GkeYuDPdOyTRJ0Es201Aw0byUBlz
SQWtdqkkL7q8vRnUc8uhDDB/A7CrU0lNxGwrTyh9YUwNjn1mFHSGohBy0VHRiFAF0y0+uj1aadCWvCgEsvsdseYlqBr+OtTD2sip/y1mYP
Vsre2xe5obXmJzFXzJriQrcZz208MjMOE5Vvz+U0PY/RRUqfXQdtkUxQnGs/T01yh7+E3R3LMCrhk3w+PISuNLCSPG0Sf6lrUA</xenc:Ciph
erValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
<ds:Signature Id="_1"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/>
</ds:CanonicalizationMethod>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#hmac-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5003">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>AiAgXvnVHF6eatthuPwzG4A/hw8=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5004">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>5Ab1ebo4/FraGgck/A8iDx1J9+I=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5005">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>cpHaSaANqa1Ctogh/9Gv6rbbivs=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5006">
<ds:Transforms>

<ds:Reference URI="#_5004">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>pOE9k50Odm1bpagrnYxikFnj8IQ=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5005">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>Nd/8wVmBdLowQKMblBRYK+6xcjA=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5006">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>6QWqKtiSnibxN8alXBJ+aUy1yVA=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_3">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>Dji/v8LpUM1zccDNhJsHd6fVaH8=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>nUNYjCespsZKXbVKWnE0TdkFVWA=</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security1.1#EncryptedKeySHA1">uVSGWduakDJe2qHFnEZ4dUt/ljU=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S:Header>
<S:Body wsu:Id="_5006">
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5007"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<ds:KeyInfo
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">
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<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>BLoJ2F/86smJfhXz7WZzid7Dx4Y=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5007">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>LX/ljKbElCK0/l0OY6BTLEW1WVk=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_3">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>Kzo9PEsY7D3nnraB42PZO+XbG+U=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#uuid_3aed497d-ff1c-4a37-964e-56f9189d080c">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>XbDgClGFz2z0OMkdeDN4xlMrMEo=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:SignatureValue>4RPUOnA4IDzOyMG/ZwGJ9TAhC+o=</ds:SignatureValue>
<ds:KeyInfo>
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference wsu:Id="uuid_c1149094-08fa-49ea-996f-a8ea9ce37b56">
<wsse:Reference
URI="#_5002"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security1.1#EncryptedKey"/>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S:Header>
<S:Body wsu:Id="_5007">
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/wssecureconversation/200512">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<ds:KeyInfo
xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">
<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:Reference
URI="#_5002"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security1.1#EncryptedKey"/>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
<wsse:KeyIdentifier
EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/oasis-wss-soap-message-security1.1#EncryptedKeySHA1">uVSGWduakDJe2qHFnEZ4dUt/ljU=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>rnfTD8vqOU7YuMiZKbuvxath4/uStxTsxh/yuGVmvvC+OKzNAKOzHFxBTp/hIgHNl0eAGrJHJ7bD2/xuM6wnLMidQO
UyZ1nEOtATqOWPAl7VVauurHg48JxE2WzEcbVKpLK/XaeyOyUOQFjXvljqHuc8dPfGlZ1GM+wQ0Ggwvpg=</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
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</ds:KeyInfo>
<xenc:CipherData>
<xenc:CipherValue>KVFK0+8PB54BvOq1oT2AoC0JV6odWJX+CH0quyzD2lRd08Gf4Qd+0r2f9xdMOjVeWGqPmCP618PwK4X5RNjW68I
N4FOI4S0Rv4/qpc65ygF49fgDRy4hwsYay97QQ6/4n/22a5rFjf9sQW93Tb99dQ==</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
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Example 3: Mutual Certificates (MCS)
1

Request

Response

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/"

xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"

xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"

xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"

xmlns:exc14n="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"

xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:wsse="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:wsu="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">

xmlns:xenc="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#">

<S:Header>

<S:Header>

<To

wsu:Id="_5005"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS02R0WSServi
ce</To>

<To wsu:Id="_5005" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To>
<Action

wsu:Id="_5003"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s02r0.server.bash/EchoS02R0WS/sendEchoResponse</Action>

<Action

wsu:Id="_5004"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s02r0.server.bash/EchoS02R0WS/sendEchoRequest</Action>
<ReplyTo wsu:Id="_5003" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">

wsu:Id="_5002"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:b922c13e-e733-4f08-bab2-

<RelatesTo wsu:Id="_5004" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:28076cd2-4ceb-40d6-ae9c-6de83f5b03c6</RelatesTo>

<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>

<wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1">

</ReplyTo>
<MessageID

<MessageID
a92c34e88b8c</MessageID>

<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3"
wsu:Id="_5002"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:28076cd2-4ceb-40d6-ae9c-

6de83f5b03c6</MessageID>
<wsse:Security S:mustUnderstand="1">

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

<wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:53:05Z</wsu:Created>

<wsu:Timestamp wsu:Id="_3"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"
secureconversation/200512">

<wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:58:05Z</wsu:Expires>
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">

</wsu:Timestamp>
<xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5007"

<wsu:Created>2008-11-02T23:53:05Z</wsu:Created>

xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

<wsu:Expires>2008-11-02T23:58:05Z</wsu:Expires>

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">

</wsu:Timestamp>

<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/>

<wsse:BinarySecurityToken

<ds:KeyInfo

EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"

xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">

ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3"

<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

wsu:Id="uuid_a18fed82-16fb-4ba7-addb-bb886f30134f"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

<wsse:KeyIdentifier
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"

secureconversation/200512">MIIDDzCCAnigAwIBAgIBAzANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFADBOMQswCQYDVQQGEwJBVTETMBEGA1UECB

ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-

MKU29tZS1TdGF0ZTEMMAoGA1UEChMDU1VOMQwwCgYDVQQLEwNKV1MxDjAMBgNVBAMTBVNVTkNBMB4XDTA3MDMxM

1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">/mItfvuFdS7A0GCysE71TFRxP2c=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>

jEwMjQ0MFoXDTE3MDMwOTEwMjQ0MFowbzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQVUxEzARBgNVBAgTClNvbWUtU3RhdGUxITAfBgNVBAoTG
EludGVybmV0IFdpZGdpdHMgUHR5IEx0ZDEMMAoGA1UECxMDU1VOMRowGAYDVQQDExF4d3NzZWN1cml0eWNsaWVudDCBnz

</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
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ANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQEFAAOBjQAwgYkCgYEAvYxVZKIzVdGMSBkW4bYnV80MV/RgQKV1bf/DoMTX8laMO45P6rlEarxQiOYrgzuYp

<xenc:CipherData>

+snzz2XM0S6o3JGQtXQuzDwcwPkH55bHFwHgtOMzxG4SQ653a5Dzh04nsmJvxvbncNH/XNaWfHaC0JHBEfNCMwRebYocxYM92pq/G5
OGyECAwEAAaOB2zCB2DAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMCwGCWCGSAGG+EIBDQQfFh1PcGVuU1NMIEdlbmVyYXRlZCBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0

<xenc:CipherValue>l8HHf0gE3XIqazuL/U2x/bZOC8t0NC5fs04Q/uq5RU9R6AT9iPTEb9i/ab/3LNFwnUFy67m3zfQmbMuKeaE+otneBEEHX

ZTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQU/mItfvuFdS7A0GCysE71TFRxP2cwfgYDVR0jBHcwdYAUZ7plxs6VyOOOTSFyojDV0/YYjJWhUqRQME4xCzAJB

8K6m0vjNfG7Hc2wIRgQO2Ef8MDQOaaMFP1ZKSoK9bLXo9xD+hQ1jXCtCUNL1VaiEJgcxAOtDl/uOfI=</xenc:CipherValue>

gNVBAYTAkFVMRMwEQYDVQQIEwpTb21lLVN0YXRlMQwwCgYDVQQKEwNTVU4xDDAKBgNVBAsTA0pXUzEOMAwGA1UEAx

</xenc:CipherData>

MFU1VOQ0GCCQDbHkJaq6KijjANBgkqhkiG9w0BAQQFAAOBgQBEnRdcQeMyCYqOHw2jbPOPUlvu07bZe7sI3ly/Qz+4mkrFctqMSupgh

<xenc:ReferenceList>

QtLv9dZcqDOUFLCGMse7+l5MG00VawzsoVe242iXzJB111ePzhhppIPOHXXtflj/JD2U4Qz75C/dfdd5AAZbqGSFtZh7pyE8Ot1vOq7R48/bH
uvTsEVUQ==</wsse:BinarySecurityToken>
<xenc:EncryptedKey Id="_5007"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

<xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/>
</xenc:ReferenceList>
</xenc:EncryptedKey>

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">

<ds:Signature Id="_1"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#rsa-oaep-mgf1p"/>
<ds:KeyInfo

<ds:SignedInfo>

xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xsi:type="keyInfo">

<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">

<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/>

<wsse:KeyIdentifier

</ds:CanonicalizationMethod>

EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-

<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5002">

1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>

<ds:Transforms>

</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">

</ds:KeyInfo>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>

<xenc:CipherData>

</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>

<xenc:CipherValue>mYictXCXb4po/chiQP+x6+UTZv3ZFuIccHYzOx9J6M1HPSmWYLDEUE8EkKU4W6YTU8Y0uopjlH6Dgsun+wqItDU
mKj0Yg3whFCNWlXvvltS9conN6J3KSZTz85zK1LY8mAmcSTTegplRlsqCtuPUYNWV7/+1br4+JBUSgOfPGy0=</xenc:CipherValue>

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>fZevxFpoUe0O+ib+4cJ5c/5QtAI=</ds:DigestValue>

</xenc:CipherData>

</ds:Reference>

<xenc:ReferenceList>

<ds:Reference URI="#_5003">

<xenc:DataReference URI="#_5008"/>

<ds:Transforms>

</xenc:ReferenceList>

<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">

</xenc:EncryptedKey>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>

<ds:Signature Id="_1"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">

</ds:Transform>
xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">
<ds:SignedInfo>
<ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsse S"/>
</ds:CanonicalizationMethod>
<ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#rsa-sha1"/>

</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>5tMtOXddKS5hpu/EssMo5gLSMGY=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5004">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
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<ds:Reference URI="#_5002">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>+YMQSKO6KUAZZiZRNK2Aw/X5IyU=</ds:DigestValue>

</ds:Transforms>

</ds:Reference>

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

<ds:Reference URI="#_5005">

<ds:DigestValue>c2r5I0nidByse48vZ1s5K7gVX4E=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5003">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>

<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>Nd/8wVmBdLowQKMblBRYK+6xcjA=</ds:DigestValue>

</ds:Transforms>

</ds:Reference>

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

<ds:Reference URI="#_5006">

<ds:DigestValue>bfaj3tu9jIeOXTrb3JWtYD+ZKaI=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5004">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>

<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>K56DINu9+dyLCrPwOAmcTiV1fZU=</ds:DigestValue>

</ds:Transforms>

</ds:Reference>

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

<ds:Reference URI="#_3">

<ds:DigestValue>BAhm4BLMooiBr1NI9rwLm+1OYY4=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
<ds:Reference URI="#_5005">
<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

<ds:Transforms>
<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">
<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/>
</ds:Transform>
</ds:Transforms>
<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>
<ds:DigestValue>X9xUde9yklabvg1xhmtQscPwbkw=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>
</ds:SignedInfo>

<ds:DigestValue>X2+HYlWW9NOqjhw54V+HbcSKkDM=</ds:DigestValue>
</ds:Reference>

<ds:SignatureValue>bpomFxcblaE+EMDNt6RRaXAmYkZTKTK94tmzlvq0WnXni5iBcMXpBP5elLM+b87a8NWQ8IHdlIEaz3/r0wOOmz3fh

<ds:Reference URI="#_5006">

wiSiEOIaoN9BR8iGziUeZ3jzjbfIBdeq7pQr9MK8j9MELgto4MSotim/csImXLrE3Y+O1cX7OomIfb3sNU=</ds:SignatureValue>

<ds:Transforms>

<ds:KeyInfo>
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<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">

<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="S"/>

<wsse:KeyIdentifier

</ds:Transform>

EncodingType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-soap-message-security-1.0#Base64Binary"

</ds:Transforms>

ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-x509-token-profile-

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

1.0#X509SubjectKeyIdentifier">dVE29ysyFW/iD1la3ddePzM6IWo=</wsse:KeyIdentifier>

<ds:DigestValue>UOc+OFH9SsG+7m2KsX0TO4y4unQ=</ds:DigestValue>

</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

</ds:Reference>

</ds:KeyInfo>

<ds:Reference URI="#_3">

</ds:Signature>

<ds:Transforms>

</wsse:Security>

<ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#">

</S:Header>

<exc14n:InclusiveNamespaces PrefixList="wsu wsse S"/>

<S:Body wsu:Id="_5006">

</ds:Transform>

<xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008"

</ds:Transforms>

Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content"

<ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#sha1"/>

xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

<ds:DigestValue>X9xUde9yklabvg1xhmtQscPwbkw=</ds:DigestValue>

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">

</ds:Reference>

<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>

</ds:SignedInfo>

<xenc:CipherData>

<ds:SignatureValue>YjI9Ee0jJOZkepquOFmUigXb4Ms1VlDEj7bqzvMvIsSk42FAFkHQrteiqkLcZqym/NEsuZGbuneTf8384KEl76Ik67EXT9

<xenc:CipherValue>Dq6GxW9E98czYA6sGGGnCDSUal5+t5moWseIth61pp1wkKbGNdFOTMvHoLTE82btl/+01KHhkEUV8G8bhvbyklXt6

R4yLwS6v5CD5TUmYmvGTjrM0sy3+JN8khG3QoXgqST7vKLycfPYRzlA7PkdsNb7MG5QN+KYBdvypY=</ds:SignatureValue>

+8rPQkNChbrCP2cQENN+uEo8TTN2lxcs2fetBU1W8ddR+BZrjhzo1jA1y4h5OGJ25M0592I0tzuF0DLXuA=</xenc:CipherValue>

<ds:KeyInfo>

</xenc:CipherData>

<wsse:SecurityTokenReference>

</xenc:EncryptedData>

<wsse:Reference
URI="#uuid_a18fed82-16fb-4ba7-addb-bb886f30134f"

</S:Body>
ValueType="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-

</S:Envelope>

wss-x509-token-profile-1.0#X509v3"/>
</wsse:SecurityTokenReference>
</ds:KeyInfo>
</ds:Signature>
</wsse:Security>
</S:Header>
<S:Body wsu:Id="_5006">
<xenc:EncryptedData Id="_5008"
Type="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#Content"
xmlns:ns10="http://www.w3.org/2003/05/soap-envelope"

xmlns:ns11="http://docs.oasis-open.org/ws-sx/ws-

secureconversation/200512">
<xenc:EncryptionMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#aes128-cbc"/>
<xenc:CipherData>
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<xenc:CipherValue>KX4UCZjxjepkkAHbJDsCt2UbXvLNXODxLUD8AU1axYGV/hoPjo1fFjuDu94m6XvcoyqwKfXVZKMMmiklMddg+hm
R+wK1T3tUY+TtuP/tmd/bNFQkSmoN+RfU0LfAx8DaNnqvuz9QJt1Ujm3mEQqbjg==</xenc:CipherValue>
</xenc:CipherData>
</xenc:EncryptedData>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
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Example 4: Reliable Messaging

1

Request

Response

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Header>
<To

<S:Header>
<To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To>

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To>

<Action
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/CreateSequenceResponse</

<Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/CreateSequence</Action>
<ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>
</ReplyTo>
<MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:5e9caaa4-c296-4972-b9c1-8910e573978f</MessageID>

Action>
<MessageID

<RelatesTo

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:5e9caaa4-c296-4972-b9c1-

8910e573978f</RelatesTo>

</S:Header>

</S:Header>

<S:Body>

<S:Body>

<ns2:CreateSequence

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:3416b50a-2bbc-49ed-90e5-

f221b11ada10</MessageID>

<ns2:CreateSequenceResponse

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">

<ns2:AcksTo>

<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>

<ns3:Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</ns3:Address>

<ns2:Accept>

</ns2:AcksTo>

<ns2:AcksTo>

<ns2:Offer>
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier>
</ns2:Offer>
</ns2:CreateSequence>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

<ns3:Address>http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSService</ns3:Ad
dress>
</ns2:AcksTo>
</ns2:Accept>
</ns2:CreateSequenceResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>
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<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Header>
<To
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To>
<Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s00r1.server.bash/EchoS00R1WS/sendEchoRequest</Action>
<ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>
</ReplyTo>
<MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:a4129c51-bfa1-4e96-9933-5b8b39ae4afe</MessageID>
<ns2:Sequence

<S:Header>
<To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To>
<Action
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://s00r1.server.bash/EchoS00R1WS/sendEchoResponse</Action>
<MessageID

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:b973c467-e39f-4061-8d8c-

07312d279191</MessageID>
<RelatesTo

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:a4129c51-bfa1-4e96-9933-

5b8b39ae4afe</RelatesTo>
<ns2:Sequence
xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>
<ns2:MessageNumber>1</ns2:MessageNumber>
</ns2:Sequence>
<ns2:AckRequested

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier>
<ns2:MessageNumber>1</ns2:MessageNumber>
</ns2:Sequence>
<ns2:AckRequested
xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>
</ns2:AckRequested>

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier>
</ns2:AckRequested>
<ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement

</S:Header>

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

<S:Body>

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

<ns2:sendEcho xmlns:ns2="http://s00r1.server.bash/">
<echoText>A</echoText>
</ns2:sendEcho>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>
<ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="1"/>
</ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement>
</S:Header>
<S:Body>
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<ns2:sendEchoResponse xmlns:ns2="http://s00r1.server.bash/">
<return>A</return>
</ns2:sendEchoResponse>
</S:Body>
</S:Envelope>

3

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Header>

<S:Header>

<ns2:Sequence

<ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">

<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>

<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>

<ns2:MessageNumber>2</ns2:MessageNumber>

<ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="2"/>

<ns2:LastMessage/>

</ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement>

</ns2:Sequence>
<To
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ
ice</To>
<Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/LastMessage</Action>

<Action
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/LastMessage</Action>
</S:Header>
<S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>

<ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>
</ReplyTo>
<MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:fa473ac0-a927-4075-96b5-45d84a5aa03e</MessageID>
</S:Header>
<S:Body/>
</S:Envelope>

4

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Envelope xmlns:S="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/soap/envelope/">

<S:Header>

<S:Header>

<ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement

<To xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</To>

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

<Action

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/TerminateSequence</Actio

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

n>

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">

<MessageID

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:0d92d0cb-43a7-4fd9-95f8-

fdc13ecbd40b</MessageID>
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<ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier>
<ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="1"/>
</ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement>
<To

<RelatesTo

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:eb4cd190-e4cc-46da-a17f-

31a72a2131cc</RelatesTo>
<ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement
xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://cspgbba_desk.disc.stjohns.brunel.ac.uk:4040/EchoWebApplication/EchoS00R1WSServ

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

ice</To>

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

<Action xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm/TerminateSequence</Action>
<ReplyTo xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">
<Address>http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing/anonymous</Address>
</ReplyTo>
<MessageID xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing">uuid:eb4cd190-e4cc-46da-a17f-31a72a2131cc</MessageID>

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>
<ns2:AcknowledgementRange Lower="1" Upper="2"/>
</ns2:SequenceAcknowledgement>

</S:Header>

</S:Header>

<S:Body>

<S:Body>

<ns2:TerminateSequence

<ns2:TerminateSequence

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns2="http://schemas.xmlsoap.org/ws/2005/02/rm"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns3="http://www.w3.org/2005/08/addressing"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns4="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-secext-1.0.xsd"

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:a0c16e3b-523e-47db-af6e-76233d7bbe0d</ns2:Identifier>
</ns2:TerminateSequence>

xmlns:ns5="http://docs.oasis-open.org/wss/2004/01/oasis-200401-wss-wssecurity-utility-1.0.xsd"
xmlns:ns6="http://schemas.microsoft.com/ws/2006/05/rm">
<ns2:Identifier>uuid:559afeed-9662-400c-9bc2-e15c2443c98f</ns2:Identifier>
</ns2:TerminateSequence>

</S:Body>

</S:Body>

</S:Envelope>

</S:Envelope>
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AHP Matrices
Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Peer Authentication
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
UDP
1
1
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
MCS
3
3
1
1
1
1
SSL
3
3
1
1
1
1
SA
3
3
1
1
1
1
SV
3
3
1
1
1
1
STS
3
3
1
1
1
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.0588
0.0588
0.1765
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.1765

SV
0.1765

STS
0.33
0.33
1
1
1
1
1

STS
0.1765

0.1765

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Origin Authentication
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
STS
UA
1
1
1
9
9
9
UDP
1
1
1
9
9
9
MCS
1
1
1
9
9
9
SSL
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
1
SA
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
1
SV
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
1
STS
1
1
1
9
9
9
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.2308
0.2308
0.2308
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.0256

SV
0.0256

Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1429
0.1429
0.1429
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.1429

STS
0.0256

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Integrity
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
1
1
1
UDP
1
1
1
1
1
MCS
1
1
1
1
1
SSL
1
1
1
1
1
SA
1
1
1
1
1
SV
1
1
1
1
1
STS
1
1
1
1
1

0.2308

STS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SV
0.1429

1
1
1
0.11
0.11
0.11
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STS
0.1429

0.1429
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Message Confidentiality
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
UDP
1
1
0.33
0.33
0.33
0.33
MCS
3
3
1
1
1
1
SSL
3
3
1
1
1
1
SA
3
3
1
1
1
1
SV
3
3
1
1
1
1
STS
3
3
1
1
1
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.0588
0.0588
0.1765
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.1765

SV
0.1765

SSL

SA
0.1429

SSL

SA
0.0323

STS

STS
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

STS
0.1429

0.1429

STS
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
1

SV
0.2903

0.1765

1
1
1
1
1
1
1

SV
0.1429

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Authorization
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
1
1
0.11
UDP
1
1
1
1
0.11
MCS
1
1
1
1
0.11
SSL
1
1
1
1
0.11
SA
9
9
9
9
1
SV
9
9
9
9
1
STS
9
9
9
9
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.0323
0.0323
0.0323
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

0.33
0.33
1
1
1
1
1

0.1765

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Nonrepudiation
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
1
1
1
UDP
1
1
1
1
1
MCS
1
1
1
1
1
SSL
1
1
1
1
1
SA
1
1
1
1
1
SV
1
1
1
1
1
STS
1
1
1
1
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1429
0.1429
0.1429
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

STS

0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
1

STS
0.2903

0.2903

XVI

Appendix B

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to End-to-End Security
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
1
9
9
1
UDP
1
1
1
9
9
1
MCS
1
1
1
9
9
1
SSL
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
0.11
SA
0.11
0.11
0.11
1
1
0.11
SV
1
1
1
9
9
1
STS
1
1
1
9
9
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1915
0.1915
0.1915
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.0213

SV
0.0213

SSL

SA
0.2903

Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.2903
0.2903
0.0323
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.2903

STS

STS
1
1
9
9
1
9
1

STS
0.2903

SV

0.0323

STS
9
9
1
9
1
1
1

SV
0.0323

0.1915

0.11
0.11
1
1
0.11
1
0.11

SV
0.0323

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Users DB
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
UA
1
1
9
1
9
UDP
1
1
9
1
9
MCS
0.11
0.11
1
0.11
1
SSL
1
1
9
1
9
SA
0.11
0.11
1
0.11
1
SV
0.11
0.11
1
0.11
1
STS
0.11
0.11
1
0.11
1

1
1
1
0.11
0.11
1
1

0.1915

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Certificates
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
0.11
0.11
1
UDP
1
1
0.11
0.11
1
MCS
9
9
1
1
9
SSL
9
9
1
1
9
SA
1
1
0.11
0.11
1
SV
9
9
1
1
9
STS
1
1
0.11
0.11
1
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.0323
0.0323
0.2903
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

STS

9
9
1
9
1
1
1

STS
0.0323

0.0323
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Security Service Token
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
SV
UA
1
1
1
1
1
1
UDP
1
1
1
1
1
1
MCS
1
1
1
1
1
1
SSL
1
1
1
1
1
1
SA
1
1
1
1
1
1
SV
1
1
1
1
1
1
STS
9
9
9
9
9
9
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.0667
0.0667
0.0667
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.0667

SV
0.0667

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to Flexibility
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
UA
1
1
2
0.5
2
UDP
1
1
2
0.5
2
MCS
0.5
0.5
1
0.33
1
SSL
2
2
3
1
3
SA
0.5
0.5
1
0.33
1
SV
0.5
0.5
1
0.33
1
STS
0.17
0.17
0.2
0.14
0.2
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1821
0.1821
0.1023
Consistency Ratio= 1.12%

SSL

SA
0.3019

Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1554
0.1567
0.1313
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL
0.2057

STS

SV

STS
6
6
5
7
5
5
1

STS
0.1023

SV

0.0271

STS
1.21
1.22
1.02
1.6
1.55
1
0.18

SV
0.1993

0.6

2
2
1
3
1
1
0.2

SV

SA

0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
1

0.0667

0.1023

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to AVR RTT
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
UA
1
0.99
1.18
0.76
0.78
UDP
1.01
1
1.19
0.76
0.79
MCS
0.85
0.84
1
0.64
0.66
SSL
1.32
1.31
1.57
1
1.03
SA
1.28
1.27
1.52
0.97
1
SV
0.83
0.82
0.98
0.63
0.65
STS
0.15
0.15
0.17
0.11
0.11

STS

6.8
6.85
5.75
9
8.72
5.64
1

STS
0.1289

0.0229
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Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to STD RTT
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
UA
1
1
1
1
1
UDP
1
1
1
1
1
MCS
1
1
1
0.99
1
SSL
1
1
1.01
1
1
SA
1
1
1
1
1
SV
1
1
1
1
1
STS
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1633
0.1635
0.1632
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SSL

SA
0.1641

SSL

0.1638

SA
0.1656

STS
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.11

SV

Pairwise Comparison Matrix for the Alternatives with Respect to MAX RTT
Matrix
UA
UDP
MCS
SSL
SA
UA
1
1
1
0.98
0.98
UDP
1
1
1
0.98
0.98
MCS
1
1
1
0.98
0.98
SSL
1.02
1.02
1.02
1
1
SA
1.02
1.02
1.02
1
1
SV
1
1
1
0.98
0.98
STS
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
0.11
Eigen Vector
UA
UDP
MCS
0.1627
0.1628
0.1625
Consistency Ratio= 0.00%

SV

STS
0.1638

SV

0.0182

STS
1
1
1
1.02
1.02
1
0.11

SV
0.1655

8.96
8.97
8.95
9
8.99
8.98
1

8.84
8.85
8.83
9
8.99
8.83
1

STS
0.1624

0.0184
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Appendix C
A Generic AHP Tool
A Generic Java Class to Perform the AHP Calculations
1 public class AHP
2{
3 //The number of Criteria, Sub-Criteria and Alternatives
4
5 public double numOfCriteria;
6 public int[] numOfSubCriteria;
7 public int numOfAlternatives;
8 //Pair-wise Comparison Matrices
9 public double[][] criteriaMatrix;
10 public double[][][] subCriteriaMatrix;
11 public double[][][][] alternativesMatrix;
12 //Squared Matrices
13 public double[][] criteriaSquaredMatrix;
14 public double[][][] subCriteriaSquaredMatrix;
15 public double[][][][] alternativesSquaredMatrix;
16 //Normalized Matrices
17 public double[][] criteriaNormalizedMatrix;
18 public double[][][] subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix;
19 public double[][][][] alternativesNormalizedMatrix;
20 //Eigen Vectors
21 public double[] criteriaEigenVector;
22 public double[][] subCriteriaEigenVector;
23 public double[][][] alternativesEigenVector;
24 //Weighted Sum Vectors
25 public double[] criteriaWeightedSum;
26 public double[][] subCriteriaWeightedSum;
27 public double[][][] alternativesWeightedSum;
28 //Global Weights Matrices
29 public double[][] globalWeight;
30 //scoresVector Array
31 public double[][][] scoresVector;
32 public double[] results;
33 //Consistancy Ratios
34 public double criteriaConsistancyRatio;
35 public double[] subCriteriaConsistancyRatio;
36 public double[][] alternativesConsistancyRatio;
37 //Saaty Random Consistancy Indices
38 private static final double[] randomConsistancyIndices = new double[]
39 {
40
0,0,0,0.58,0.89,1.11,1.25,1.35,1.40,1.45,1.49
41 };
42
43 public AHP(int numOfCriteria, int[] numOfSubCriteria, int numOfAlternatives)
44 {
45
if (numOfCriteria == numOfSubCriteria.length)
46
{
47
//Initialize The numbers
48
this.numOfCriteria = numOfCriteria;
49
this.numOfSubCriteria = numOfSubCriteria;
50
this.numOfAlternatives = numOfAlternatives;
51
///Initialize the Matrices
52
criteriaMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria];
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53
criteriaSquaredMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria];
54
criteriaNormalizedMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][numOfCriteria];
55
subCriteriaMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][];
56
subCriteriaSquaredMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][];
57
subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix = new double[numOfCriteria][][];
58
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaMatrix.length; i++)
59
{
60
subCriteriaMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]];
61
subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]];
62
subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]][numOfSubCriteria[i]];
63
}
64
alternativesMatrix = new double[criteriaMatrix.length][][][];
65
alternativesSquaredMatrix = new double[criteriaSquaredMatrix.length][][][];
66
alternativesNormalizedMatrix = new double[criteriaNormalizedMatrix.length][][][];
67
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++)
68
{
69
alternativesMatrix[i] = new
double[subCriteriaMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives];
70
alternativesSquaredMatrix[i] = new
double[subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives];
71
alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i] = new
double[subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i].length][numOfAlternatives][numOfAlternatives];
72
}
73
74
//Initialise Vectors
75
criteriaEigenVector = new double[criteriaMatrix.length];
76
criteriaWeightedSum = new double[criteriaSquaredMatrix.length];
77
subCriteriaEigenVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][];
78
subCriteriaWeightedSum = new double[criteriaWeightedSum.length][];
79
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++)
80
{
81
subCriteriaEigenVector[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]];
82
subCriteriaWeightedSum[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]];
83
}
84
alternativesEigenVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][][];
85
alternativesWeightedSum = new double[criteriaWeightedSum.length][][];
86
scoresVector = new double[criteriaEigenVector.length][][];
87
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesEigenVector.length; i++)
88
{
89
alternativesEigenVector[i] = new
double[subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length][numOfAlternatives];
90
alternativesWeightedSum[i] = new
double[subCriteriaWeightedSum[i].length][numOfAlternatives];
91
scoresVector[i] = new double[subCriteriaWeightedSum[i].length][numOfAlternatives];
92
}
93
94
//
95
results = new double[numOfAlternatives];
96
//Initialize Consistancy Ratios
97
criteriaConsistancyRatio = 0;
98
subCriteriaConsistancyRatio = new double[criteriaMatrix.length];
99
alternativesConsistancyRatio = new double[criteriaMatrix.length][];
100
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++)
101
{
102
alternativesConsistancyRatio[i] = new double[subCriteriaMatrix[i].length];
103
}
104
//
105
globalWeight = new double[numOfCriteria][];
106
for (int i = 0; i < globalWeight.length; i++)
107
{
108
globalWeight[i] = new double[numOfSubCriteria[i]];
109
}
110
} else
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111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164
165
166
167
168
169
170
171
172
173

{
System.out.println("numOfCriteria <> numOfSubCriteria.length");
System.exit(0);
}
}
public void squareMatrices()
{
//Calculate the Squared Matrices
criteriaSquaredMatrix = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(criteriaMatrix));
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaMatrix.length; i++)
{
subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i] = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(subCriteriaMatrix[i]));
}
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesMatrix.length; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < alternativesMatrix[i].length; j++)
{
alternativesSquaredMatrix[i][j] = squareMatrix(squareMatrix(alternativesMatrix[i][j]));
}
}
}
private double[][] squareMatrix(double[][] array)
{
double[][] squaredMatrix = new double[array.length][array.length];
for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++)
{
for (int k = 0; k < array.length; k++)
{
squaredMatrix[i][j] += array[i][k] * array[k][j];
}
}
}
return squaredMatrix;
}
public void normalizeMatrices()
{
//Calculate the Normalized Matrices
criteriaNormalizedMatrix = normalizeMatrix(criteriaSquaredMatrix);
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaSquaredMatrix.length; i++)
{
subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i] = normalizeMatrix(subCriteriaSquaredMatrix[i]);
}
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesSquaredMatrix.length; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < alternativesSquaredMatrix[i].length; j++)
{
alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i][j] = normalizeMatrix(alternativesSquaredMatrix[i][j]);
}
}
}
private double[][] normalizeMatrix(double[][] array)
{
double[][] normalizedMatrix = new double[array.length][array.length];
double[] columnSum = new double[array.length];
for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++)
{
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174
for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
175
{
176
normalizedMatrix[i][j] = array[i][j];
177
columnSum[j] += normalizedMatrix[i][j];
178
}
179
}
180
181
for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
182
{
183
for (int j = 0; j < array.length; j++)
184
{
185
normalizedMatrix[i][j] = normalizedMatrix[i][j] / columnSum[j];
186
}
187
}
188
return normalizedMatrix;
189 }
190
191 public void calculateEigenVectors()
192 {
193
//Calculate Eigen Vectors
194
criteriaEigenVector = calculateEigenVector(criteriaNormalizedMatrix);
195
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++)
196
{
197
subCriteriaEigenVector[i] = calculateEigenVector(subCriteriaNormalizedMatrix[i]);
198
}
199
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesEigenVector.length; i++)
200
{
201
for (int j = 0; j < alternativesEigenVector[i].length; j++)
202
{
203
alternativesEigenVector[i][j] = calculateEigenVector(alternativesNormalizedMatrix[i][j]);
204
}
205
}
206 }
207
208 private double[] calculateEigenVector(double[][] array)
209 {
210
double[] eVector = new double[array.length];
211
for (int i = 0; i < array.length; i++)
212
{
213
for (int j = 0; j < array[i].length; j++)
214
{
215
eVector[i] += array[i][j];
216
}
217
eVector[i] = eVector[i] / array.length;
218
}
219
return eVector;
220 }
221
222 public void calculateWeightedSums()
223 {
224
//Calculate Weighted Sums
225
criteriaWeightedSum = calculateWeightedSum(criteriaMatrix, criteriaEigenVector);
226
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaWeightedSum.length; i++)
227
{
228
subCriteriaWeightedSum[i] = calculateWeightedSum(subCriteriaMatrix[i],
subCriteriaEigenVector[i]);
229
}
230
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesWeightedSum.length; i++)
231
{
232
for (int j = 0; j < alternativesWeightedSum[i].length; j++)
233
{
234
alternativesWeightedSum[i][j] = calculateWeightedSum(alternativesMatrix[i][j],
alternativesEigenVector[i][j]);
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235
}
236
}
237 }
238
239 private double[] calculateWeightedSum(double[][] matrix, double[] eigenVector)
240 {
241
double[] weightedSum = new double[eigenVector.length];
242
for (int i = 0; i < matrix.length; i++)
243
{
244
for (int j = 0; j < matrix[i].length; j++)
245
{
246
weightedSum[i] += matrix[i][j] * eigenVector[j];
247
}
248
}
249
return weightedSum;
250 }
251
252 public void calculateConsistencyRatios()
253 {
254
criteriaConsistancyRatio = calculateConsistancyRatio(criteriaWeightedSum, criteriaEigenVector);
255
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaWeightedSum.length; i++)
256
{
257
subCriteriaConsistancyRatio[i] = calculateConsistancyRatio(subCriteriaWeightedSum[i],
subCriteriaEigenVector[i]);
258
}
259
for (int i = 0; i < alternativesWeightedSum.length; i++)
260
{
261
for (int j = 0; j < alternativesWeightedSum[i].length; j++)
262
{
263
alternativesConsistancyRatio[i][j] = calculateConsistancyRatio(alternativesWeightedSum[i][j],
alternativesEigenVector[i][j]);
264
}
265
}
266 }
267
268 private double calculateConsistancyRatio(double[] weightedSum, double[] eigenVector)
269 {
270
double eigenValue = 0;
271
for (int i = 0; i < weightedSum.length; i++)
272
{
273
eigenValue += weightedSum[i] / eigenVector[i];
274
}
275
eigenValue = eigenValue / weightedSum.length;
276
double ci = (eigenValue - (eigenVector.length)) / (eigenVector.length - 1);
277
double ri = randomConsistancyIndices[eigenVector.length];
278
double consistancyRatio = ci / ri;
279
return consistancyRatio;
280 }
281
282 public void calculateGlobalWeight()
283 {
284
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++)
285
{
286
globalWeight[i] = new double[subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length];
287
for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++)
288
{
289
globalWeight[i][j] = criteriaEigenVector[i] * subCriteriaEigenVector[i][j];
290
}
291
}
292 }
293
294 public void calculateScores()
295 {
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296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321 }

for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++)
{
for (int k = 0; k < alternativesEigenVector[i][j].length; k++)
{
scoresVector[i][j][k] = globalWeight[i][j] * alternativesEigenVector[i][j][k];
}
}
}
}
public void calculateResultsVector()
{
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteriaEigenVector.length; i++)
{
for (int j = 0; j < subCriteriaEigenVector[i].length; j++)
{
for (int k = 0; k < alternativesEigenVector[i][j].length; k++)
{
results[k] += scoresVector[i][j][k];
}
}
}
}
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Java Main Class to Run the AHP Tool
1 public class MainClass {
2
3 /**
4
* AHP Step 1: Create and Initialize Hierarchy
5
*/
6 private int numOfAlternatives = 7;
7 private int numOfCriteria = 3;
8 private int[] numOfSubCriteria = new int[]{
9
7, 4, 3
10 };
11 private final double[][] measuresArray = new double[][]{
12
{
13
6.798309352, 6.85455513, 5.746259492, 9, 8.719698985, 5.638189001, 1
14
},
15
{
16
8.955703524, 8.969387467, 8.953079593, 9, 8.985187484, 8.981801766, 1
17
},
18
{
19
8.838517131, 8.846820526, 8.828284664, 9, 8.992032095, 8.826131932, 1
20
}
21 };
22 private String[] criteria;
23 private String[] criteriaNames;
24 private String[][] subCriteria;
25 private String[][] subCriteriaNames;
26 private String[][][] alternatives;
27 private String[] alternativesNames;
28
29 public MainClass() {
30
//Initialise String Matrices
31
criteria = new String[numOfCriteria];
32
criteriaNames = new String[numOfCriteria];
33
34
subCriteria = new String[criteria.length][];
35
subCriteriaNames = new String[criteriaNames.length][];
36
for (int i = 0; i < subCriteria.length; i++) {
37
subCriteria[i] = new String[numOfSubCriteria[i]];
38
subCriteriaNames[i] = new String[numOfSubCriteria[i]];
39
}
40
alternatives = new String[criteria.length][][];
41
alternativesNames = new String[numOfAlternatives];
42
for (int i = 0; i < alternatives.length; i++) {
43
alternatives[i] = new String[subCriteria[i].length][numOfAlternatives];
44
}
45
46
//Initialize double Matrices
47
AHP ahp = new AHP(numOfCriteria, numOfSubCriteria, numOfAlternatives);
48
49
//Enter the names for all criteria and sub-criteria
50
fillNamesArrays();
51
52
53
/**
54
* AHP Step 2: Pair-Wise Comparisons
55
*/
56
//Enter the pair-wise compariosn values for the judgement-based criteria and sub-criteria
57
fillStringArrays();
58
59
//Calcualte the weights for the measurement-based sub-criteria
60
for (int i = 0; i < measuresArray.length; i++) {
61
weightsCalculator(ahp.alternativesMatrix[alternatives.length - 1][i], i);
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62
}
63
64
/**
65
* AHP Step 3: Eigen Vector
66
*/
67
//Square all the matrices
68
ahp.squareMatrices();
69
//Normalize all the matrices
70
ahp.normalizeMatrices();
71
//calculate the eigen vector for each matrix
72
ahp.calculateEigenVectors();
73
// calculate the wighted sums
74
ahp.calculateWeightedSums();
75
76
/**
77
* AHP Step 4: Consistency Ratio
78
*/
79
ahp.calculateConsistencyRatios();
80
81
/**
82
* AHP Step 5: Ratings
83
*/
84
ahp.calculateGlobalWeight();
85
ahp.calculateScores();
86
ahp.calculateResultsVector();
87
88
//Display All the Matrices
89
/*Code to display all the matrices and calculations*/
90 }
91
92 private void weightsCalculator(double[][] doubleArray, int index) {
93
for (int i = 0; i < doubleArray.length; i++) {
94
for (int j = 0; j < doubleArray[i].length; j++) {
95
doubleArray[i][j] = measuresArray[index][i] / measuresArray[index][j];
96
}
97
}
98 }
99
100 private void fillStringArrays() {
101
/**Code to enter the pair-wise comparisons*/
102 }
103
104 private void fillNamesArrays() {
105
/**Code to enter names for the criteria and sub-criteria*/
106 }
107
108 public static void main(String[] args) {
109
// TODO code application logic here
110
MainClass m = new MainClass();
111 }
112 }
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Appendix D
An Example of a Stego Key
Sequence

Binary

Oct

Dec

Hex

isbn-author-name-pages-publisherisbn-author-name-publisher-pages-

000 0000
010 0000

0
40

0
32

0
20

NO EMBEDDING
Space

isbn-author-pages-name-publisher-

010 0001

41

33

21

!

isbn-author-pages-publisher-name-

010 0010

42

34

22

isbn-author-publisher-name-pages-

010 0011

43

35

23

#

isbn-author-publisher-pages-name-

010 0100

44

36

24

$

isbn-name-author-pages-publisher-

010 0101

45

37

25

%

isbn-name-author-publisher-pages-

010 0110

46

38

26

&

isbn-name-pages-author-publisher-

010 0111

47

39

27

'

isbn-name-pages-publisher-author-

010 1000

50

40

28

(

isbn-name-publisher-author-pages-

010 1001

51

41

29

)

isbn-name-publisher-pages-author-

010 1010

52

42

2A

*

isbn-pages-author-name-publisher-

010 1011

53

43

2B

+

isbn-pages-author-publisher-name-

010 1100

54

44

2C

,

isbn-pages-name-author-publisher-

010 1101

55

45

2D

-

isbn-pages-name-publisher-author-

010 1110

56

46

2E

.

isbn-pages-publisher-author-name-

010 1111

57

47

2F

/

isbn-pages-publisher-name-author-

011 0000

60

48

30

0

isbn-publisher-author-name-pages-

011 0001

61

49

31

1

isbn-publisher-author-pages-name-

011 0010

62

50

32

2

isbn-publisher-name-author-pages-

011 0011

63

51

33

3

isbn-publisher-name-pages-author-

011 0100

64

52

34

4

isbn-publisher-pages-author-name-

011 0101

65

53

35

5

isbn-publisher-pages-name-author-

011 0110

66

54

36

6

author-isbn-name-pages-publisher-

011 0111

67

55

37

7

author-isbn-name-publisher-pages-

011 1000

70

56

38

8

author-isbn-pages-name-publisher-

011 1001

71

57

39

9

author-isbn-pages-publisher-name-

011 1010

72

58

3A

:

author-isbn-publisher-name-pages-

011 1011

73

59

3B

;

author-isbn-publisher-pages-name-

011 1100

74

60

3C

<

author-name-isbn-pages-publisher-

011 1101

75

61

3D

=

author-name-isbn-publisher-pages-

011 1110

76

62

3E

>

author-name-pages-isbn-publisher-

011 1111

77

63

3F

?

author-name-pages-publisher-isbn-

100 0000

100

64

40

Glyph

@
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author-name-publisher-isbn-pages-

100 0001

101

65

41

A

author-name-publisher-pages-isbn-

100 0010

102

66

42

B

author-pages-isbn-name-publisher-

100 0011

103

67

43

C

author-pages-isbn-publisher-name-

100 0100

104

68

44

D

author-pages-name-isbn-publisher-

100 0101

105

69

45

E

author-pages-name-publisher-isbn-

100 0110

106

70

46

F

author-pages-publisher-isbn-name-

100 0111

107

71

47

G

author-pages-publisher-name-isbn-

100 1000

110

72

48

H

author-publisher-isbn-name-pages-

100 1001

111

73

49

I

author-publisher-isbn-pages-name-

100 1010

112

74

4A

J

author-publisher-name-isbn-pages-

100 1011

113

75

4B

K

author-publisher-name-pages-isbn-

100 1100

114

76

4C

L

author-publisher-pages-isbn-name-

100 1101

115

77

4D

M

author-publisher-pages-name-isbn-

100 1110

116

78

4E

N

name-isbn-author-pages-publisher-

100 1111

117

79

4F

O

name-isbn-author-publisher-pages-

101 0000

120

80

50

P

name-isbn-pages-author-publisher-

101 0001

121

81

51

Q

name-isbn-pages-publisher-author-

101 0010

122

82

52

R

name-isbn-publisher-author-pages-

101 0011

123

83

53

S

name-isbn-publisher-pages-author-

101 0100

124

84

54

T

name-author-isbn-pages-publisher-

101 0101

125

85

55

U

name-author-isbn-publisher-pages-

101 0110

126

86

56

V

name-author-pages-isbn-publisher-

101 0111

127

87

57

W

name-author-pages-publisher-isbn-

101 1000

130

88

58

X

name-author-publisher-isbn-pages-

101 1001

131

89

59

Y

name-author-publisher-pages-isbn-

101 1010

132

90

5A

Z

name-pages-isbn-author-publisher-

101 1011

133

91

5B

[

name-pages-isbn-publisher-author-

101 1100

134

92

5C

\

name-pages-author-isbn-publisher-

101 1101

135

93

5D

]

name-pages-author-publisher-isbn-

101 1110

136

94

5E

^

name-pages-publisher-isbn-author-

101 1111

137

95

5F

_

name-pages-publisher-author-isbn-

110 0000

140

96

60

`

name-publisher-isbn-author-pages-

110 0001

141

97

61

a

name-publisher-isbn-pages-author-

110 0010

142

98

62

b

name-publisher-author-isbn-pages-

110 0011

143

99

63

c

name-publisher-author-pages-isbn-

110 0100

144

100

64

d

name-publisher-pages-isbn-author-

110 0101

145

101

65

e

name-publisher-pages-author-isbn-

110 0110

146

102

66

f

pages-isbn-author-name-publisher-

110 0111

147

103

67

g

pages-isbn-author-publisher-name-

110 1000

150

104

68

h
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pages-isbn-name-author-publisher-

110 1001

151

105

69

i

pages-isbn-name-publisher-author-

110 1010

152

106

6A

j

pages-isbn-publisher-author-name-

110 1011

153

107

6B

k

pages-isbn-publisher-name-author-

110 1100

154

108

6C

l

pages-author-isbn-name-publisher-

110 1101

155

109

6D

m

pages-author-isbn-publisher-name-

110 1110

156

110

6E

n

pages-author-name-isbn-publisher-

110 1111

157

111

6F

o

pages-author-name-publisher-isbn-

111 0000

160

112

70

p

pages-author-publisher-isbn-name-

111 0001

161

113

71

q

pages-author-publisher-name-isbn-

111 0010

162

114

72

r

pages-name-isbn-author-publisher-

111 0011

163

115

73

s

pages-name-isbn-publisher-author-

111 0100

164

116

74

t

pages-name-author-isbn-publisher-

111 0101

165

117

75

u

pages-name-author-publisher-isbn-

111 0110

166

118

76

v

pages-name-publisher-isbn-author-

111 0111

167

119

77

w

pages-name-publisher-author-isbn-

111 1000

170

120

78

x

pages-publisher-isbn-author-name-

111 1001

171

121

79

y

pages-publisher-isbn-name-author-

111 1010

172

122

7A

z

pages-publisher-author-isbn-name-

111 1011

173

123

7B

{

pages-publisher-author-name-isbn-

111 1100

174

124

7C

|

pages-publisher-name-isbn-author-

111 1101

175

125

7D

}

pages-publisher-name-author-isbn-

111 1110

176

126

7E

~

publisher-isbn-author-name-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 1: To Continue

publisher-isbn-author-pages-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 2

publisher-isbn-name-author-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 3

publisher-isbn-name-pages-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 4

publisher-isbn-pages-author-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 5

publisher-isbn-pages-name-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 6

publisher-author-isbn-name-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 7

publisher-author-isbn-pages-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 8

publisher-author-name-isbn-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 9

publisher-author-name-pages-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 10

publisher-author-pages-isbn-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 11

publisher-author-pages-name-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 12

publisher-name-isbn-author-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 13

publisher-name-isbn-pages-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 14

publisher-name-author-isbn-pages-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 15

publisher-name-author-pages-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 16

publisher-name-pages-isbn-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 17

publisher-name-pages-author-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 18

XXX

Appendix D

publisher-pages-isbn-author-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 19

publisher-pages-isbn-name-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 20

publisher-pages-author-isbn-name-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 21

publisher-pages-author-name-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 22

publisher-pages-name-isbn-author-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 23

publisher-pages-name-author-isbn-

N/A

N/A

N/A

N/A

Control 24: End of Message
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